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Abstract
A considerable number of welfare programs and social policies are adopted by authoritarian
regimes, but we know relatively little about what shapes the pattern of redistribution in the absence
of electoral competition. This dissertation demonstrates that in authoritarian regimes like China,
selective welfare provision is used to preempt disruptions to social order when the regime can ob-
tain information about the private preferences of individuals. For China’s Minimum Livelihood
Guarantee (Dibao) program, threats of collective action cause governments to be more responsive
to applicants for Dibao, individuals who have greater potential to disrupt social order are more
likely to be recipients of benefits, and benefits are distributed before time periods when disruptions
are expected to occur and in localities where the threat of disruptions is a greater concern. Contrary
to previous understandings, information enables welfare benefits to be targeted at specific individ-
uals, and provision is shaped by a fear of social disorder, even when disorder does not pose a direct
threat to the survival of the regime.
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Chapter 1
Preempting Social Disorder
In Qingdao, a city along China’s eastern seaboard, the Wang family lives in the neighborhood of
Golden Beach Road.1 Mrs. Wang and her husband are street vendors, selling mops, wash basins,
and a random assortment of cooking utensils not far from their home. Mr. Wang was recently
injured, and as her nine year old son heads back to school in the fall, Mrs. Wang fears that she
will not be able to make ends meet. She approaches her residents’ committee (E‘⇢), a group
of administrators who facilitate government programs for the neighborhood, to apply for China’s
Minimum Livelihood Guarantee ( N ;›ú), a welfare program commonly referred to as
Dibao (N›) that provides cash transfers to provide a basic standard of living for impoverished
households. After of hearing her situation, the residents’ committee deemed her ineligible, telling
Mrs. Wang that she need not apply because she can obtain additional income by finding another
job or asking extended family members for help. According to the Golden Beach Road residents’
committee, Dibao recipients in the neighborhood are elderly and severely disabled, people who
have no ability to engage in labor, no extended family who can help, and no access to any outside
1All names and some personal details have been altered to protect individual privacy. Neighborhood, sometimes
translated as community, refers to>:, the urban equivalent of rural villages.
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sources of income.
A ten minute walk away, in the neighborhood of Lagoon Garden, Mr. Li recently qualified for
Dibao, and finds his monthly cash transfer of several hundred yuan very helpful in making ends
meet for his wife and teenage son. Mr. Li is in his 40s, he is in good health, and he is not working.
According to the Lagoon Garden residents’ committee, the residents’ committee proactively helped
Mr. Li obtain Dibao, and although Dibao recipients in the neighborhood include the elderly and
infirm, they also include laid-o↵ and unemployed workers in good health.
The Wang family and the Li family both face severe financial di culties, so why was one
proactively given Dibao while the other was told not to apply? More broadly, why is it only the
old and infirm receive welfare in Golden Beach Road, while those who are able-bodied can receive
welfare in Lagoon Garden?
Economic or demographic di↵erences are obvious explanations for this di↵erence, but both
neighborhoods are old communities in Qingdao with similar types of residents and similar dis-
tributions of income. The poorest households in the two neighborhoods are similar financially
and demographically, and even if they were not, the Dibao policy delineates an absolute level of
income below which households are eligible such that all households below the income threshold
(the Dibao line) should, in theory, be eligible for the program. Another potential explanation relates
to the financial capacity of these two neighborhoods; however, the finances of the residents’ com-
mittee does not a↵ect Dibao provision because funding for the program comes from upper levels
of government. A final explanation of this variation is malfeasance, that one of the neighborhoods
is distributing welfare as a favor to certain households. This interpretation is also unlikely because
households receiving Dibao in both neighborhoods seem to be facing real financial di culties and
because there have been intensive e↵orts to crack down on corruption within the Dibao program in
recent years. Residents’ committees have become exceptionally cautious in distributing benefits,
2
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so it is perhaps not surprising that Dibao recipients in Golden Beach Road are those in extreme
poverty, with no means of subsistence without state assistance. Then what makes Lagoon Garden
di↵erent?
The explanation for this di↵erence lies in the recognition that in certain neighborhoods like
Lagoon Garden, welfare is selectively targeted to residents not only for their dire economic cir-
cumstances but for the threat they pose to social order, that welfare provision is a means of incen-
tivizing inaction or buying inertia to preempt disruption. However, this selective welfare provision
does not occur in all neighborhoods, but in the subset of neighborhoods where the regime can
obtain private information about the preferences and inclinations of residents.
In the case of the Li family, Mr. Li was recently released from prison, and threatened to
petition and protest in front of government o ces for an injury obtained during his incarceration.
The Lagoon Garden residents’ committee heard about his threats from their network of informants
known as block captains (Ë|), neighborhood residents comprised mostly of older women, who
gather information about their neighbors: which household has an unplanned pregnancy, which
household is su↵ering from illness, which household is unhappy, and report this information to
the residents’ committee on a regular basis. After learning of Mr. Li’s threats, the residents’
committee director and an o cer from the local public security o ce visited his home repeatedly
to understand his grievances. The residents’ committee immediately helped Mr. Li obtain Dibao to
“stabilize his mental state” (©÷Ñ Û≈Í3ö↵e) so that Mr. Li would not protest, petition,
or engage in other actions deemed to be disruptive.
In contrast, while block captains also exist in Golden Beach Road, these block captains are
generally unfamiliar with the circumstances of their neighbors and meet very infrequently with
the residents’ committee. Without information on who might threaten social order, Golden Beach
Road cannot target welfare benefits to preempt disruption, and instead distribute benefits to the
3
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most needy households in the neighborhood to minimize contention over the fairness of distribu-
tion.
This dissertation demonstrates how a regime’s access to information allows it to engage in
selective welfare provision in order to preempt disruptions to social order, such as protest and col-
lective action. Specifically, county governments are 30% more responsive to Dibao applicants who
threaten to engage in collective action than those who simply describe their economic hardship;
neighborhoods with the capacity to extract private information are three times more likely to give
Dibao to residents who have the potential to disrupt social order than neighborhoods without this
information extraction capacity. Benefits on top of monthly cash transfers are distributed before
time periods when disruptions are believed to be more likely and in localities where the threat of
disruptions is a perceived to be greater. Together these findings reveal how information and welfare
allow the regime to buy inertia among its subjects.
This dissertation alters previous understandings of the motivation behind redistribution under
authoritarianism as well as our understandings of the pattern of redistribution. Prior scholarship
assumes that redistribution under authoritarian regimes is directly motivated by threats of regime
survival, but this dissertation shows that redistribution is also motivated by fear of small-scale
social disruptions, which are not intended to challenge the rule of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and which are extremely unlikely to directly threaten the durability of the regime. In pre-
vious descriptions of the pattern of redistribution in authoritarian regimes, redistribution is often
described as a response to protest and one that can be broadly targeted at regions, such as cities,
more prone to protest. This dissertation shows that redistribution can also be an e↵ort to preempt
protest, and that it can be very precisely targeted when the regime has access to individual-level
information. Only by altering our assumptions about the motivation for redistribution and examin-
ing information capabilities can we explain why the characteristics of Dibao recipients in nearby
4
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neighborhoods like Golden Beach Road and Lagoon Garden are so di↵erent.
1.1 Studying Welfare
Welfare provision is of particular interest to social scientists because it is composed of visible
programs that reveal political choices. Social policies are by design visible and public, but their
designs and outcomes emerge from political calculation and competition. By studying welfare pro-
vision, social scientists have learned a great deal about the e↵ects of electoral institutions (Cutright
1965; Flora and Alber 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Myles 1989), of class coalitions (Cook and
Orenstein 1999; Esping-Andersen 1985; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kamerman and Kahn 1978;
Korpi 1978, 1980, 1983, 2003; van Kersbergen and Manow 2008; Rueschemeyer and Wolchik
1999; Ruggie 1984; Stephens 1979), of globalization (Garrett and Lange 1991; Wilensky 2002),
and of economic development trajectories (Cameron 1978; Garrett 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001;
Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1999; Stephens 1979) in shaping political outcomes. However, the vast
majority of welfare research has been focused on consolidated democracies with high levels of
economic development.
Practically speaking, welfare programs and social policies have tangible implications for how
individuals live and for the structure of social life. Di↵erences in welfare provision between coun-
tries and even between subnational units engender di↵erences in income inequality, levels of unem-
ployment, the labor force participation of women and children, and these structural characteristics
can have downstream e↵ects on educational attainment, patterns of criminal behavior, and even
mortality.
These practical implications are especially salient in China, where several decades of eco-
nomic opening and reform have generated vast economic inequalities (Gustafsson, Shi and Sicular
2008; Khan and Riskin 2001; Li et al. 2007; Shue and Wong 2007; Sicular et al. 2010). With
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decollectivization and reform of state-owned enterprises starting in the 1980s, programs for social
assistance disappeared as collectives and work units no longer existed to pool, manage, and dis-
tribute funds (Frazier 2004, 2010; Hurst 2009; Hurst and O’Brien 2002). For example, rural health
insurance, which at its peak reached 85% of the rural population, only survived in 5% of brigades
by 1985, transforming China’s health care system from one that was wholly state-controlled one
of the most market-oriented health systems in the world (Shao 1988; Wagsta↵ et al. 2009; Wang
2004). By the mid 1990s, increasingly large gaps emerged between coastal and inland areas, be-
tween urban centers and rural areas; even in urban China, poverty was on the upswing (Shue and
Wong 2007; Wong 1998). In 1996, the UN estimated that 65 million people were living below
the poverty line (530 RMB per year in 1996 prices), and the State Council Development Research
Center, using a more stringent definition of absolute poverty, estimated that over 30 million people
were living below the poverty line (World Bank 1996; Zhang 1997).
In response to growing inequality, a plethora of new social policies began appearing in the
late 1990s and early 2000s, making China an ideal setting for examining the politics of welfare
provision, and for contributing to our understanding of social policies under authoritarian regimes
(Leung 2006; Li 2014; Lin, Liu and Chen 2009; Liu 2009). This dissertation focuses on China’s
Minimum Livelihood Guarantee program or Dibao, a means-tested, non-conditional cash transfer
program targeted at households, which is China’s largest social assistance program.
1.2 Selective Welfare Provision
Selective welfare provision refers to the selective distribution of benefits under the aegis of a social
policy scheme in order to preempt social disruption. Selective welfare provision cannot be divorced
from this goal of preempting social disorder, of preventing individuals from taking actions that
6
Chapter 1. Preempting Social Disorder
disrupt social order.2 Provision is selective in two ways. First, it is selective because only specific
types of individuals are targeted. At the time when benefits are to be distributed (t0), there are
three potential groups of individuals who have di↵erent attitudes and behaviors toward the power
holder—the person or group in power.3 The first group are “well-behaved” individuals, who are
supportive or indi↵erent to the power holder, who have not taken any actions that the power holder
deems undesirable in the previous time period (t 1) and who do not plan to take any actions that the
power holder deems undesirable in the next time periods (t1).4 The second group are “ill-behaved”
individuals who have engaged in actions that the power holder deems undesirable in the period
prior to benefit distribution (t 1). The third group are “potential disrupters,” who may engage in
actions that the power holder deems undesirable in the next period (t1). Since selective welfare
provision is aimed at preempting social disruption, it occurs when benefits are distributed to this
third group of individuals who may engage in disruptive actions in the future. It is important to
note that potential disrupters are those who may engage in disruption in the period immediately
following benefit distribution, and the ill-behaved are those who engaged in disruption in the period
immediately prior to benefit distribution. Provision is also selective in terms of the timing of
benefits. If disruption may occur in t1, benefits are distributed in t0 before disruptions are expected
to take place, not t2 after disruptions have already occurred.
Another feature of selective welfare provision is that redistribution occurs within a public social
policy scheme. This form of redistribution is distinct from ad hoc, informal, or extralegal disburse-
ment of material benefits, and with it comes limitations on the boundaries of provision. Some social
2In this dissertation, the terms social disorder and social disruption are used interchangeably. Social order denotes
the absence of disorder and disruption, and social order is used interchangeably with social stability, a term often used
by the CCP to denote the absence of various forms of disorder and disruption (for additional discussion of the meaning
of stability see Chapter 2).
3In an authoritarian regime, the power holder could be a dictator, a monarch, or a ruling party. In a democratic
regime, the power holder is the party currently in power.
4Note that the well-behaved could include those who are supportive of the regime as well as those who are disen-
gaged from social and political actions.
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programs have precisely operationalized rules for eligibility that leave little room for discretion.
Many programs, however, have complicated tests of deservedness that have to be applied to each
applicant, leaving room for discretion (Kitschelt 2011; Mkandawire and for Social Development
2005; Sen 1992; Titmuss 2000; Van de Walle and Nead 1995). Illustrated by examples such as
Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados, Mexico’s Program for Rural Development
Investments, Peru’s FONCODES, discretion creates opportunities for administrators to engage in
personalistic clientelism and corruption, as well as opportunities for politicians and political par-
ties to engage in more impersonal forms of clientelism, like vote buying or turnout buying (Fox
1994; Galasso and Ravallion 2004; Schady 2000). This discretion also facilitates selective welfare
provision, which as discussed in Section 1.3.3, bears many similarities to the machine politics of
buying voters but di↵ers because incentives are distributed to promote inaction and because the
exchange is more e↵ective when it is inconspicuous. As a result, blatant violations of the rules of
social program are less likely with selective welfare provision. Let us say that there is a national
means-tested program to provide social assistance for low income families, and selective provision
occurs as part of this program. If an extremely wealthy family threatens social order, it is extremely
unlikely that benefits from this program would be targeted at them. Benefits are more likely to be
selectively targeted at households with low income, which pose a threat to social order.
Targeting benefits to potential disrupters before they can engage in undesirable activities is not
possible without information about private preferences and inclinations. It is easy to identify the ill-
behaved because they have already taken action. It is very di cult to identify potential disrupters
because they have yet to act. Throughout history and across regime types, states have invested
in information extraction and surveillance capabilities in part to identify potential threats and dis-
ruptions originating from their subjects. Large scale surveillance conducted by the U.S. National
Security Agency shows that democracies also engage in the collection of private, individual-level
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information, but authoritarian regimes face a particular imperative to gather private information
because the private preferences and publicly expressed preferences of its subjects often di↵er (Ku-
ran 1991). In other words, authoritarian regimes face a problem of insincerity, in particular, of
insincere supporters, that is compounded by regimes’ use of repression and information control.
Unlike democracies where individuals critical of the regime do, for the most part, freely express
their views, individuals fearful of repression and punishment in authoritarian regimes hide their
true preferences. Whether it is the KGB in the Soviet Union (Dimitrov 2014a), the Stasi in East
Germany, or the Information-Sociological Center in Communist Bulgaria (Dimitrov 2014b), au-
thoritarian regimes have a long history of investing tremendous resources into order to gather
information about the true preferences of citizens, and in particular to root out insincere supporters
of the regime.
When selective welfare provision is easily observable, it can create incentives for more people
to threaten disruption. Unlike distributing rewards so that individuals will take an action that is
desirable, like voting or turning out at a rally, where the visibility of the exchange can increase
the number of people taking the action that is being encouraged, visibility is problematic when
rewards are given so that individuals do not take an action that is undesirable, like protesting. If
this exchange is visible, others may threaten to engage in these undesirable actions in order to
obtain benefits. Thus, selective welfare provision is more likely to achieve the goal of preemptive
social disorder when it is concealed.
Several characteristics of selective welfare provision help to obscure the instrumental exchange
of material benefits for inaction. First, the distinction between the ill-behaved (who behaved badly
in the period immediately prior to benefit distribution) and potential disrupters (who may behave
badly sometime in the next period) plays a role. If benefits are distributed to those who just engaged
in disruption, it is very easy to observe that rewards are a means of pacifying bad behavior. When
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benefits are distributed to those who may engage in disruption in the future, it is more di cult to
observe the exchange of reward for compliance. Second, information plays a role in obscuring
the instrumental function of selective welfare provision when the power holder can extract detailed
information about individuals that is not common knowledge so that recipients and observers of the
exchange are at an information disadvantage. If the precise economic circumstances of individuals
were known to all, it would be easier to compare the situations of individuals who do and do not
receive benefits. Finally, the form of selective welfare provision—redistribution occurring within
a public social policy scheme—helps hide the strategic intent of benefits because social programs
with complex rules for eligibility make provision decisions di cult to parse out. If the rules
of eligibility for a social policy were known to all, it would be much easier to determine when
rules were being violated, including violations where de jure rules of the program were selectively
applied.
To illustrate these factors, suppose there is a community of 100 households and a means tested
social policy scheme. In this community, 40 households are impoverished and eligible for the pol-
icy, and among these 40 poor households, five households are extremely impoverished (e.g., the
elderly and infirm who have no possible sources of income), and among the remaining 35 house-
holds that are poor but not absolutely destitute, four households have recently engaged in disruption
and six households may protest in the near future. Assuming that economic circumstances of every
household were known to all, and the eligibility rules of the social policy were understood by all,
if benefits were only given to the five extremely impoverished households, there would likely be
minimal contention. This is the situation described in the Golden Beach Road neighborhood. With
the same assumptions, if benefits were given to the five extremely impoverished households and
the six potentially disruptive households, it would be possible to see that certain households are
receiving benefits because they threaten social order. It would then be di cult to persuade other
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households that selective welfare provision is not taking place, resulting in the perverse incentive
that previously well-behaved households could threaten social disruption in order to obtain ben-
efits. When economic circumstances and eligibility rules are known to the power holder but not
to households, households are at an information disadvantage and are more easily persuaded that
selective welfare provision is not taking place.5 This is the situation described in Lagoon Garden.
However, even if households were at an information disadvantage, if benefits were given to the five
extremely impoverished households and to the four households after they had recently engaged in
disruption, it would still be di cult to persuade observers that benefits are not being used as a
reward for disruptive behavior, generating incentives not just to threaten disruption but to engage
in disruption in order to obtain benefits.
To sum up, this dissertation identifies the empirical phenomenon of selective welfare provision—
the selective distribution of benefits within a public social policy scheme to individuals who have
the potential to disrupt social order in an attempt to preempt disruption. Access to information
and complex rules of eligibility help the power holder to identify and target benefits to potential
disrupters while improving the likelihood of persuading observers of this exchange that the trade is
not a reward for threatening social disorder; in other words, of improving the likelihood of conceal-
ing the instrumental function of selective welfare provision. However, this deception is unlikely
to be foolproof. Even with access to information and a complex social program, the action of
distributing benefits and assigning eligibility is publicly observable, and could reveal information
to observers.
5This dynamic is similar to game theory models of cheap-talk persuasion (Crawford and Sobel 1982), where if the
receiver (subject) has an information disadvantage, the sender (power holder) can always to a some extent engaged
in e↵ective persuasion. In an extreme case when the receiver knows all of the information, deception can never be
e↵ective.
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1.3 Welfare and Authoritarian Politics
Esping-Andersen (1990) noted that the first major welfare state initiatives—in Bismarck Ger-
many, von Ta↵e’s Austria, and in France under Napoleon III—occurred prior to democracy. In
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, the majority of social policies—
from old age support to unemployment assistance–were adopted under autocratic rule (Mares and
Carnes 2009). Given the prevalence of social policy development under authoritarian regimes,
what motivates these regimes to provide welfare? What are the characteristics of redistribution
under authoritarianism? How does authoritarian welfare provision compare to other types of redis-
tribution in nondemocratic and transitional systems? This section discusses how selective welfare
provision changes our previous understandings of these questions.
1.3.1 Disruption not Revolutionary Threat
Prevailing explanations firmly connect welfare provision by authoritarian regimes to their desire
to suppress or counter threats to regime survival (Haber 2007; Tullock 1987; Wintrobe 1998). Ac-
cording to this view, since threats to authoritarian survival can come from either elite coups or
revolution by the masses, redistributive e↵orts either narrowly target a small group of elites with
extremely generous benefits or provide broad and uneven benefits to di↵erent societal groups, re-
sulting in a chaotic mix of benefits. Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek is cited as an example of the
first type, where the Labor Insurance program of 1950 provided employment related benefits to
a small proportion of the population (Kwon 2003; Chang and Tsai 1985). There are numerous
examples of the second type of welfare provision including the social polices of Argentina’s mili-
tary junta in the mid 1900s (Carnes 2014), social security entitlements and pensions under Brazil’s
military regime (Haggard and Kaufman 2008), as well as the gradual but uneven expansion of
Mexico’s Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social (Haber 2007; Skidmore, Smith and Green 1992).
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What is puzzling about this characterization is the large number of social policies aimed at
individuals at the lowest echelons of society, given the rarity of revolutions. Svolik (2012) finds
that among the non-constitutional ways autocrats lost o ce between 1946 and 2008, 68% were
removed by regime insiders and only 11% by popular uprisings. What is more striking is that
when theories of authoritarian welfare provision are examined more closely, they do not predict
redistribution toward the masses at large. Broad and uneven benefits are utilized when the size of
the “launching organization” or “selectorate” that put the autocrat in power is larger in size (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2004; Haber 2007; Mares and Carnes 2009). A larger launching organization
may include individuals who have been co-opted into the regime such as party members or govern-
ment bureaucrats, but in a non-democratic context, even a large launching organization is a much
smaller subset of the population than “the masses.” Formal models predict that autocrats cannot
credibly commit to redistribution to the poor and that the masses who have the power to engage
in revolution would not use their power to obtain redistributive policies but rather to change the
political system from autocracy to democracy.
What explains this inconsistency between theories that say authoritarian regimes would not re-
distribute to the poor and empirical evidence that authoritarian regimes do redistribute to the poor?
This divergence between theory and empirical evidence can be reconciled if authoritarian redistri-
bution is not motivated solely by the threat of regime overthrow. This dissertation demonstrates
that authoritarian welfare provision is also motivated by social fear, by fear of disruption from
below that is distinct from the threat of revolutionary mobilization. Theories predict that autocrats
are unlikely to redistribute today because the threat of revolution is unlikely to exist tomorrow, but
in contrast to revolutionary threats that are rare and relatively fleeting, social disruption is constant
and continual.
Fear of disruption motivates social policies across regimes—in all systems where elites want to
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maintain their social, economic, and political advantages. For example, examining welfare in the
U.S., Piven and Cloward (1971) attribute the New Deal as well as welfare expansion of the 1960s
to fear of disruption from below. In his study of Imperial Germany, Steinmetz (1993) describes
social policies as a response from elites driven by social fear of pressure from lower classes and
finds the presence of protest to be a positive predictor of subsidized unemployment insurance
among German municipalities. O↵e (1984) describes welfare as a safety valve for guarding against
potential social problems.
The type of behavior Dibao aims to prevent includes individual protest and petitions as well as
small-scale collective action that is constrained in size and geographic scope. These forms of popu-
lar protest, or everyday protest, are recurring and regular characteristics of life in China (Lorentzen
2013; O’Brien and Li 2006; O’Brien and Stern 2007; Perry 2002, 2007, 2008, 2010; Wasserstrom
and Perry 1994). It is often cited that China experienced 180,000 “mass incidents” in 2010.6 Even
if this number is o↵ by an order of magnitude, China still experiences a consistently high level of
contention, yet the CCP remains in power. This is not to say that small-scale localized protests
cannot coalesce into a revolutionary movement; they can, and revolutions are often triggered by
minor disruptions. However, even if disruption has the potential to threaten the regime directly or
indirectly—for example through decreased legitimacy—welfare aimed at preempting disruption is
broader in purpose than ensuring regime survival.
Disruptions have immediate and tangible e↵ects on governance. Protests can disrupt economic
production and lead to capital flight. Collective action can disrupt the normal functioning of gov-
ernment, making it di cult for leaders and bureaucrats to carry out day to day tasks. Disruption
increases administrative burdens as time and resources are needed to deal with protest and collec-
tive action. All of these factors can decrease access to rents for those in power.
Outside observers of China often remark that the CCP seems particularly sensitive to collective
6See http://on.ft.com/1uDFnGX
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action. The country spends more on internal policing than on its military,7 a single incidence of
collective action can destroy the career advancement prospects of local level o cial (Edin 2003),
and tremendous e↵orts are expended to censor discussions of collective action (King, Pan and
Roberts 2013, 2014). This sensitivity to protest could be because the CCP believes popular uprising
is a greater threat than is typical of other authoritarian regimes, perhaps due to a long tradition of
rebellion and revolution (Perry 2002, 2008) or its large size. This sensitivity to protest could be
because the CCP today is relatively immune to foreign pressure, in large part due to its economic
importance (Levitsky and Way 2010; Skocpol 1979). This sensitivity could also stem from China’s
advanced capitalist economy, which relies on a stable geopolitical environment. Whether or not the
CCP is truly more sensitive to disruption, or whether it simply has the capacity to take measures
to mitigate disruption, it is unlikely that all authoritarian regimes are equally motivated by fear
of social disruption, and it is likely that fear of social disruption also motivates democratic and
transitional regimes.
Shifting from a narrow focus on threats to regime survival to a broader focus on threats to social
order allows us to make sense of redistributive e↵orts within authoritarian regimes that are aimed
at the lowest echelons of society.
1.3.2 Preemptive Targeting of Potential Disrupters
This dissertation expands our understanding of the patterns and characteristics of authoritarian
welfare in three ways. First, it shows that benefits can be aimed at preempting contention and
are not simply a reaction to protest. Second, it shows that welfare can be targeted not only at
a regional level but at an individual level. Finally, it shows that individuals targeted by welfare
provision are those who have the potential to cause social disorder, not loyal supporters of the
7See Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2012.
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regime or established opponents of the regime.
Existing explanations that tie welfare provision to protest often characterize benefits as a reac-
tion to social contention and protest (O↵e 1984; Piven and Cloward 1971; Skocpol and Amenta
1986). Studies of protest and contention in China show that cash payments from stability mainte-
nance funds are used to buy o↵ individuals who protest (Cai 2010; Lee and Zhang 2013; Lee and
Shen 2014). Distributing rewards to those who have already engaged in protest has the unfortunate
e↵ect of creating incentives to engage in protest and collective action in order to obtain material
benefits. Lee (2014) observes this result in China where “gamesmanship between o cials and
citizens determines the price tag of stability” (Lee and Shen 2014, 9). Although redistributing to
preempt contention by providing welfare to those who threaten to engaged in collective action also
runs into this danger by creating incentives to threaten disruption, contention is a public action
that is di cult to obscure, but the threat of contention may be a private action or one that can be
obscured.
Among existing scholarship that describe redistribution as a measure to prevent protest, re-
distribution is described as targeted toward urban regions where contention is more likely. Cities
are thought to pose a greater danger to authoritarian regimes (Hobsbawm 1973; Zipf 1941), and
regimes distribute to urban regions to mitigate the threat they pose (Ades and Glaeser 1994; Bates
1981; Wallace 2013, 2014). Wallace (2014) shows how redistribution in favor of cities in China has
led to increased urban concentration, which further promotes collective action. This dissertation,
focused on welfare provision within urban China, shows that benefits can be targeted at individuals
within cities when the regime has access to information about the private lives of individuals.
In terms of the type of individual targeted by provision, my work departs from previous under-
standings by identifying a new group of individuals, those who have the potential to disrupt social
order, as the recipients of selective welfare provision. The regime’s access to information about
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individual preferences and inclinations allows the regime, in the words of Timor Kuran, to identify
preference falsification, to identify individuals who may engage in behaviors undesirable to the
regime but who have yet to do so.
The targeting of potential disrupters departs from prior research where targeting is described
as aimed at supporters of the regime or at opponents who have acted in opposition to the regime.
Stroessner in Paraguay and the Somoza family in Nicaragua rewarded supporters with land, smug-
gling, and business opportunities (Geddes 2006). The PRI in Mexico buys the loyalty of supporters
(Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Este´vez 2007). Parliamentary elections in the Mubarak regime func-
tioned as a way to distribute rents to regime supporters (Blaydes 2011). Slater (2003) describes
how Malaysia under Mahathir punished regime opponents and rewarded loyalists, and suggests
that authoritarian regimes all over the world, including Cuba, Mexico, Cambodia, China, Laos,
Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe “seem
most likely to persevere when their institutions exhibit su cient infrastructural power to curtail
opposition by punishing opponents and rewarding loyalists in pinpoint fashion” (Slater 2003, 98).
Targeting benefits to known opponents requires less capacity to extract information, whereas tar-
geting benefits to potential disrupters requires the capacity to obtain private information.
1.3.3 Modern Clientelism
Selective welfare provision resembles strategic interactions with voters in machine politics (Kitschelt
2000). Like the rewards distributed by political machines, selective welfare provision is a form of
modern clientelism, which requires information to guide the distribution of particularistic bene-
fits. However, targeting benefits to prevent protest, i.e., to discourage a visible action, di↵ers from
distributing incentives to encourage a visible action like turning out to vote. With this distinction,
information not only helps identify prospective recipients but also serves to obscure the instrumen-
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tal function of redistribution.
Kitschelt (2000) di↵erentiates clientelistic linkages between rulers and citizens from program-
matic linkages by selective incentives that create asymmetric but mutually beneficial exchange.
This definition means that clientelism can be personalistic, where face-to-face relations with nor-
mative bonds of deference and loyalty exist between patron and client, but that clientelism can
also be “modern”—characterized by mutually beneficial exchange without personal bonds. Pref-
erential access to material advantage in public social policy schemes is a prime example of modern
clientelism. In social programs where administrators enjoy a great deal of discretion, “complicated
means-tested and tests of deservingness have to be applied to determine eligibility of applicants”
(Kitschelt 2011, 5), facilitating selective incentives.
As a form of modern clientelism, selective welfare provision di↵ers from most existing de-
scriptions of clientelism and cooptation in China and other communist regimes, which focus on
personalistic bonds, such as factionalism among elites related to political advancement (Nathan
1973; Rigby 1970; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012; Tarkowski 1981; Willerton 1979), entrepreneur-
patron ties of the reform period (Wank 1996), as well as co-optation of entrepreneurs into the
CCP for their skills and expertise (Dickson 2003). While selective welfare provision bears some
similarity to elite-mass linkages described by Oi (1985), where local politics are structured along
clientelist lines so that non-elites can try to a↵ect policy implementation, it di↵ers significantly
because selective provision takes place within formal channels, whereas the clientelism described
by Oi (1985) exists in lieu of weak formal channels. The method of providing selective incentives
through the Dibao program bears greater resemblance to the formal channels of benefit distribution
described by Walder (1988), but in the absence of personalistic ties.
As a form of modern clientelism that rewards individuals who fall between regime supporters
and opponents, selective welfare provision is similar to the phenomenon of rewarding “swing
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voters” in vote buying (Cox and McCubbins 2002; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Stokes 2005).
However, selective welfare provision does not su↵er the problem of monitoring vote choice among
voters with the secret ballot that is associated with vote buying (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Nichter
2008). Since rewards are given for not protesting and not engaging in collective action, violation
of this implicit agreement results in highly visible and public actions. In this sense, selective
welfare provision is more akin to turnout buying and abstention buying where rewards are given for
behavior that can be directly observed and monitored (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter 2014).
Although information plays an important role in identifying the targets of benefits for both
turnout buying and selective welfare provision, information plays an additional role of obscur-
ing the instrumental function of redistribution when rewards are used to prevent individuals from
taking action. If a political ruler wants subjects to take an action—e.g., turnout, vote in his/her
favor—the instrumental exchange between leader and subject can be visible because the more sub-
jects that take this action, the better it is for the ruler. However, if a political ruler wants subjects to
avoid an action—e.g., not protest—it is problematic if the instrumental exchange between leader
and subject is visible, because the more subjects that take the action, the worse it is for the ruler.
In other words, the PRI may want more individuals to turn out, but the CCP does not want more
individuals to threaten collective action.
1.4 Overview of Chapters
The dissertation begins in Chapter 2 by describing the relationship between welfare and social
order in China, as well as the key features of the Dibao program and how Dibao fits into the
context of a broader complex of policies—redistributing in response to protest, repression—that
the CCP utilizes in its rule. Chapters 3 to 5 form the core of the dissertation, demonstrating how
China’s Dibao program is aimed at preempting threats to social order, and the role of information
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in enabling selective welfare provision.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that ad hoc benefits distributed to Dibao recipients are intended to
decrease incentives to engage in protest and disruption. Distributing benefits prior to periods of
time when local governments believe protest is likely to occur and distributing benefits in local-
ities where local governments believe contention is more likely to occur reveals that benefits are
directed to potential disrupters, not to the ill-behaved or well-behaved. In order to implement these
preemptive strategies, o cials must have information on when contention is likely to occur, and
in the absence of specific information on planned protests, o cials rely on heuristics to gauge
when and where contentious action is more likely. Through interviews with government o cials
and analysis of internal government documents, key political meetings are identified as “sensitive
periods” when o cials believe protest is more likely to occur. A new dataset of ad hoc benefits
distributed to Dibao households shows that Dibao benefits are promulgated prior to these “sensi-
tive periods,” not after these periods, and ad hoc benefits are more frequently distributed in cities
where contention is perceived to be a greater concern because of the presence of ethnic minorities
even when actual levels of protest are relatively low.
Chapter 4 shows that threats of collective action communicated through government websites
lead to increases in government responsiveness to Dibao applicants. An authoritarian regime’s
ability to preempt collective action depends on whether the regime can identify potential oppo-
nents. One way of identifying these individuals is to capture the complaints of individuals who
threaten to engage in disruptive behavior. Based on an online field experiment, localities react with
greater responsiveness to individuals who threaten to engage in collective action if their demands
for Dibao are not met. Specifically, threats of collective action cause governments to be 30 percent
more likely to respond, to be 50 percent more likely to respond publicly, and to be approximately
50 percent more likely to provide the most detailed responses to demands for Dibao.
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Chapter 5 shifts from Dibao applicants to Dibao recipients, and from gathering information that
is volunteered to information that is extracted. This chapter demonstrates how Dibao is targeted at
individuals who are more likely to be disruptive when the regime can extract detailed information
about citizens. When information about who is likely to engage in collective action is not volun-
teered, selective welfare provision depends on the ability to extract information about the private
lives of individuals. Here, using a novel measure of the regime’s ability to obtain information at
the individual level—the penetration of block captains in neighborhoods—data shows that selec-
tive welfare provision goes hand in hand with grassroots information gathering capabilities. Using
an original survey of 100 neighborhoods across four cities in China, when neighborhoods have
strong information extraction capabilities, Dibao recipients are more likely to be former prisoners
and less likely to be the disabled.
Chapter 6 turns to the implications of selective welfare provision. While the goal of maintain-
ing social order has always been a feature of the Dibao program, using benefits to achieve this
strategic goal has the potential to increase contention and protest. Based on data from the neigh-
borhood survey, this chapter shows that selective welfare provision generates contention over who
should receive Dibao and the deservingness of recipients. For now, discontent over selective wel-
fare provision is funneled through residents’ committees, and residents’ committees are generally
able to pacify unhappy residents. However, extensive resources are required to manage discon-
tent, raising questions over the viability of selective welfare provision as a long term strategy for
managing social order.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by examining the applicability of selective welfare pro-
vision to other systems, both authoritarian and democratic, and discussing the conditions under
which selective welfare provision is more likely to take place. Finally, the dissertation closes by
considering the future of selective welfare provision in a context of technology change and increas-
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ing information access.
Replication Data: In addition to interviews and qualitative data, three original, quantitative
datasets are used to generate these results: a dataset of ad hoc Dibao benefits for 36 cities from 2008
to 2013 generated from news sources, a dataset based on an online field experiment of responsive-
ness to Dibao applicants among all Chinese counties and districts, and a dataset of the Dibao pro-
gram in 100 neighborhoods across four Chinese cities. These data and the code required to replicate
all tables, figures, and empirical results presented can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29438
(Pan 2015).
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Welfare and Social Order in China
“To China’s problems, the overwhelming priority is stability. Without a stable environment, noth-
ing can be achieved, and what has been achieved will be lost.”1 These are Deng Xiaoping’s words
spoken in a meeting to George H. W. Bush on February 26, 1989. These words, and in particular
the concept that stability trumps all, have been repeated countless times in CCP documents and the
speeches of China’s top leaders.
This chapter connects redistribution in China to a desire for social stability, which entails po-
litical survival but also the more expansive goal of social order. The evolution of Dibao, as well
as key features of the program, are described. The chapter concludes by putting Dibao into the
context of a broader set of redistributive and repressive e↵orts to maintain stability.
Stability motivates China’s redistributive e↵orts. Without concern for stability, the Dibao pro-
gram is unlikely to have come into existence. But what does stability entail? At the most fun-
damental level, stability refers to political stability or the continuation of CCP rule. However,
stability is more than regime survival, more than the absence of coups or revolutions. Stability also
refers to social order, or what the CCP calls social stability.
1-˝ÑÓò,ã✓ ⌥Ñ/ Å3ö.° 3öÑØÉ,¿H˝  ⇣,Úœ÷óÑ⇣ú_⇢1â.
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This concept of stability refers to a society free of protest, collective action, other forms of
contention, as well as general lawlessness. This concept of stability is often described as a pre-
condition for economic development. In a speech given in March of 1987, Deng said stability is
the first condition for the “three steps” economic development strategy of doubling gross national
product (GNP) from 1981 to 1990, of quadrupling the 1980 GNP by the end of the 20th century,
and of increasing per capita GNP to the level of medium-developed countries by 2050.2 This un-
derstanding of stability as fundamental to economic development continues to this day. In May
of 2014, at the second central working session on Xinjiang, President Xi Jinping emphasized that
economic development and stability are inexorably linked (—Uå3ö∆ Ô⌃).3
Redistribution and social welfare aimed at the poor are important aspects of China’s e↵ort to
maintain social stability. The poor are seen as a threat to social order because of their level of
discontent and their ability to mobilize collectively. Wang Dongjing, current Provost of the Party
School of the Central Committee of the CCP, which trains senior and middle ranking o cials of
the Party, has said:
...an excessive income gap will destabilize social order, and is something that needs
government attention...low-income groups are slow to reap the rewards of this prosper-
ity for a number of reasons. In the long term, this will trigger emotional dissatisfaction
and a↵ect social stability.
Zhou Baogang, a member of the Politics and Law Commission of the CCP in Hebei who has
worked extensively in China’s public security system, says that those who are easiest to mobilize
for collective action are low-income workers with poor quality of life (“π◆—® ¬† ¬ 
§S'ãˆÑ§S. . .6e4sN  ;(œÉÓÑÂ∫§S”) (Zhou 2008, 76).4
2Conversation with foreign dignitary on March 8, 1987. Deng said “˝Öâö‚”Ñ?ª@b... Ü¸ È
è0€L>⇢;I˙æ” is the first condition in realizing “ ep—U⇠e” see http://bit.ly/1IdV6Il (Retrieved
January 21, 2015)
3See http://bit.ly/1KwVi12 (Retrieved December 3, 2014).
4This idea that the poor are most likely to engage in collective action reflects view of formal theorists (Acemoglu
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To prevent protest and collective action among the poor, government documents highlight the
importance of social welfare provision. Zhou writes of the need to “improve social assistance...to
reduce discontent among the bottom rungs of society toward the income gap and social status gap”
(“⇢«åÑ>⇢›ú6¶...œ1>⇢ïB§S˘6eÓ› >⇢0MÓ› ·√ Ñq
Õ”) (Zhou 2008, 353). In Prevention and Management of Mass Incidents: A Reader for Party and
Government Cadres (Ñ2 ⌅n§S'ãˆZ?rË˚,), published by People’s Daily Press,
the authors write that “building a basic social safety net is of great importance in resolving societal
conflicts and preventing collective action to ensure social stability” (“ÑQ>⇢ ˙,Ñâh
Q Ÿ˘◆„>⇢€˛ 2⇤§S'ãˆÑÙ§>⇢3öw Õ'Ñ✏I”) (Yufang yu
chuzhi qunti xing shijian dangzheng ganbu duben [Prevention and Management of Mass Incidents:
A Reader for Party and Government Cadres] 2009, 147).
However, in recent years, there is a growing recognition within the CCP that redistributive ef-
forts, when given to those who protest, can have the undesirable e↵ect of increasing contention.
Lee and Shen (2014) describe how “dishing out cash payment or other material benefits in ex-
change for compliance has become a patterned and routinized response to popular unrest,” result-
ing in the persistence of instability and the commodification of state authority (Lee and Shen 2014,
9). The CCP regime seems well aware of this phenomenon and its inherent dangers (Chen 2012).
In o cial documents as well as popular discourse, there are multiple phrases and terms used to
describe the behavior of individuals who engage in protest and collective action in order to obtain
material benefits:
“Big disturbance big resolution, small disturbance small resolution, no disturbance no
resolution” ('˘'„≥ ✏˘✏„≥  ˘ „≥)
and Robinson 2006), but runs counter to survey data that suggests Chinese citizens have no problem with the increasing
income gap and that there is a myth of the social volcano (Whyte 2010). Since the Chinese government’s strategy for
managing collective action is based on its belief about the sources of protest, whether or not social disruption will
originate from the poor is moot as long as the state believes inequality to be a source of contention and protest.
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“Trouble-making citizen” ( ⌘)
“Endless trouble-making petitioning” ( ø˘ø)
“professional petitioning” (L⇢⌦ø)
There appears to be increasing emphasize on using redistributive e↵orts to prevent threats to
stability and on using repression to punish those who have engaged in disruption. The Ministry of
Civil A↵airs (MoCA) and its subordinate agencies, which manage social assistance programs, in-
creasingly emphasize that social policies should aim to prevent mass incidents and resolve societal
contradictions.5
For those who engage in protest and contentious actions, the emphasis has shifted toward pun-
ishment (repression). In late 2014, the powerful CCP Central Politics and Law Commission (-q
-.?’‘X⇢) issued policies to curtail “endless trouble-making.” 6 According to the Politics
and Law Commission, those who engage in disruption to obtain compensation must be punished.
In an example provided by the Commission to illustrate this approach, a Mr. Liu killed a man in a
hit and run car accident, and was sentenced to five years in prison and a fine of nearly half a mil-
lion Chinese yuan. After the deceased’s family received the compensation, the family repeatedly
assembled in front of Mr. Liu’s father’s place of business to demand additional compensation, and
some relatives traveled to Beijing more than 17 times to petition for added compensation. Instead
of receiving compensation, members of the deceased’s family were subject to criminal detention.
Although responding to collective action and protest with compensation is still a common practice,
the CCP is actively trying to move away from this practice.
5For examples, see Emergency Plans of Ziling Township for Managing and Resolving Mass Incidents (P≠a⌅
n§S'Å—ãˆî%ÑH), and speech by Gong Weibin, Director for the Department of Society and Culture at
the China National School of Administration (http://202.201.7.26/adksvod/vodText/56830/info.html)
6See http://bit.ly/1zVaDsw (Retrieved November 3, 2014)
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2.1 Dibao: China’s Minimum Livelihood Guarantee
Dibao is a means-tested, cash transfer program targeted at the household level that is intended as the
last line of defense for the urban poor (Solinger 2005). The program began in urban China and was
expanded to include rural areas in the mid 2000s. As of September 2014, some 19 million urban
residents and 52 million rural residents received transfers from the state as part of this program.7
Although the Dibao program is rolled out in both urban and rural China, the level of benefits is
determined by locality, and urban benefits outweigh rural. To make appropriate comparisons and
to examine within city variation in Dibao provision, this dissertation focuses exclusively on urban
Dibao.
Like redistribution more generally, China’s Dibao program was motivated by concern over
social instability. Dibao grew out of the aftermath of mass lay o↵s and state-owned enterprise
(SOE) reform (Solinger 2005, 2008). From its inception, scholars have linked Dibao with e↵orts
to promote social stability and to minimize disruption (Solinger 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2015;
Tang 2003). Solinger (2008) describes Dibao as an e↵ort to maintain stability by keeping the poor
marginalized and politically pacified, and Solinger (2015) finds evidence that fear of protest may
be driving dibao spending and allocation. Zhu Rongji, China’s premier at the time of Dibao’s
adoption, said, “The Dibao’s support of social stability and guarantee of the reform of the state
firms has important significance; we should strengthen it, should fund it” (Tang 2003).
2.1.1 Program Design and Implementation
In 1997, the State Council promulgated the “Notice Regarding Establishing an Urban Minimum
Livelihood Guarantee Scheme” (sé(h˝˙ÀŒ⇥E⌘ N ;›ú6¶Ñ⇢Â)
requiring all county and higher levels of government to establish the Dibao program in urban
7From the Ministry of Civil A↵airs http://bit.ly/16n7Zht (Retrieved January 22, 2015).
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areas before the end of 1999.8 Starting with 2.8 million urban recipients in 1999 (Solinger 2008),
coverage peaked with 23.2 million urban beneficiaries in 2009, and has since declined to 19.4
million recipients as of September 2014.9 After adjusting for inflation, total expenditures increased
from 2.1 billion RMB at the program’s inception in 1999 to approximately 46 billion RMB in 2011,
and has stayed at that level since.10
The Ministry of Civil A↵airs and its subsidiaries at provincial, prefectural (city), and county
levels of government administer the Dibao program. Central, provincial, and prefectural levels
of government all contribute funding to the Dibao program, and all play a role in its design.11
The central level establishes general guidelines and principals. The provincial level sets targets,
establishes more precise rules based central directives, and provides supervision to lower levels of
government. City level governments determine the Dibao line, the income under which households
are eligible for the program, and can exercise discretion in refining the rules of eligibility for the
program.
Individuals can only obtain Dibao in the locality where they hold a residential permit (hukou),
even if they are living or working in a di↵erent city. For example, if a married couple holding resi-
dential permits from rural Hebei is working in Beijing and their joint income falls below Beijing’s
Dibao line, they are not eligible for Beijing’s Dibao program. If their income falls below the Dibao
line of the location of their residential permit, they can obtain the Dibao benefits of their locality.12
8For original text see http://bit.ly/1BZgFDL (Retrieved January 22, 2015).
9For data by year see Ministry of Civil A↵airs http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/zwgk/tjsj/ (Retried January 22, 2015).
10Numbers are inflation adjusted based on OECD consumer pricing data to 2014 RMB. According to data from
the Ministry of Civil A↵airs, total expenditures for urban Dibao was 42.9 billion in 2011 RMB (46.1 billion in 2014
RMB), 46.0 billion in 2012 RMB (48.3 billion in 2014 RMB), 45.6 billion in 2013 RMB (46.7 billion in 2014 RMB),
and 47.6 billion RMB in 2014.
11Various bureaucratic entities may be involved at each level. For example, when setting the Dibao line, the civil
a↵airs department, the finance department, the human resources and social security department, the reform and devel-
opment commission, and the statistics department may all be involved because of the fiscal implications of changing
the Dibao line.
12Although residential permit policies are changing and restrictions on movement are easing, it is rare for a resident
to physically relocate in order to access better benefits.
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2.1.2 Cash Transfers and Ad Hoc Benefits
The core feature of the Dibao program is the cash transfers provided to households whose incomes
fall below the Dibao line. However, these cash transfers constitute very meager subsidies to Dibao
households. The Dibao line sets the general eligibility threshold for households and represents
the maximum amount of cash transfers that any Dibao household can receive. For example, let’s
say City A has a Dibao line of 400 RMB per household per month; this means each household
in City A with income below 400 RMB per month should, in theory, receive a cash subsidy so
that the household’s monthly income reaches 400 RMB per month. In this example, a family
with a household income of 100 RMB per month would receive monthly subsidies of 300 RMB
per month; a family with a household income of 350 RMB per month would receive monthly
subsidies of 50 RMB per month.
The city government sets the Dibao line, in part because pricing, consumption, and income pat-
terns vary widely among cities, and in part because city governments often shoulder a large share
of program costs. Central guidelines ask city governments to set the Dibao line to ensure recipients
can support basic living needs in terms of clothing, food, housing, utilities, and educational costs
for children; however, large di↵erences in Dibao lines exist among cities.13
Figure 2.1 shows substantial variation in the Dibao line among 36 of China’s largest cities14.
This figure shows the Dibao line from 1997 to 2011 with and without adjusting for inflation for all
13In 2004, policy documents were issued by MoCA calling for increasing standardization of Dibao policies, but de-
tails as to how standardization should be achieved were not provided (see http://bit.ly/1LSxisX (Retrieved August 12,
2013). In 2011 MoCA in conjunction with the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance,
and the National Bureau of Statistics released detailed guidelines on how localities should calculate Dibao standards
using basic living expenditures, Engel coe cient, or consumption expenditure ratios (see http://bit.ly/1ze5iG3, re-
trieved August 12, 2013), but much is left to the discretion of local governments in determining what constitute basic
necessities and in deciding whether future Dibao standards are dependent on past policies. For example, what is in-
cluded in non-food necessities is not strictly defined, and what households constitute the “lowest income families”
can vary. Finally, the di↵erent methods of calculating Dibao standards can yield di↵erent estimates of the Dibao line,
which city governments can then choose among to obtain their preferred standard.
14These 36 cities are the unit of analysis for Chapter 3, and are described in greater detail in Section 3.3.
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Figure 2.1: Dibao line among 36 cities from 1997 to 2011 without inflation adjustment (left panel) and
adjusted to 2011 RMB (right panel)
of China’s provincial-level cities, provincial capitals, and sub-provincial level cities. Given their
political importance, these cities should be the most aligned with national policies, and hence least
likely to exhibit variation. However, this is clearly not the case. The gap between the city with the
lowest Dibao line and the highest Dibao line was approximately 200 RMB when the program first
started, and increased to 300 RMB by 2011.
Figure 2.1 also reveals that within cities, the Dibao line has not increased substantially in the
past decade after controlling for increases in the cost of living. The Dibao line exhibits this path
dependence largely because many cities peg the Dibao line to the local minimum wage and level
of unemployment insurance. Typically, the level of unemployment insurance is set below mini-
mum wage, and the Dibao line is set below unemployment insurance. Changes to these rates can
have large e↵ects on local fiscal expenditures, and thus changing the Dibao line requires extensive
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negotiation among local bureaucracies.15
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Figure 2.2: Dibao line in RMB per month (in black) and average monthly household food expenditures
(dots) for 36 cities between 1997 and 2011
Although cash transfers are the core feature of the Dibao program, they constitute extremely
modest transfers leading observers to remark that Dibao functions to keep the poor impoverished
(Solinger 2008, 2010). Although the Dibao line is supposed to be at a level that covers clothing,
15Based on interviews with civil a↵airs o cials in Beijing, Henan, and Hubei.
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food, housing, and other basic living expenses, Figure 2.2 shows that in most cities, the Dibao
line falls below the city’s average food expenditures.16 In this figure, dots represent the average
monthly household food expenditures, and the black line is the monthly Dibao line, which is the
maximum subsidy that a Dibao household can receive in a month. For all of these 36 cities, which
serve as reference points for other localities, the Dibao line (in Figure 2.2) is at or below average
household food expenditures (dots), and in many cases, the Dibao line has increased more slowly
than food expenditures over time.
Despite the meager level of cash transfers, Dibao status is often described as desirable.17 The
attractiveness of Dibao status derives in large part from the ad hoc benefits distributed to some
Dibao households. These benefits are ad hoc not because they are informal—they are recorded in
government policy documents and publicized on o cial media—but because they can be issued at
any time and represent a one time distribution of benefits. The economic value of these benefits
vary hugely—an ad hoc benefit could be access to another apartment that can be rented for thou-
sands of yuan per month, or it can be free light bulbs that are worth just a few yuan. These benefits
are distributed throughout the year, and can be issued by provincial, city, and even district levels
of government without formal budget negotiations. Few ad hoc benefits are provided to all Dibao
households, and most are limited in quantity, which generates greater variation into the actual level
of benefits received by di↵erent Dibao households.
These benefits introduce a great deal of flexibility and discretion into the Dibao program. Ad
hoc benefits mean that Dibao recipients in the same city, district, or even neighborhood may not
receive the same level of material transfers. As such, they play an important role in selective
welfare provision. These ad hoc benefits are described in depth in Chapter 3, which explains how
the timing and geographic variation of ad hoc benefits is aimed at decreasing incentives to engage
16Food expenditure data from the 2011 China City Economic Yearbook (-˝:ﬂœNﬂ°tt).
17Interviews with Dibao administrators, Dibao recipients and residents without Dibao in Qingdao, Zibo, Zhengzhou,
and Wuhan.
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in social disruption.
2.1.3 Determining Eligibility
The process of determining eligibility is another place where discretion and selectivity can be
seen. The residents’ committee at the neighborhood level, which assesses income and assembles
application materials, plays a crucial role in the application process.
For any potential applicant, the process of obtaining Dibao starts with the neighborhood res-
idents’ committee. Residents’ committees, which have on average five to twenty sta↵ members
that oversee several thousand households, are not an o cial part of the state bureaucracy. How-
ever, they are sta↵ed by individuals who act as representatives of the state, interacting most directly
and most frequently with urban residents on a wide range of issues, from family planning to pub-
lic safety to social services. Residents’ committees often overlap physically and in terms of sta↵
with a Party branch, so that even though the residents’ committee falls outside of China’s formal
administrative boundaries, the neighborhood is very much within the control of the CCP.18 Resi-
dents’ committees were used during the early communist period to reach city dwellers who had no
other connection to the regime, such as unemployed housewives (Zheng 2005). In Read’s study of
residents’ committees in Beijing, he describes how they convey information from the state to resi-
dents, and how they collect information as a crucial component of the state’s surveillance network
(Read 2012, 106-7).
In the simplest terms, the residents’ committee facilitates initial Dibao applications by collect-
ing application materials, ensuring the veracity of submitted materials, and managing subsequent
reporting. Since Dibao is a means-tested program, assessing income is a primary concern when
evaluating the veracity of materials. After the residents’ committee verifies application materials,
18If there are 50 to 100 Party members, the Party branch is called a dangzongzhi (Z;/); if there are 3 to 50 Party
members, the branch is called a dangzhibu (Z/Ë).
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it submits all relevant paperwork to the street o ce, which typically passes the application to the
district civil a↵airs department for final approval.19
Although the district provides final approval of Dibao applications, the residents’ committee
is the crucial actor in determining eligibility, going as far as turning away applicants who are un-
likely to be approved, as was the case with Mrs. Wang in Golden Beach Road.20 Read writes that
“neighborhood leaders are not at liberty to make an up or down decision about welfare benefits
on their own authority, they are preliminary fact finders, and advise higher level agencies” (Read
2012, 121-2). While this statement is factually correct, it misses the crucial point that the di -
culty of ascertaining income turns residents’ committees from fact finders into gatekeepers with a
great deal of power. In other words, because it is often very di cult to determine the income of
Dibao applicants, many of whom work informally, the residents’ committee, through its role as the
assessor of income, has control over the success or failure of Dibao applications.
This discretion of the residents’ committee can result in personalistic clientelism, for example
conferring Dibao to friends and relatives, a phenomenon called favor Dibao (∫≈N›), which
the regime has been working hard to eliminate.21 In the case of favor Dibao, residents’ commit-
tees use their discretion to confer Dibao to households that do not fulfill the eligibility criteria.
However, this discretion also allows residents’ committees to engage in selective welfare provi-
sion, where residents’ committees ensure the success of applications for a subset of households
that meet eligibility criteria but also have the potential to disrupt social order.
The residents’ committee is an important partner in successful Dibao applications because of
19In some localities, the street o ce civil a↵airs department approves applications.
20Another example of this can been seen on zhidao.baidu where, in response to a woman’s question about how
to manage someone who wants to apply for Dibao but does not fulfill the requirements, a self-identified residents’
committee employee answered that if the potential applicant does not fulfill the criteria, then you cannot submit the
materials upward, and goes on to provide guidance on how to dissuade the potential applicant (˘é & N›aˆ
Ñ3˜∫,`/ ˝⌃vPôÄ⌦•Ñ). See http://bit.ly/1EEdiYU (Retrieved November 10, 2014).
21The negative reaction of the regime to favor Dibao is unsurprising since favor Dibao has generated contention
and protest (see Chapter 6 for more details).
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the complexity of the administrative process. For example, in a neighborhood in Wuhan’s Jianghan
district, applicants are required to submit an application form, a copy of their personal identification
card, a copy of their urban residence permit (hukou), a marriage certificate, validation of their in-
come or validation of unemployed status if they have no source of income, documentation of illness
and/or disability, copy of lease or housing ownership, and monthly utilities statements. In many
neighborhoods, residents’ committees, accompanied by neighborhood representatives and block
captains, conduct extensive investigations to ascertain the income of prospective Dibao household
by visiting the household and interviewing household members as well as neighbors and employ-
ers. In instances where there is no formal employment, residents’ committee members have been
known to visit sites of informal employment—from vegetable markets to roadside kiosks—to as-
sess income.22 Given this complex application process, the support and assistance of the residents’
committee can mean the di↵erence between a successful or failed application.23
2.2 Dibao in Context
The CCP employs a broad complex of tools to ensure social stability. In this section, I use fiscal
expenditures to put the Dibao program into the context of this broader array of governance tools.
While these fiscal measures do not fully capture the relative importance of Dibao, because they do
not account for the cost of human resources devoted to running the program, fiscal expenditures
provide a starting point. Examining Dibao expenditures in the overall scheme of publicly available
redistributive and repressive expenditures reveals that, as a single program, Dibao represents an
important dimension of rule.
22Based on interviews in Qingdao, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou.
23This echos the work of Bai, Hsieh, and Song (2014) on the relationship between entrepreneurs and their govern-
ment “sponsors” (http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/conferences/2014/summer/macro song.pdf); if enterpreneurs have gov-
ernment sponsors, then it is much more likely that their firms will be successful.
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It is often noted that China’s spending on domestic security, including armed police and sta-
bility maintenance funds, has outstripped the country’s spending on national defense, but what is
less often mentioned is that spending on social welfare is nearly double that of either domestic
security or national defense spending. Based on data from the 2011 China Statistical Yearbook,
Table 2.1 shows, central and local governments together spent 533.3 RMB on national defense in
2010, 551.8 billion on domestic security, and 913.0 billion on social welfare and unemployment. If
we focus only on local government expenditures, provincial and lower levels of government spent
868.0 billion on social welfare compared to 464.3 billion on domestic security.24 This di↵erence
is substantial even if a large proportion of domestic security expenditures are removed from o -
cial expenditure reports or hidden within other categories of expenditures.25 Spending on social
welfare is the third largest expenditure category overall representing 10.2% of total government
expenditures, and it is the second largest expenditure category for local government, at 11.7% of
overall local government expenditures.
Within social welfare and unemployment, direct Dibao expenditures were 97.0 billion RMB,
representing slightly over 10% of total welfare expenditures in 2010.26 However, these direct costs
do not include all of the cost of administrating the program or the cost of ad hoc benefits. One
other program with higher government expenditures is China’s Old-Age Insurance program, a so-
cial insurance program administered by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. In
2010, government contributions into the old pension scheme totaled 195.4 billion RMB.27 How-
ever, as a voluntary, largely beneficiary-financed insurance program, Old-Age Insurance cannot be
24Local governments contribute very little: 15.7 billion to national defense.
25Based on data from 2009, the last year for which this extra-budgetary expenditures is available, China spent a total
of 17.2 billion RMB in extra-budgetary expenditures on social welfare and 145.7 billion RMB on other expenditures.
26Includes both urban and rural Dibao since total welfare spending is not disaggregated between urban and rural.
Within Dibao expenditures, 54% was urban. See Ministry of Civil A↵airs Social Welfare Statistical Report for 2010
at http://bit.ly/1LSxw3f (Retrieved January 22, 2015).
27See Ministry of Civl A↵airs Statistical Announcement for 2010 at http://bit.ly/1zUF6FR (Retrieved January 22,
2015).
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Table 2.1: Government expenditures by category (in billion RMB)
Central Local
Category Total Government Governments
Education 1,255.0 72.1 1,182.9
General Public Services 933.7 83.7 850.0
Social Safety Net and Employment E↵ort 913.1 45.0 868.0
Agriculture, Forestry and Water Conservancy 813.0 38.8 774.2
Urban and Rural Community A↵airs 598.7 1.0 597.7
Public Security 551.8 87.5 464.3
Transportation 548.8 149.0 399.9
National Defense 533.3 517.6 15.7
Medical and Health Care 480.4 7.4 473.1
Exploration, Power and Information 348.5 48.8 299.7
Science and Technology 325.0 166.1 158.9
Environment Protection 244.2 6.9 237.3
Housing Security 237.7 38.6 199.0
Interest payment for domestic and foreign debts 184.4 150.9 33.5
Culture, Sport and Media 154.3 15.0 139.3
Commerce and Services 141.3 14.0 127.3
A↵airs of Land and Weather 133.0 17.6 115.4
Management of Grain & Oil Reserves 117.2 49.5 67.7
Post-earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction 113.3 3.8 109.5
Financial Supervision 63.7 48.8 14.9
Foreign A↵airs 26.9 26.8 0.1
Total 8,987.4 1,599.0 7,388.4
Source: 2011 China Statistical Yearbook
targeted selectively to help maintain social stability in the way that a means-test cash transfer can
be. Compared to other social assistance programs, Dibao is China’s single largest cash transfer
program.28
28China has other social assistance programs, some are legacies of the Communist era while others are targeted
toward specific regions, but no other program comes close to the size of the Dibao program.
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Decreasing Incentives for Disruption with
Ad Hoc Benefits
This chapter demonstrates that ad hoc benefits distributed to Dibao households are aimed at pre-
empting disruption and are not given as rewards for disruption or as rewards for good behavior. It
does so by examining the timing of ad hoc benefits and the geographic dispersion of ad hoc bene-
fits. Based on heuristics of when and where protest is likely to occur, ad hoc benefits are distributed
prior to periods of time when o cials believe protest is more likely and in regions where protest is
perceived as a greater threat.
Distributing benefits before periods when protest is believed to be likely, rather than after they
have occurred, shows how Dibao is intended to decrease incentives to engage in disruption rather
than pacify individuals who have already protested. Distributing benefits in cities where protest is
believed to be more likely (but where protest does not actually occur at greater frequency) shows
how benefits are intended to diminish the potential for protest rather than to reward those who have
engaged in social disruption or to reward those who pose no threat to social order.
Two important distinctions related to this analysis need to be highlighted. First, benefits are
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distributed based on o cials’ beliefs and perceptions of the likelihood of protest, not the actual
incidence or level of disruption. In equilibrium, if the distribution of benefits is e↵ective in pre-
empting disruption, the probability of social disorder may even out across time and geography.
Furthermore, even if the distribution of ad hoc benefits is not e↵ective in preempting protest, a
locality with high potential for disruption may not experience higher levels of disorder because
leaders assigned to those localities may be more capable of managing disruption and because a
broader array of tactics might be used to prevent disorder in localities perceived to be more threat-
ening. However, it is worth noting that even if various tactics to prevent disruption are e↵ective
and even out the probability of disruption in equilibrium, we would expect the distribution of ben-
efits to continue if disorder is expected to increase or return in their absence. This expectation is
reasonable since threats to social order—individual petitions, small scale collective action—can
occur with relative ease, unlike revolutionary mobilization.
The second distinction is the focus on the distribution of benefits to households that have al-
ready been approved for the Dibao program. By examining benefits to those who already qualify
for the program, this chapter holds in abeyance the question of how Dibao is targeted to those
who are potential disrupters. The question of how the regime identifies potential disrupters and
selectively awards them with benefits is examined in later chapters.
3.1 Ad Hoc Benefits
Ad hoc benefits can have a large impact on the economic well-being of Dibao recipient house-
holds, so they are an important component to analyzing the e↵ect of the Dibao program; however,
because ad hoc benefits do not reach all Dibao households, they introduce additional discretion
and selectivity into the program.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the core feature of the Dibao program and the one that is most
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often discussed and analyzed are cash transfers that subsidize the di↵erence between household
income and the Dibao line. However, because the Dibao line can be exceptionally low and has
remained relatively unchanged over time, focusing on this portion of the program provides an
incomplete picture of Dibao benefits. Instead, by focusing on ad hoc benefits—benefits that are
distributed to Dibao households in addition to core cash transfers—a more comprehensive view of
the redistributive e↵ect of the Dibao program emerges.
As of December of 2011, the average Dibao line among 36 of China’s largest cities was 376
RMB per household per month. Since the Dibao line represents the maximum monthly income for
Dibao households, as noted in Chapter 2 these amounts barely support subsistence living standards,
especially in the context of the rising cost of living in urban China. Given these limited cash
transfers, the desirability of Dibao status derives in large part from the ad hoc benefits conferred
to some Dibao households, especially benefits in the realm of housing (Hong 2004). Dibao lines
are di cult to change because when they change, other standards—minimum wage levels and
unemployment benefits—also have to be changed, a process that entails intense negotiation among
bureaucracies.1 While the Dibao line often only changes once every few years, ad hoc benefits,
which do not have to be approved through a formal budgetary process, are distributed many times
each year.
At the national level, MoCA and other ministries have issued documents and notices encour-
aging the provision of ad hoc benefits for Dibao households. In 2004, MoCA along with the
Ministries of Construction, Land and Resources, Finance, and Taxation issued notices to ensure
the availability of low-cost rental housing for Dibao households.2 Access to low-cost housing for
Dibao households was also emphasized by the State Council in 2007.3 From 2004 to 2007, the
1Based on author’s interviews with civil a↵airs and finance bureau o cials in Beijing and Wuhan. Between 1997
and 2011, the Dibao line was changed on average of nine times among 36 cities across China that are often used as
the reference set of cities for Dibao standard setting.
2See http://bit.ly/1BZh7Ss (Retrieved August 14, 2013).
3See http://bit.ly/1DEVYix (Retrieved August 14, 2013).
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State Council and CCP Organization Department along with a number of ministries issued a series
of documents encouraging local Party and government authorities to put in place ad hoc benefits
to assist Dibao households beyond cash transfers.4
Provinces, cities, and districts all have autonomy to provide ad hoc benefits for Dibao house-
holds. For example, in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province, ad hoc benefits include access to
low-cost housing for around 4,000 Dibao households, free health check-ups for women of Dibao
households, and free public transportation for students belonging to Dibao households. In Hefei,
the provincial capital of Anhui, ad hoc benefits include subsidies for natural gas and water, higher
medical reimbursement standards, and waived burial and funeral expenses. In Zhengzhou, the cap-
ital of Henan province, Dibao families with children who are in college can receive up to 8,000
RMB per year in cash subsidies, and Dibao households can receive medical subsidies up to 10,000
RMB per year. In the capital of Hubei province, Wuhan, Dibao households can receive 10 RMB
per month per square meter in housing assistance, Dibao households do not have to pay garbage
collection fees and pay reduced fees for water, and children of some Dibao households are selected
to participate in free supplemental educational courses for English and other subjects.
As the above examples show, ad hoc benefits are often limited in number and Dibao households
often have to meet additional qualifications in order to receive them. These characteristics of ad
hoc benefits introduce additional discretion and selectivity into the Dibao program.
3.2 Timing and Geographic Patterns of Disruption
Ad hoc benefits are announced and distributed through the year, year after year, but within cities,
they vary in terms of their timing, and among di↵erent cities, they are used to varying extents.
4For policy documents, see http://bit.ly/1ze5AwE, http://bit.ly/1D3M2kt, http://bit.ly/1zUFuUE,
http://bit.ly/18T7u0s, http://bit.ly/1DkRD6i (Retrieved August 14, 2013).
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The continuous yet discretionary nature of these ad hoc benefits provides analytical leverage in
examining the instrumental function of the Dibao program in preempting threats to social order.
Selective welfare provision refers to the selective distribution of benefits to potential disrupters
who may cause social disorder in the future, not to well-behaved individuals who are supportive of
the regime or disengaged from social and political action, and not to ill-behaved individuals who
have already engaged in disruption. Putting aside the question of how Dibao is targeted to potential
disrupters for later chapters, let us assume for now that at least some Dibao recipients are potential
disrupters.
Timing: In order to decrease the incentives of potential disrupters to engage in disruption, ad hoc
benefits would be distributed prior to periods of time when disruption such as protest or collective
action is believed to be more likely. In contrast, if welfare programs are designed to buy o↵
individuals who have already engaged in protest, benefits are more likely distributed after periods
of time when disruptions have already occurred. This means that in order for ad hoc benefits to
be aimed at decreasing incentives for disruption, we should observe a higher likelihood of ad hoc
benefits being distributed before, rather than after, periods of time when protest and disruption are
thought to be likely.
To reiterate, if we observe that the distribution of benefits occurs prior to periods when col-
lective action is believed to be likely, benefits are more likely targeted at potential opponents who
may engage in undesirable actions. If we observe the distribution of benefits after periods of time
when collective action is believed to be likely, benefits are more likely targeted at actual opponents
who have already engaged in desirable actions.
Geographic Dispersion: Even if we see benefits appearing prior to time periods with higher
perceived probability of disruption, benefits could well be aimed at well-behaved. Distributing
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benefits at these times could serve to improve general goodwill toward the regime, without being
aimed at mitigating the threat of potential disrupters. Although subsequent chapters will take
a closer look at the characteristics of Dibao applicants (Chapter 4) and recipients (Chapter 5),
examining patterns in the use of ad hoc benefits among di↵erent cities can help us di↵erentiate
between these alternative explanations of welfare provision.
If the perceived threat of disruption is positively correlated with the level of ad hoc benefits,
then benefits are more likely aimed at preempting social disorder. In other words, if benefits
are intended to preempt disruption, then we should see higher levels of benefits in places where
disruption is perceived to be a more serious problem. On the other hand, if the perceived threat of
disruption is negatively correlated with the level of ad hoc benefits, then benefits are more likely
aimed at rewarding the well-behaved. Here, if benefits are rewards for good behavior, then we
should see higher levels of benefits in places where disruption is perceived to be a less serious
problem.
Perceptions of the threat of disruption are based on heuristics, and thus, a positive correlation
between perceived levels of threat and ad hoc benefits could be a spurious result of other factors
that correlate with perceptions. For example, perceived levels of threat could correspond with a
locality’s actual levels of protest, with a locality’s level of income inequality, with the demograph-
ics of the locality. In order to isolate the relationship between perceived levels of threat and ad hoc
benefits, these other factors are included as control variables.
3.3 Data
This section describes the original dataset created to capture the level of ad hoc benefits over
time and across cities. Also discussed is how the periods of time when disruption is believed
to be most likely is measured, and how perceived levels of potential disruption among cities are
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measured. For this analysis, I focus on 36 of China’s largest cities, which have been the focus of
a great deal of Dibao research (Chen, Ravallion and Wang 2006).5 These 36 cities include all of
China’s provincial-level cities and provincial capitals, and sub-provincial level cities.6 These cities
are among the most politically important in China, and because of their status, their policies and
strategies are often referenced and copied by other localities (Hong 2004).
3.3.1 Ad Hoc Benefits
Using traditional and new media sources available online, I collected all news reports mention-
ing Dibao for these 36 cities from January 2008 to June 2013. Data was collected by searching
news.baidu.com using the city name, the term Dibao in Chinese, and a six month period. For
example, to compile the data for Beijing, 11 searches were conducted, using the terms “Beijing
AND (Minimum Livelihood Guarantee OR Dibao)” (⌫¨AND ( N ;›úORN›)) from
January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2008, “Beijing AND (Minimum Livelihood Guarantee OR Dibao)”
from July 1, 2008 to December 31, 2009 and so on for each six month period until the period of
January 1 2013 to June 30, 2013. For each search, all pages of results were collected.7
After removing duplicate reports of the same benefit, 3,022 distinct reports related to Dibao
were found.8 Each news report was read by human coders to determine whether it related to an
ad hoc Dibao benefit, resulting in 2,390 (79%) distinct reports of ad hoc benefits. Reports not
included are those that focus on changes in the Dibao line, as well as news describing or criticizing
5Beijing, Changchun, Changsha, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Guiyang, Haerbin, Haikou,
Hangzhou, Hefei, Huerhaote, Jinan, Kunming, Lanzhou, Nanchang, Nanjing, Nanning, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shang-
hai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Tianjin, Urumqi, Wuhan, Wuxi, Xiamen, Xian, Xining, Yinchuan,
Zhengzhou
6Sub-provincial cities are independently administered cities distinct from prefectural-level cities governed by the
province. There are currently 15 sub-provincial cities and all are provincial capitals.
7The rule of collecting the first 100 pages of results was utilized, but among the 396 city-time period searches
conducted, none came close to reaching 100 pages.
8Duplication removal was done through human reading.
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the Dibao program and its outcomes. News related to visits by government o cials to Dibao
households are included, since visits by o cials almost always entail material benefits in the form
of gifts. For the reports of ad hoc benefits, human coders then determined whether the benefit
was distributed by the government or private sources. An example of a private source would be
a local Carrefour donating food to Dibao families. Since private distribution of ad hoc benefits
often involves collaboration with the government, both public and private benefits are included in
my analysis.9 Next, coders identified whether the benefit was a cash transfer, an in-kind transfer
(e.g., cooking oil, reduced utilities costs, reduced housing costs), or a service (e.g., free cancer
screening). We also identified the category of the benefit (e.g., housing, food, education), whether
anyone with Dibao status can obtain the benefit or whether there was a limit to the number of Dibao
households who could receive the benefit, whether the benefit targeted a particular demographic
(e.g., elderly over the age of 75, disabled children, pregnant women), and finally the date the ad
hoc benefit went into e↵ect.10
The left panel of Figure 3.1 shows the number of ad hoc benefits collected by year from January
1, 2008 to June 30, 2013. In 2008, 454 unique ad hoc benefits were identified, 374 in 2009, 388 in
2010, 485 in 2011, 432 in 2012, and 257 in the first half of 2013. We do not see a decline in reports
of ad hoc benefits going back in time, suggesting that online news sources capture a relatively
consistent sample of ad hoc benefits.
The right panel of Figure 3.1 shows the number of ad hoc benefits collected by city for the
entire time period. The figure reveals substantial variations in the use of ad hoc benefits among
cities. Over the course of four years, only 22 ad hoc benefits were distributed in Wuxi, while 127
were distributed in Chengdu. This between–city variation is revealed more clearly in Figure 3.2,
which shows the count of benefits by day over the five year period for each city. In this figure, the
9The exclusion of benefits from private sources does not a↵ect the substantive results.
10Also recorded were the dates of the news report and the date the benefits was announced. Analysis is based on
the date the ad hoc benefit goes into e↵ect (i.e., is distributed to citizens).
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Figure 3.1: The number of ad hoc benefits by year (left panel); number of ad hoc benefits by city (right
panel)
y-axis refers to the number of unique ad hoc benefits, the x-axis is date, ranging from January 1,
2008 to June 30, 2013, and each black vertical bar denotes the distribution of an ad hoc benefit.
From Figure 3.2, bursts in the distribution of benefits as well as periods of concentrated distri-
bution can be seen in some cities, but the overall pattern of distribution varies among cities. Cities
such as Lanzhou, Shijiazhuang and Tianjin exhibit bursts at regular intervals over the five year pe-
riod. Other cities, for example Guiyang and Hangzhou, never distribute more than one benefit per
day, and still others such as Beijing, Chengdu, and Guangzhou have a few periods characterized
by large bursts and concentrations of benefit distribution.
On average, cities distributed 66 unique benefits over this time period, approximately 1.2 ben-
efits every month. Systematic bias in government reporting of ad hoc benefits among cities is
unlikely. Local governments are unlikely to censor reports of Dibao benefits because Dibao is a
topic that the localities want to publicize—not only does it serve an administrative function of mak-
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Figure 3.2: Count of ad hoc benefits by day from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2013 for each city (vertical
bars represents date of benefit)
ing government policy known, it also demonstrates the “good works” of the local government.11
Thus, any bias in this data would derive from the lack of capacity of local government or of local
news media to report their own policies. Capacity constraints are likely related to the fiscal power
of localities or their level of economic development, so these variables are included as controls in
11News reports of protest related to Dibao or critique of the program are not included in this analysis.
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subsequent analysis.12
Across all cities, the vast majority (89%) of benefits are funded by the government. Of the non-
state-funded benefits, nearly 7% come from state-owned enterprises and government organized
NGOs, like the theWomen’s Federation, and only 4% are funded by private sources. In terms of the
form of the benefit, 45% were in-kind benefits, 43% were direct cash transfers, and the remaining
12% were services. The distribution of benefits by category is shown in Table 3.1. The largest
Table 3.1: Ad hoc dibao benefits by category
Occurrence
Category Count Proportion
Living expenses 1033 43%
Medical and Health 372 16%
Utilities 284 12%
Housing 243 10%
Education 223 9%
Employment 76 3%
Entertainment 76 3%
Burial and Funerary 50 2%
Elderly 22 1%
Transportation 11 0%
Total 2390
category are living expenses, primarily cash or in-kind benefits intended to provide additional
support for daily living expenses such as food and clothing. The second largest categories are
benefits related to medical and health expenses—for example, waiving individual contribution for
public health insurance programs, free health check-ups and screenings, and cash subsidies to cover
other out-of-pocket medical expenses. Utilities benefits include heating, oil, gas, water, and trash
collection subsidies. Housing benefits refer to access to low-cost housing and housing purchase and
rental subsidies. Education benefits are typically cash transfers for children, ranging from those
in preschool to college. Benefits in the employment category are typically job training programs
12I find no correlation between these economic and fiscal factors and the number of reported benefits.
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and sometimes job openings targeted at Dibao recipients. The entertainment category refers to
benefits such as tickets to movies, amusement parks, and other diversions. Burial and funerary
benefits refer to waivers and subsidies for various types of burial expenses. Benefits in the elderly
category includes waivers of personal contribution for old age pension programs, access to old
persons homes, and sometime direct cash subsidies with age limitations. Transportation benefits
are subsidies to reduce expenses related to public transportation.
In terms of limitations on the scope of beneficiaries, 58 percent of ad hoc benefits did not
specify a limit to the number of Dibao households that could receive the benefit, while remaining
reports detailed either a specific ceiling to the number of possible recipients among Dibao house-
holds or described the amount of benefits as limited. However, even if a limit to the number of
recipients is not explicitly publicized, there is still likely to be a limit to the number of ad hoc
benefits available.13 Finally, 70% of ad hoc benefits were not targeted to any specific type of Dibao
household, but 13% were limited to Dibao households with children meeting certain characteris-
tics (e.g., in school, single parent, disabled) and 5% were limited to Dibao households with elderly
members. For the remaining 12% of ad hoc benefits targeted at specific populations, a range of
specific categories—women, workers, the disabled—are included.
3.3.2 Sensitive Time Periods
There are two ways of determining when the threat of disruption is high. The first relies on specific
information obtained through surveillance about the timing of planned disruptions. The second re-
lies on heuristics of when protest is likely. Since localities can have varying levels of surveillance
capabilities and since surveillance information is not publicly available, I focus on heuristics com-
mon across localities to identify what the Chinese call “sensitive” periods when threats to social
13Based on interviews with local o cials in Beijing, Zhengzhou, and Qingdao.
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order are thought to be high.
There is a prevalent view that disruption—protest, petition, collective action—are most likely
to occur around the “two meetings” or lianghui ($⇢)—people’s congresses and people’s po-
litical consultative conferences, which typically occur within a few days of one another. This
phenomenon is captured in the documentary Petition, when petitioners amass in Beijing during
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and National People’s Congress to air their
demands (Petition 2009).14 In the study Unexpected Mass Incidents in China: Causes and Coun-
termeasures (-˝§S'Å—ãˆ⇣‡ ˘V), central and local people’s congresses and
political consultative conferences are identified as times with high potential for protest (China
Administrative Management Association Issue Committee 2009, 94).
Chen (2009) shows that among petitioners in one locality, 20% of petitioning events or threats
of petition occurred during special events, in particular lianghui. The rationale for picking certain
times is to “catch the attention of the local leaders who often attend important local events...those
events are political rituals that symbolize legitimacy and stability” (Chen 2009, 463).
Local governments are reminded to be on guard prior to and during these sensitive periods. In
Strategies for Preventing and Managing Mass Incidents during the Reform Period, Zhou writes
that in order to prevent protest, o cials “need to be diligent during sensitive periods...it is very
likely that some people will take the opportunity to organize...and emotions can be easily stirred
up again” (“Z}O ˆ Â\...àÔ˝  Ë⌃∫ :i'ã ...⇢ —§⌫≈ÍÑÕ∞
—\”) (Zhou 2008, 588).
Based on conversations with government o cials from civil a↵airs and finance departments
as well as academics involved in the process of determining Dibao policies in Beijing, Wuhan,
and Zhengzhou, interviewees describe ad hoc benefits for Dibao households as a way for local
14The documentary was filmed from 1996 to 2008; since the 2008 Olympics, this practice has been largely sup-
pressed in Beijing.
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governments to help preempt disruption during sensitive periods. Because ad hoc benefits can be
distributed without going through a formal budgetary process, they are easy and flexible to imple-
ment. According to a department head of a city civil a↵airs bureau, ad hoc benefits are distributed
before lianghui to preempt social unrest, and to ensure that “these events proceed smoothly...and
the masses are passive” (“§⌫Ñâö”).
To measure these sensitive time periods, I collect the date and duration of lianghui meetings
for each city and for each year using baidu.com search. Since lianghui meetings are significant
events for politics as well as policy, details of all meetings are easily found. Lianghui tend to occur
toward the beginning of the year, and are sometimes close in date to Chinese New Year, which
is based on the lunar calendar. Benefits are often distributed ahead of Chinese New Year, and
while the logic of distributing benefits before Chinese New Year could also be related to mitigating
threats of disorder, there is a deep tradition of gift giving before this major holiday (Qian, Abdur
Razzaque and Kau 2007; Yau 1988); as a result, benefits distributed before Chinese New Year
may also be aimed at shoring up general support toward the regime. To eliminate this potential
confounding e↵ect, lianghui meetings that occur 20 days or more days away from Chinese New
Year are the focus of the analysis.15
3.3.3 Ethnicity and Perceived Threat of Protest
Similar to using heuristics to identify time periods when threat of disruption is believed to be
high, I also use heuristics commonly held by government leaders as a way of identifying perceived
potential for disruption among localities. Specifically, I use beliefs related to ethnicity to measure
perceived threat of disruption.
Ethnicity has been identified by the CCP as a potential source of social disruption. Although
15Excluding lianghui close to Chinese New Year would not bias results in favor of the preemption hypothesis; if
anything, it reduces the power of the analysis.
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events over the past few years in Tibet and Xinjiang have brought ethnic conflict to the attention
of Western observers, Chinese leaders and academics have long been concerned with latent dis-
content in areas with greater ethnic diversity. One of the main findings of the book Unbalanced
Development in China’s Western Minority Regions: Research on Early Warning Systems and So-
cial Stability (-˝Ë⌘p⌘œ0:—U1a Ñf:6 >⇢3öv) concludes that
minority areas have “relatively more hidden dangers to security” (âhê£É⇢).16 Chinese aca-
demics Wang and Li (2013) write that because there is greater tension between groups in minority
areas, there are significant “hidden dangers to social harmony and stability” and “latent menaces”
(>⇢å⇣3öÀ↵ÜÉ'ê£ b⇣Ü\(Ñ ¡) (Wang and Li 2012, 24).
While ethnicity is not the only factor that could influence perceptions of the threat of disorder,
I focus on ethnicity because it is least likely to be correlated with redistributive e↵orts for non-
strategic reasons. If I were to use inequality as a measure of potential disruption, and I find a
correlation between the level of inequality and the distribution of ad hoc benefits, this correlation
could be due to a variety of reasons, including e↵orts to mitigate discontent as well as e↵orts to
lessen inequality. If I were to use government corruption as a measure of potential disruption,
correlation between corruption and the distribution of benefits could mean that benefits are used to
mitigate potential threats or that the distribution of benefits provides additional opportunities for
malfeasance.
I utilize two measures of ethnicity as proxies for the perceived potential for disruption: 1) the
number of di↵erent ethnic groups in a locality, and 2) the population share of ethnic groups sus-
pected of having a propensity for protest. I use these two measures because they are unlikely to be
confounded by the economic circumstances of minorities and unlikely to be related to the regime’s
commitment to a rmative action for minorities. Minorities are often economically disadvantaged.
Using the total population share of minorities could reflect e↵orts to improve the economic plight
16See http://bit.ly/1AyoDbA (Retrieved December 4, 2014)
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of these groups. Similarly, minorities are often the designated recipients of a rmative action so
total population share of minorities could reflect a rmative action for minorities in accessing ben-
efits.17
The number of di↵erent ethnic groups captures the extent of ethnic diversity in a locality. Ethnic
diversity is cited as an area of concern for social stability in o cial government sources, so ethnic
diversity is a possible heuristic Chinese o cials use to estimate the potential for disruption.18
The population share of minorities suspected of having a propensity for protest also captures
the perceived threat posed by ethnic minorities. Among Chinese leaders, there is the belief that
certain minorities, such as Uyghurs, have a higher propensity to protest, while other minorities,
e.g., Zhuang, Tujia, Gaoshan, are not suspected of having this propensity.
Data on the number of ethnic minorities groups for the 36 cities is drawn from the 2010 census.
The CCP recognizes 56 ethnic groups, including the Han and 55 ethnic minorities. While data
on ad hoc benefits spans 2008 to 2013, the use of 2010 data is justified as ethnic composition
is unlikely to experience dramatic changes from year to year in light of China’s restrictions on
residential mobility.19
The population share of ethnic minorities suspected of having a propensity to protest is also
based on 2010 census data. In order to determine which minorities are suspected of having a
propensity to protest, I combine the opinions of experts with how frequently each ethnic minority is
associated with the issue of social stability media reporting. I consulted academics and government
experts who deal with issues of ethnic minorities in China, asking them to identify which of the
55 ethnic minorities are perceived to be prone to protest. Minorities identified by more than two
17I do not find any ad hoc benefits that are targeted at specific ethnic minorities.
18For examples, see speeches by Jiang Zemin http://bit.ly/1LSypIT, Hu Jintao http://bit.ly/1KlI7Su, and Xi Jinping
http://bit.ly/1zmwbfF (Retrieved January 29, 2015).
19As discussed in Chapter 1, access to Dibao is tied to the location of residence. Thus, if ethnic minorities are
migrants in a city, they will not receive the Dibao benefits provided by that city unless they become residents. The
2010 census data shown here captures the population of individuals holding residential permits in these cities.
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experts as having a propensity for protest were automatically included in the analysis. Minorities
identified by only one or two experts were included if they were frequently discussed in the context
of social stability based on online news results. Specifically, I calculated the proportion of online
search results for each minority that dealt with stability by conducting a baidu.com search of the
name of the minority, e.g., Yi (]œ), and a separate search of the name of the minority and the
word stability, e.g.,]œ3ö.20 Across minority groups, an average of 15% of search results dealt
with issues of stability. If a minority group is mentioned by one or two experts as being perceived
to be prone to protests and more than 15% of results mentioning the minority group dealt with
issues of stability, the group is included in the analysis.21
3.3.4 Control Variables
In analyzing the distribution of ad hoc benefits across cities, control variables for the actual level
of protest, the level of income inequality, fiscal capacity, and demographics are included. The
inclusion of control variables is not meant to imply a causal relationship between perceived levels
of threat and ad hoc benefits, but simply to establish whether there is a positive correlation between
ad hoc benefits and perceived levels of threat when taking into account other factors that may be
related to perceptions of threat and the distribution of ad hoc benefits.
The actual level of protest is measured using reports of protests for each city from a variety of
sources.22 Sources used to identify protest include the China Labor Bulletin (http://numble.com/),
20Searches were conducted on July 10, 2013.
2115 percent is used as the threshold becuase it is the average proportion of news results mentioning a minority
group and stability. 19 minority groups are included among those suspected of having a propensity for protest. They
are Daur, Dongxiang, Jing, Jino, Kazak, Kirgiz, Lahu, Mongolian, Naxi, Nu, Ozbek, Salar, Tajik, Tatar, Tibetan,
Uygur, Yi, Yugur. The majority of these groups are those residing in West and Northwest China. The groups, e.g.,
Yi and Naxi, based in Southwest China were identified as having a propensity for disruption due to drug tra cking,
intravenous drug use, and HIV/AIDS in regions dominated by those groups.
22Since the availability of protest data declines when going back in time, analysis of ad hoc benefits and ethnicity is
based on the last full year (2012) data.
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the China Digital Times, Google searches for the name of the cities in the set of 36 along with its
districts and keywords related to protest and collective action, Chinese language books on collec-
tive action in China,23 and search of sina blogs and sina weibo for the name of cities and subsidiary
districts and keywords related to protest. For 2012, 241 protests were identified for the 36 cities.
The level of income inequality is measured by the proportion of the city population that fall be-
low the Dibao line set by the city at the end of 2004,24 using data from the China Urban Household
Short Survey along with data from the Ministry of Civil A↵airs (Chen, Ravallion and Wang 2006).
The China Urban Household Short Survey estimates the proportion of households with income
lower than a city’s Dibao line, including households that do and do not receive Dibao.25
Demographics, specifically the proportion of the population not engaged in the workforce,
often explain variation in welfare provision. To capture the potential e↵ect of demographics on ad
hoc benefits, I include the proportion of the population over the age of 65 using data from the 2010
census.
3.4 Results
I start by examining the timing of the distribution of benefits, then move to the relationship between
benefit distribution and ethnicity.
23Chinese language books include: Zhongguo tufa shijian baogao [Report on Mass Incidents in China] (2009);
Yufang yu chuzhi qunti xing shijian dangzheng ganbu duben [Prevention and Management of Mass Incidents: A
Reader for Party and Government Cadres] (2009); China Administrative Management Association Issue Committee
(2009); Gao and Wu (2011); He (2010); Zhou (2008).
24Alternative measures of income inequality, including average urban household income in 2010 and urban-rural
income inequality in 2010, do not change the substantive results.
25Since the Dibao line accounts for local costs of living, this measure captures the proportion of the city population
who are impoverished based on local standards. This number di↵ers from the number of households who actually
receive Dibao so that strategic considerations a↵ecting the provision of Dibao do not a↵ect this measure.
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3.4.1 Distributing Benefits Before Sensitive Time Periods
Using the data of ad hoc benefits, I find that more benefits are distributed before than after sensitive
periods when the regime believes protests are likely to occur. Figure 3.3 is a density plot of the
number of ad hoc dibao benefits distributed prior to, during, and after lianghui meetings for the
36 cities, for all years. The left panel includes all lianghui meetings while the right panel only
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of Dibao benefits given before, during, and after all city lianghui meetings (left
panel) and for meeting occurring 20 or more days away from Chinese New Year (right panel).
includes lianghui dates that are 20 or more days away from Chinese New Year. Because benefits
are often distributed prior to Chinese New Year and city-level lianghui meeting are often close to
Chinese New Year, analysis of lianghuimeetings that are not confounded by the timing of Chinese
New Year provide a cleaner test of the timing of benefits in relation to politically sensitive periods
where protest is perceived to be more likely. Both plots show that a larger number of benefits are
distributed prior to and during lianghui meetings than after. The result is striking when lianghui
meetings are disentangled from Chinese New Year. As the right panel of Figure 3.3 clearly shows,
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more benefits are distributed prior to lianghui sessions than after.
The di↵erence between benefits distributed prior to and during lianghui and benefits distributed
after lianghui is statistically significant at the 5% level. Figure 3.4 shows the di↵erence in the
number of ad hoc benefits for all lianghui meetings and for lianghui meetings occurring 20 days
away from Chinese New Year. Based on a t-test, it is 38% (18% - 58%) more likely that benefits
●
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Difference in Ad Hoc Benefits
(After − Before Lianghui)
Meetings
starting 20
days before
or after
Chinese
New Year
All
meetings ●
●
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before Lianghui
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after Lianghui
Figure 3.4: Di↵erence in the number of ad hoc benefits distributed after lianghui and before lianghui. 95%
confidence intervals based on a t-test are shown.
are distributed before or during lianghui than after. When controlling for Chinese New Year, it is
52% (26% to 78%) more likely that benefits are distributed before or during lianghui than after.
To further verify that there is a di↵erence in ad hoc benefits distributed before and after
lianghui, I conduct a permutation test of the di↵erence in ad hoc benefits in all adjacent 10 day
periods, not including lianghui periods and Chinese New Year, for the 36 cities. The mean di↵er-
ence in ad hoc benefits before and during lianghui vs. after lianghui is significantly larger than the
mean di↵erence in ad hoc benefits between other time periods of similar duration (p-value 0.004).
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In addition, the mean number of benefits distributed before and during lianghui is larger than the
mean number of ad hoc benefits distributed in any other 10 day period (p-value 1.369e-11).
This analysis reveals that across 36 of the largest Chinese cities, ad hoc benefits are much more
likely to be distributed before than after periods of time when the regime believes collective action
to be most likely. This suggests that benefits are more likely intended to decrease the incentives
of individuals who may engage in protest during these times, and less likely to be intended for
individuals who engaged in activities like protest or collective action during these sensitive time
periods.
3.4.2 Distributing Benefits Where Fear of Protest is Higher
Ethnic Diversity: I examine the relationship between the number of di↵erent ethnic groups in
a city and the total number of ad hoc benefits distributed in 2012. The left panel of Figure 3.5
shows the number of ad hoc benefits distributed in 2012 and the number of non-Han minority
groups from the 2010 census for each city. There is a strong positive relationship between the
number of ethnic minorities and the number of ad hoc benefits that are distributed. The right panel
of Figure 3.5 focuses on ethnic diversity and the number of ad hoc benefits distributed prior to
lianghui meetings.26 The right panel also shows a positive relationship between ethnic diversity
and the number of benefits.
This positive correlation between benefits and ethnic diversity lends support to the idea that
Dibao benefits are intended to mitigate the perceived risk of potential disruption. A greater number
of benefits are distributed in locations with a greater diversity of ethnic groups, where disruption
and disorder are perceived to be more likely to occur.
This positive relationship between ethnic diversity and ad hoc benefits remains after controlling
26For lianghui meetings that occur 20 or more days away from Chinese New Year.
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Figure 3.5: Plot of ad hoc benefits and the number of minority groups with lowess line (left panel); plot of
the benefits distributed before lianghui and the number of minority groups with lowess line (right panel)
for a city’s level of poverty, fiscal revenues, share of population over the age of 65, and the actual
number of protests that took place in 2012. Figure 3.6 is a plot of the expected probability of all ad
hoc benefits (left panel) and of ad hoc benefits distributed before lianghui (right panel) for di↵erent
numbers of minority groups, holding a city’s level of poverty, fiscal capacity, elderly population,
and number of reported protests at their observed values.27 In other words, Figure 3.6 shows
that the positive correlation between ethnic diversity and Dibao benefits—including all ad hoc
benefits distributed in 2012 as well as the subset of benefits distributed prior to lianghui—cannot
be attributed to economic needs within the city, the fiscal capacity of the city to pay for welfare
programs, the demographic needs of the city population, or the actual level of protest reported in
the city.
27Expected probabilities of ad hoc benefits based on OLS regression of the number of ad hoc benefits distributed in
2012 on the number of minority groups. Coe cient estimates for this model can be found in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 3.6: Plot of minority groups and expected probability of ad hoc benefits with 95% confidence in-
tervals (left panel); lot of minority groups and expected probability of ad hoc benefits with 95% confidence
intervals (right panel)
Ethnicity and Perceived Propensity for Protest: When examining the population share of eth-
nic groups perceived to have a propensity for protest, we also see a positive relationship with the
distribution of ad hoc benefits. Since the population share of ethnic groups suspected of having a
propensity for protest does not correlate with the total population share of ethnic minorities, the
positive relationship is unlikely to be due to a rmative action or preferential access of minority
groups to welfare programs.
The left panel of Figure 3.7 shows the relationship between ad hoc benefits distributed by
cities in 2012 and the proportion of the city represented by minority groups perceived to have a
propensity for protest in 2010. We see a clear positive relationship between perceived propensity
of protest and the distribution of ad hoc benefits. This relationship cannot be explained by a rma-
tive action toward minorities in general because there is a low correlation (0.23) between a city’s
proportion of ethnic minorities and a city’s proportion of ethnic minorities perceived to hae a high
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Figure 3.7: Plot of ad hoc benefits and log population share of minority groups perceived to have high
propensity to protest with lowess line (left panel); plot of log population share of minorities and log popu-
lation share of minority groups perceived to have high propensity to protest (right panel)
propensity for protest (see right panel of Figure 3.7).
This positive relationship between perceived propensity for protest and ad hoc benefits also
remains after controlling for a city’s level of poverty, fiscal revenues, share of population over
the age of 65, and the actual number of protests that took place in 2012. Figure 3.8 is a plot of
the expected probability of ad hoc benefits given di↵erent population proportions of minorities
perceived to have a high propensity to protest, holding a city’s level of poverty, fiscal capacity,
elderly population, and number of reported protests at their observed values.28
28Expected probabilities of ad hoc benefits based on OLS regression of the number of ad hoc benefits distributed in
2012 on log population share of minorities perceived to have a high propensity for protest. Coe cient estimates for
this model can be found in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 3.8: Plot of population share of minorities with high perceived propensity for protest and expected
probability of ad hoc benefits with 95% confidence intervals
3.5 Summary
Descriptive analysis of the timing and regional variation of ad hoc benefits shows that benefits
distributed to Dibao households are aimed at preempting disruptions to social order by decreasing
incentives to engage in disruptive behavior. Using commonly held heuristics to identify periods
of time when disruption is more likely to occur, I find that ad hoc benefits are promulgated prior
to key political meetings, when the regime believes protest is more likely to occur, not after these
periods. Distributing benefits before rather than after these sensitive periods suggests that Dibao
is intended to decrease incentives to engage in protest before threats can manifest rather than to
pacify individuals who have protested.
Using the heuristic of ethnicity as a proxy for the perceived threat of protest, I find that localities
with larger numbers of ethnic groups and those with larger population shares of ethnic groups
perceived to have a propensity for protest are the places that distribute greater amounts of ad hoc
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benefits. This positive relationship between perceived propensity for disruption and ad hoc benefits
suggests that benefits are not intended to boost general regime legitimacy among supporters, and
are instead targeted toward potential disrupters. Furthermore, this positive correlation persists after
controlling for a city’s level of poverty, fiscal capacity, demographic characteristics, and reports of
actual protest.
The analyses in the chapter rely on heuristics to gauge when and where disruptions are more
likely to occur. Presumably, localities have more specific information, collected through surveil-
lance, about when disruption could occur, and perhaps this more specific information would ex-
plain more of the bursts and concentrated periods of benefit distribution shown in Figure 3.2. In
the next two chapters, I turn to distribution of welfare benefits under conditions where the regime
does have specific, individual-level information about Dibao applicants and recipients.
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This chapter explores government responsiveness to di↵erent types of Dibao applicants using an
online field experiment, and finds that responsiveness is substantially higher for Dibao applicants
who threaten to engage in collective action than those who simply describe their economic hard-
ship. In order for selective welfare provision to reach individuals who have the potential to disrupt
social order, information is needed to identify these individuals. One type of information that can
be used to identify potential disrupters is complaints. In the process of complaining about govern-
ment services or policies, individuals reveal information about themselves that allow the regime to
determine whether they are likely to engage in disruptive behavior in the future.
I make use of complaints as a channel for information gathering by conducting an online ex-
periment where requests for assistance in applying for Dibao that do and do not contains threats of
collective action were randomly assigned to di↵erent counties. If Dibao is intended for individuals
who have the potential to disrupt social order, then applicants who self-identify as a possible threat
should be prioritized. However, if Dibao does not have this instrumental purpose, we should not
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see any di↵erence between responsiveness to applicants who identify themselves as threatening to
social order and those who do not. Through an experiment, I find that threatening collective action
causes local government to be 30%more responsive to the requests of Dibao applicants, and nearly
50% more likely to provide publicly viewable responses as well as the most informative responses
to demands for Dibao.
4.1 Methods of Information Gathering
All types of regimes invest in surveillance capabilities in order to identify potential threats of dis-
ruption, but authoritarian regimes face a particular imperative to understand the private preference
of their subjects because private preferences are more likely to diverge from publicly expressed
preferences in environments without freedom of speech and with repression. A great deal of in-
formation can be inferred from behavior, but when the information the regime requires—whether
someone has the potential to engage in socially disruptive behavior—cannot always be inferred
from behavior, then the regime must obtain information related to mindsets and attitudes.
Authoritarian regimes utilize a large number channels for gathering information about the pref-
erences of individuals that encompass many types of information (Dimitrov 2014b,a; Stockmann
2013). I organize channels along two dimensions (see Figure 4.1), which relate to their e↵ective-
ness in surfacing private preferences, and the ease of implementation.
The first dimension relates to whether the information gathering process is covert or overt in
relation to the subject of the inquiry—in other words, whether or not the person about whom in-
formation is being gathered is aware of the information gathering or transmission process. When
information is collected through public opinion polling or surveys, it is clear to respondents that
information is being gathered about them. Similarly, when journalists conduct interviews as part
of an investigation, it is also clear to interviewees that information is being gathered from them.
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Figure 4.1: Typology of information gathering channels with examples
For complaints, even if the individuals complaining are not aware that their complaints are part of
a systematic information gathering process, they are consciously engaged in transmitting informa-
tion about themselves. Covert processes of information collection take place when information that
is assumed to be private is transmitted to the regime. For example, an informant has a conversation
with a person that the person assumed would be private. When that information is transmitted from
the informant to the regime, the person in question is unaware that information has been gathered.
Other examples of covert information gathering including wire tapping as well as covert collection
of information from computers and other electronic devices.
The second dimension relates to the structure of information—whether or not the bounds of in-
formation being gathered are predefined. Structured information is information where the bound-
aries of questions and answers have been delimited by the regime or by whoever is gathering
information on behalf of the regime. Surveys gather structured information. For open-ended ques-
tions, the scope of the question is pre-defined, and for close-ended questions, the scope of both
the question and the answer have already been delimited. Unstructured information does not come
with these constraints. Typically, unstructured information is volunteered rather than solicited.
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Di↵erent methods of information gathering di↵er in terms of their e↵ectiveness in identifying
private preferences. Overt, structured methods of information gathering such as public opinion
polling and surveys may yield insights, but can miss critical issues that the regime is unaware of.
Overt, unstructured methods of information gathering such as complaints filed by individuals or
independent reports of concerns can bring new problems to the attention of the regime. How-
ever, because these channels are overt, they run into natural limitations given the incentives for
preference falsification and insincere loyalty. Dimitrov (2014b) notes that despite disincentives
to complain, complaints are highly prevalent across authoritarian regimes when there is trust in
the central government. In other words, complaints are aimed at the central authority believed
to be legitimate even when trust in local governments is low. Because complaints often relate to
“matter-of-fact requests for services or benefits rather than hollow ritualistic displays of loyalty to
the party,” they provide useful information about individuals to the regime (Dimitrov 2014b, 275).
However, despite the advantages of complaints as a channel for collecting information, individuals
who pose the most serious threats, for example those planning a large-scale protest, have incen-
tives to hide their intentions and perhaps even to hide the grievances motivating their actions from
the state. In order to identify individuals who are actively concealing their true preferences, covert
means of obtaining unstructured information such as informants and electronic surveillance are
more e↵ective.
More e↵ective means of gathering information are typically more di cult to implement. For
example, it is easier to conduct an annual opinion poll, a structured and overt method of infor-
mation gathering, than to constantly monitor complains, an unstructured and overt method of in-
formation collection. Similarly, it is easier to monitor complaints than to have a large network of
informants who can penetrate the private lives of individuals, an unstructured and covert method
of information collection.1
1The di culty of using informants is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Technology may change the dynamic
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4.1.1 Online Channels for Gathering Complaints
This chapter focuses on an overt but unstructured channel for information gathering: complaints
made through online channels. In China, complaints can be funneled to the state in many di↵erent
ways: by visiting a government o ce in person, by telephone, and increasingly via online tech-
nologies such as email, web forums, or microblogs (Chen 2011). As a regime where support for
the central government remains high, complaints are transmitted to the regime at a high frequency.
According to Chinese government data, in the 2000s, complaints numbered well over ten million
each year (Dimitrov 2014b).
In 2007, China’s State Council promulgated the “Open Government Information Ordinance”
(OGI), which required county and higher levels of government to increase transparency and to put
into place channels for interacting with citizens. As part of this initiative, the majority of local
governments in China have set up government web portals, which contain online forums where
individuals can submit questions or comments (Meng, Pan and Yang 2014; Pan 2013). Figure 4.2
shows the “government-citizen interaction” (?⌘í®) page of the Changsha city government
website, which is very typical of online portals soliciting complaints. The page contains several
ways for individuals to interact with the local government, and for visitors to see a curated set of
questions and issues that others have raised. On the top of the column on the left is a video of an
interview with the vice director of a district government o ce. On the top of the main column is
the “mayor’s mailbox” (⇥·±), a government forum utilized by Changsha to collect inquires
and complaints.2 The description of the mayor’s mailbox reads:
of information gathering, for example making covert collection of personal information much easier. This is discussed
further in the Conclusion.
2Mayor’s mailboxes are sometime venues for private message from individuals to the government. In the case of
Changsha, content submitted to the mayor’s mailbox is publicly viewable, so the mayor’s mailbox acts as the govern-
ment forum. For list of comments and suggestions which are public, see http://www.changsha.gov.cn/zmhd/szxx/. In
other localities, sometimes there is a forum for submitting questions that may be made public in addition to a mayor’s
mailbox that facilitates private messages.
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Figure 4.2: Changsha government web portal citizen interaction page
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The “Mayor’s mailbox” is an electronic email service set up by the Changsha Mu-
nicipal People’s Government on the city government portal to accept comments and
suggestions from citizens, legal persons and other organizations related to the Chang-
sha Municipal People’s Government and associated departments. Your letter will be
assigned and forwarded to the responsible departments after validation, and after a
certain period of time, the response and result will be posted to the Changsha city gov-
ernment portal. Changsha’s development cannot be separated from your wisdom and
contribution, your comments and suggestions on the construction and development of
Changsha are welcome.3
Below the description of the mayor’s mailbox are recent questions that have been submitted.
Further below in the main column are four other topics, from left to right and top to bottom, they
are: “consultation and complaints” (®‚ï…), which specifically focus on complaints, frequently
asked questions (8¡Óò„T), public opinion polls (⌘✏Å∆), and reports of responses to
issues raised (⌘✏Å∆”ú). The Changsha website specifies the types of comments that will
be addressed, but typically there are no automatic rejections of posts based on content. However,
across government portals, posts are almost always reviewed by website administrators before they
are made public (Chen, Pan and Xu 2014; King, Pan and Roberts 2014).
Complaints on government portals range from clarifications on issues of policy to reports of
government malfeasance, and there is ample evidence that the CCP regime and local o cials
take complaints expressed through these online websites very seriously. Leaked email archives
from two local propaganda departments in Jiangxi show how propaganda o cials carefully screen
online forums for content relevant to the locality, how they respond to complaints in writing, how
3“⇥·±”/ô⇥∫⌘?ú(ô⇥?úË7QŸ⌘>⇢l⌫æÀÑ5P·± ◊⌃l⌘ ’∫åv
÷ƒ«˘ô⇥⌅ß∫⌘?úÂ ?úÂ\ËËÑ✏¡å˙ÆÑQ⌦ó„⇥®Ñe·⌘Ï⌃⇢«°ö l
—↵è⌘ s#˚L˝ËË§û v( öÑˆP(ô⇥?úË7QŸ⌘®Õà⌅⌃✏¡ ”ú⇥ô
Ñ—Uª  ®Ñzg !. "Œ®˘ôÑ˙æå—U–˙ù5✏¡å˙Æ⇥
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they bring issues, especially those related to protest and collective action, to the attention of top
government and Party o cials, and how relevant agencies are asked to respond and investigate
issues in their domain.4 Complaints posted to government websites are reviewed by the sta↵ of
a local online information management o ce, which is also the entity that manages the content
of the government portal. This online information management o ce typically reports complaints
to the local propaganda department, which identifies patterns of public sentiment and aggregates
insights. The propaganda department then transmits what it believes are the most important issues
pertaining to public sentiment to top government and Party o cials of the locality on a regular
basis.5
Since local governments use online complaints as a way of gathering information, by submit-
ting requests for assistance in obtaining Dibao to local government websites and measuring their
level of responsiveness, we can determine what factors can change government responsiveness, and
whether higher levels of responsiveness are associated with potential disruptions to social order.
4.2 Experimental Design
Among 2,869 Chinese counties, online government forums were identified for 2,227 (77%), and
2,103 (73%) forums were functional.6 For all counties with government websites, a detailed set
of characteristics was recorded, including whether the website contains a public online forum or a
place to contact local o cials, as well as the requirements for posting to the forum or contacting
o cials.7 A request for assistance in obtaining Dibao was submitted on public forums of the gov-
4See https://xiaolan.me/50-cent-party-jxgzzg.html.
5This process is based on emails found in the leaked email archives, as well as through my fieldwork.
6In the 124 counties with non-functional forums, attempts at submission led errors in page loads after a lengthy
wait. In each of these cases, at least three attempts were made at submission using di↵erent browsers.
7Government web portals may contain several methods of contacting the local government. Often there is a
“mayor’s mailbox,” an email or online form where issues submitted are not publicly viewable. Besides, there is
often a discussion forum with publicly viewable posts, replies, and discussion threads. I utilize publicly viewable
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ernment website. The posting process, as well as various dimensions of the government response
were recorded. All posts were made from within China, and submitted outside of the lianghui pe-
riod to avoid posting during a sensitive time period and one during which local o cials are likely
to have a larger workload. Then, the forums were checked 10 and 20 business days after the date
of submission for responses by at least two members of the research team for validation, and both
the date checked and the date of the responses were recorded.8
The outcome of interest is responsiveness, which is measured in four ways after the initial post
was submitted. The first measure is whether there was a response;9 and if there was a response,
when the response was given, whether the response was viewable by the general public,10 and
finally, the specific content of the response. Together, these measures provide a dichotomous,
continuous, and categorical measure of responsiveness
4.2.1 Treatment Condition
To test whether threats of collective action have an e↵ect on responsiveness to Dibao applicants,
two types of posts are composed—a control condition and a treatment condition, identical except
that the treatment condition contains a threat of collective action. The control condition is as
follows:
Respected leader:
My wife and I have lost our jobs, and we have been unable to find work for
a long time. Our economic situation is very difficult, and we cannot make
forums instead of private messaging options.
890.5 percent of the replies on government web portals include the date on which the reply was posted.
9If a request for more information is the response, that is coded a a response. The protocol is to not provide further
information to the government entity.
10Based on pre-testing and previous research, responses can be made privately or only viewable to the individual
submitting the request (King, Pan and Roberts 2014).
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ends meet. We have to support my elderly mother who is ill and for whom
we have to buy medicine. We also have our son who is in school and has school
fees and living fees that are difficult to bear. I have tried to apply for
Dibao through my residents’ committee, but they say I am not eligible.
Can you help my family obtain Dibao? Much gratitude!
Yours,
[Common male name]
This inquiry is phrased to demonstrate some knowledge of Dibao, to increase the diversity and
richness of government responses and to maximize the likelihood of a more personalized response.
For example, the request states that the head of household and his wife have been unable to find
work. This signals that the lack of employment is not due to lack of e↵ort. As well, the inclusion
of an elderly, ill mother and school-aged child emphasizes the economic hardship faced by this
household, making the household a more likely candidate for Dibao status. Finally, the inquiry
states that the applicant has been turned down by the residents’ committee. This again demonstrates
a certain level of knowledge about the Dibao program, and decreases the chances that replies will
simply tell the applicant to go to the residents’ committee.
In the treatment conditions, the threat of collective action is inserted at the beginning of the
new paragraph prior to the phrase “Can you help my family obtain Dibao?” To test the e↵ect
of threats of collective action on responsiveness, the following two sentences are added:
People around me are in a similar situation, they face difficulties, and
they also can’t get Dibao. If you can’t help, we’ll try to figure out what
we can do together about this situation.
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Note that while this treatment is called a threat of collective action, the threat is oblique. This is
intentional due to ethical as well as theoretical considerations. If a strongly worded threat was used,
this could lead the local government to investigate the post, resulting in greater use of government
resources. As well, a strongly worded threat could cross the line from a potential disrupter to
someone who is ill-behaved, and since my interest is in potential disruptions, a weaker treatment
is preferred even if it has the potential to lessen the treatment e↵ect.
These two types of posts were randomly assigned to county government web forums stratified
by prefecture so that counties within the same prefecture did not receive the same request. The
posts were written to be similar in tone and length to existing content found on online govern-
ment forums. Both conditions were pre-tested with Chinese citizens and o cials to fine-tune their
appropriateness for an online forum and their relevance to the concept tested. Because of the frag-
mentation of local government websites and more generally of county governments in China, it
is very unlikely that o cials in one county would realize that a similar post appeared in another
county during our experiment. Moreover, because forum content that is public is not indexed by
search engines, and because questions about social welfare and Dibao are among the most com-
mon types of questions found on government forums, the likelihood of identifying the posts in the
experiment was low.
4.2.2 Ethical Considerations
This experiment entailed the use of deception to protect human subjects, to minimize disruption
to the system being studied, and to protect the safety of the research team. The human subjects
aspects of our experimental protocol were pre-approved by the university’s Institutional Review
Board.
One of the guiding principles in conducting this research was to minimize disruption to the
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system being studied. Since the experiment entailed submitting requests to government managed
websites, this meant minimizing the use of government resources. The submitted requests ask
for government action in the form of a written response. Based on the subject of the inquiry,
pre-testing, and analysis of online forums, it is unlikely that local governments would take any
action beyond writing a response, and this prior expectation was borne out by the experiment. The
subjects of the research, those responding to requests on government forums, were not debriefed
in order to minimize the time government administrators would spend reading and potentially
responding to a debrief notice. Minimizing disruption also involves making sure that future posts,
whether from individuals or other researchers, are taken seriously. By not debriefing the subjects,
disruption to government and risks to future applicants of the Dibao program are reduced.
To protect the safety of the research team and for logistical reasons, confederates were not used
to submit informational requests. If confederates had been used, they would have needed to be
individuals from households who qualify for Dibao in each of the localities where the experiment
was conducted. Given the scope of the experiment, it would have been extremely di cult and
costly to recruit the appropriate number of confederates, and confederates with similar enough
characteristics to support our experimental design. In addition, by not using confederates, the
potential for inconvenience that confederates submitting the information requests might face is
eliminated.
4.2.3 Randomization and Balance
Randomization was conducted within prefectures to minimize the risk of detection. This treatment
assessing the causal e↵ect of threatening collective action was part of a larger experiment testing
two additional factors for responsiveness (Chen, Pan and Xu 2014). As a result, a quarter of China’s
2,869 counties were assigned to the treatment condition (717) and a quarter to the collective action
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treatment condition (718). Figure 4.3 visualizes the random assignment spatially. In this figure,
the boundaries denote all 2,869 counties in mainland China. Counties assigned to the control
conditions are yellow and those assigned to the treatment condition are in green.
Figure 4.3: Treatment assignment map of mainland Chinese counties with counties receiving collective
action threat treatment in green, and control counties in yellow
Table 4.1 shows the covariate balance across the control and collective action treatment groups
on a number of di↵erent demographic, economic, and fiscal factors. Demographic variables in-
clude population in 2000 and 2010, population density, gender ratio, the scope of the migrant
population, the percent of households with urban (or non-agricultural) residential permits, the per-
cent of permanent urban residents (resident with urban hukou), average years of education, literacy
rates, the unemployment rate, the proportion of the work force concentrated in agriculture, indus-
try, and service sectors, as well as the proportion of ethnic minorities. Economic variables include
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Table 4.1: Covariate balance between treatment and control groups
Control Treatment p-value
Log population 12.69 12.66 0.66
Log population (2000) 12.69 12.64 0.43
Population growth (2000-10 %) 5.66 5.77 0.66
Gender ratio (female = 1.00) 105.97 105.64 0.4
Log population density (person/km2) 14.21 14.12 0.35
Migrant (%) 0.11 0.11 0.65
Non-agriculture household (%) 19.12 18.14 0.22
Permanent urban residents (%) 0.34 0.34 0.31
Average years of education 8.15 8.08 0.37
Illiteracy rate among age above 15 (%) 7.47 7.85 0.47
Unemployment rate (%) 0.02 0.02 0.48
Work force in agriculture (%) 64.12 64.96 0.49
Work force in industry (%) 16.22 15.34 0.27
Work force in services (%) 19.66 19.4 0.67
Ethnic minority (%) 20.76 22.26 0.48
Log GDP 4.06 4.03 0.62
Log agricultural output 2.41 2.37 0.52
Log industrial output 3.16 3.12 0.64
Log services output 2.9 2.87 0.66
Log total investment 3.68 3.65 0.66
Log total saving 2.02 1.91 0.23
Log total government revenue 0.92 0.91 0.93
Log total government expenditure 2.45 2.44 0.84
Enterprises above designated size 39.81 40.58 0.86
Average nominal GDP growth (2000-10) 0.15 0.15 0.88
Note: Data are from 2000 and 2010 Census and Provincial Statistical Yearbooks.
Variables were measured in 2010 unless otherwise noted.
77
Chapter 4. Dibao Applicants and the Threat of Collective Action
GDP, per capita GDP, 2000-2010 nominal GDP growth, output by sector (agricultural, industrial,
services), the number of industrial enterprises above designated size (above 5 million CNY), total
investment from households, enterprises, and government, as well as total savings, which is the
total outstanding bank deposits of rural and urban households at the end of 2010. Finally, fiscal
variables include government revenue and expenditures. As can be seen from Table 4.1, random-
ization is successful and the treatment is balanced across all of the above dimensions.
4.2.4 Government Web Forums Characteristics
In total, 519 posts in the control group were successfully submitted, and 525 posts in the treatment
group assessing threats of collective action were successfully submitted. Figure 4.4 shows that
there is balance across the control and treatment groups for whether there is a government forum
and whether posts are successful.
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Figure 4.4: Availability of county government web forums by treatment group
For each forum, information on the characteristics of the forumwas collected, including whether
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existing posts and replies were publicly viewable—in other words, whether someone who does not
have an account or is not logged into the site can view posts and replies. Also recorded were
the dates of the most recent posts and replies. Lastly, whether posts submitted were immediately
viewable, or whether the posts were first reviewed by authorities before they were released to be
publicly viewable was recorded. As shown in Figure 4.5, approximately 70 percent of forums have
publicly viewable posts and replies. This means that for 70 percent of government forums, any-
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Figure 4.5: Openness of county government web forums by treatment group
one who visits the forum URL can view posts and replies without creating an account or logging
in. Approximately 40% of forums contain posts by the local government made within the past 30
days. However, less than 5 percent of forums immediately release submitted posts. This means
that the vast majority of government forums first review the content of posts submitted before the
posts are released to be seen by the general public. This finding is in line with the high prevalence
of review found among government websites (King, Pan and Roberts 2014). As seen in Figure 4.5,
all of these forum characteristics related to openness are balanced across treatment groups.
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Finally, information was collected on the requirements for submitting posts to the government
forum, including whether an email address is required, whether a name is required, whether a
personal identification number (´˝¡˜) is required, whether a phone number is required, and
whether an address is required. Since the information of real confederates is not used, if an ID
number, telephone number, or address is required, data is randomly generated to fill in these fields.
The same, common name was used in all requests, and email accounts were created for the exper-
iment. As shown in Figure 4.6, 80 percent of government forums require users to submit a name,
60 percent require a phone number, approximately 50 percent an email address, 30 to 40 percent
an address, and only 10 percent a personal identification number. Posting requirements are also
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Figure 4.6: Requirements for posting to county government web forums by treatment group
balanced across the control and treatment groups.
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4.3 Results
Looking at whether or not county governments responded to the requests to evaluate overall re-
sponsiveness, I find that 32 percent (95% confidence interval of 28% to 36%) of county govern-
ments responded to the Dibao request under the control condition.11 In addition to overall respon-
siveness, I examine whether the reply to the Dibao request is made publicly viewable, or whether
the response is kept private. A response is private if it is not accessible without logging into the
account, or if the reply is emailed rather than posted publicly. The public response rate to the
control group is 21% (95% confidence intervals of 18% to 25%).
The black dot on the left side of Figure 4.7 shows the point estimate for the causal e↵ect of
threatening collective action on whether county governments responded, and the black dot on the
right side of the figure shows the point estimate for the causal e↵ect of threatening collective action
on whether governments responded publicly. The vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals.12
As Figure 4.7 shows, the causal e↵ect on whether government responded to the Dibao applicant
is 10 percentage points for threats of collective action. In other words, whereas only 32% of
county governments responded to Dibao requests that describe the economic hardship faced by
the household, 42% of county government responded to Dibao requests that describe economic
hardship and threaten to engage in collective action if the government does not provide assistance
in obtaining Dibao. This means that threatening collective action causes county government to be
one third more responsive to the complaint.
The causal e↵ect of threatening collective action on publicly viewable responses is also over
10 percentage points. Whereas the overall rate of public responses is 21% for complaints that
only describe economic hardship, the rate of public responses for complaints that also threaten
11The denominator is the county websites where requests were successfully submitted.
12Conference intervals shown in the figures of the results section are based on Welsh two-sided t-test. Although
the data are binary, the large sample size and mean response rates mean the central limit theorem applies. Conference
intervals based on alternative methods produce basically identical results.
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Figure 4.7: Causal e↵ect of threatening collective action on responsiveness and public responsiveness
collective action is 32%. This means adding a threat of disruption to the complaint increases the
rate of public responses by nearly 50 percent.
In other words, threatening collective action has a large and statistically significant impact on
the level of government responsiveness to Dibao applicants. If applicants provide information that
they have the potential to disrupt social order by engaging in collective action, local governments
are much more likely to respond to their Dibao complaints. These results are stable to various
model specifications and the inclusion of controls (see Table A.4 and Table A.5 in Appendix A.2).
In addition to whether or not governments responded and whether or not the response is pub-
licly viewable, I examine the content of replies from county governments that responded to the
Dibao complaint. Responses were hand coded into three categories: (1) Deferral, (2) Referral, and
(3) Direct Information.13 The content of these three categories roughly increases with the length
of text and likely reflects increasing e↵ort on the part of the government respondent.
13Intercoder reliability for agreement in classifying response into these three categories was 99%.
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Replies are coded as Deferral if the response does not provide an answer to the question of
how to obtain Dibao. Sometimes a rationale for the lack of information is provided but other times
none is given. Oftentimes, the government response states that some piece of personal information
is missing in the complaint. Replies in the Deferral category are on average the shortest relies, and
likely require the least amount of e↵ort on part of the county government. The example below is a
typical Deferral response:
Hello letter writer! Your question does not contain enough specificity, for example,
your address.
Replies are coded as Referral when the government response suggests contacting another agency
for further assistance, and provides the contact details of that agency. For example:
Hello, you must meet certain requirements to apply for Dibao, based on the situation
you describe, we cannot determine your eligibility. Please consult with the department
of civil a↵airs for Dibao information. Telephone: ****373.
When replies state that the initial complaint does not provide su cient information, but also pro-
vides details on how to obtain additional resources and assistance (e.g., a telephone number), the
responses are coded as Referral instead of Deferral.
Finally, responses are coded as Direct Information when the reply directly provides the infor-
mation required to answer the question posted by the Dibao applicant. These replies are generally
the longest the length. Direct Information replies provide the most detailed information on what is
required to obtain Dibao as well as specific the next steps for the prospective applicant, which may
include contact information on relevant agencies. For example:
XX comrade, hello! First, thank you for your interest and support in our work on civil
a↵airs. Eligibility for Dibao is based on household income. In your post, you did not
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specify your household income, nor did you specify whether you are a rural or urban
household. For example, this year, in our city, the rural Dibao level is 2400 yuan. If
your household’s annual income is less than 2400 yuan, you have initial eligibility to
apply for Dibao. But, whether you can receive Dibao is based on a rigorous set of
criteria, which I cannot detail line by line here. Please go to the Hukou (household
registration) o ce of the township civil a↵airs department to obtain detailed informa-
tion. You can also obtain information by phone, our phone number is ****287. In
addition, since the district-level civil a↵airs agency only has ability to review Dibao
applications, and since the township government take the lead in evaluation of Dibao
eligibility, you can give your detailed information to the township o ce, who we be-
lieve will take your detailed information and provide preliminary advice on whether
you are eligible to receive Dibao.
Table 4.2 shows the number and percent of responses for each of the content categories for the
control and treatment conditions. For complaints that threaten collective action, there is the highest
proportion of responses in the Direct Information category and the lowest proportion of responses
in the Deferral category.
Table 4.2: Content of government responses by treatment group
No Response Deferral Referral Direct Info
Control 551 76.9% 33 4.6% 42 5.9% 91 12.7%
Threat of collective action 496 69.2% 36 5.0% 52 7.3% 133 18.6%
Figure 4.8 shows the di↵erence in means of each category of responses between the treatment
group and the control group.14 This di↵erence in means represents the causal e↵ect of the treatment
14The category of no response exists for each group, but is not shown here. Because the four di↵erences in means are
correlated with each other, a bootstrap procedure (of 1,000 iterations) is used to obtain the correct standard errors. In
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Figure 4.8: Causal e↵ect of threatening collective action on reply content
on the content of the response. Threatening collective action has the causal e↵ect of increasing
Direct Information responses by 6 percentage points (95% confidence intervals of 2% to 9%).
In other words, when complaints only describe the economic situation of the household, 13% of
county government respond with Direct Information, but when the complaint also includes the
threat of collective action, 19% of county governments respond with Direct Information. This
represents a 50% increase in responses that provide the more helpful information.
In terms of speed of response, over 20 percent of responses were provided within one business
day, and 70 percent of responses were provided within ten business days. No significant di↵erences
in the speed of response were found between treatment an control groups.
each round of bootstrap, prefectures are randomly drawn with replacement from universe of prefectures to make sure
the treatment conditions are balanced. Counties belonging to the newly drawn prefectures constitute a new sample.
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4.4 Summary
By conducting an experiment on a channel used for gathering information about the preferences
and inclination of individuals, I show that there is higher responsiveness to the complaints of Dibao
applicants who threaten to engage in collective action than to those who simply describe their
economic hardship. This provides further evidence that Dibao is aimed at preempting disruption.
In addition, this evidence shows how Dibao may be selectively targeted at the individual level
when the regime has access to information about individual-level preferences. By exhibiting higher
levels of responsiveness as well as providing more informative responses to those who threaten to
engage in collective action, county governments are exhibiting preferential treatment to certain
types of Dibao applicants, and privileging their chances of accessing the Dibao program.
By examining selective responsiveness at the individual level, this chapter highlights the essen-
tial role of information in facilitating selective welfare provision. An authoritarian regime’s ability
to preempt disruption depends on whether the regime can identify potential disrupters. One way
of identifying these individuals is to look for information that individuals themselves volunteer. In
the next chapters, we move from selectivity in responding to Dibao applicants to selectivity in the
assignment of Dibao status.
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This chapter demonstrates two points empirically. The first is that recipients of Dibao are those
who are more likely to disrupt social order, and the second is that this is only the case when
the regime can extract detailed information about individuals. Unlike prior chapters that focused
on when and where benefits are distributed to Dibao households (Chapter 3) or di↵erent levels
of responsiveness to Dibao applicants (Chapter 4), this chapter hones in on the characteristics of
households that receive Dibao.
When information is not volunteered by individuals through complaints or other overt channels
for information gathering, selective welfare provision depends on the ability to extract information
about the private lives of individuals in order to uncover private preferences and target potential
disrupters who have yet to take action. This chapter shows how block captains in some, but not
all, neighborhoods obtain private information about members of their community and transmit this
information to the residents’ committee and other representatives of the regime.
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5.1 Block Captains and Information Extraction
The previous chapter organized channels of information gathering along two dimensions—whether
the information gathering process is overt or covert and whether the information obtained is struc-
tured or unstructured (see Figure 4.1). The previous chapter focused on information gathering
through an overt but unstructured channel—complaints volunteered by individuals to the regime
through government web forums. However, this type of information gathering is not e↵ective in
obtaining information about potential disrupters who do not publicly reveal their desire to protest or
petition. This is the problem of insincerity and preference falsification, and overcoming it requires
covert means of gathering information.
The repressive apparatus of authoritarian regimes often lead the charge in collecting covert in-
formation. Dimitrov (2014a) describes how in the USSR the KGB employed extensive networks
into the Brezhnev era that focused on identifying dissenters who threatened the stability of the
regime. However, if a regime is not only interested in threats to regime survival, but also inter-
ested in threats to social order, the coercive apparatus may be insu cient for identifying this much
broader set of threats unless the repressive apparatus permeates all levels of society.1 Threats to
regime durability are rare, which means there are a relatively small number of individuals or orga-
nizations capable of challenging the regime, and the repressive apparatus can focus on identifying
these unusual individuals and organizations. Threats to social order are common, which means
a large number of individuals and organizations can engage in disruption. Identifying this much
more common threat requires a large, grassroots organization of informants who are integrated into
local communities.
At first blush, it might seem that such a grassroots organization is unnecessary for a regime
with many tools of information extraction and control like China. However, identifying private
1This would be the case for totalitarian regimes. Today, perhaps only North Korea would have such a pervasive,
coercive apparatus.
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preferences requires getting behind closed doors and into people’s lives, which very few methods
of information gathering can accomplish. An example of another method of information collec-
tion in China is the dang’an (cH), a personnel record, which includes information such as school
performance, employment record, political history, as well as criminal and administrative records.2
While the dang’an contains a wealth of personal information about individuals, it presents a static
picture that may not always be up to date and that may be missing key pieces of information. Sto-
ries exist of residents’ committees who distribute Dibao benefits to a resident even after he has
been in prison for a year. Presumably this person’s trial and imprisonment are in his dang’an,
but for whatever reason, the residents’ committee remained unaware of this development.3 Even
when residents’ committees work closely with local public security o ces to share information,
applicants for Dibao may not have a formal work unit, they may rent housing or live in hous-
ing not purchased under their name; in these cases, the dang’an may not accurately reflect their
present situation. Finally, in some cases, the dang’an may not contain all of the pertinent in-
formation. Based on conversations with individuals who have worked in China’s public security
apparatus, extra-judicial forms of detention, such as internment in the laojiao, or gulag, system,
psychiatric hospitals, or drug detention centers do not always appear in the dang’an.4 In contrast
to the dang’an, informants can supply the most up to date information about what a resident is
thinking or thinking of doing.
In urban China, one such grassroots organization that has engaged and continues to engage in
information gathering for the regime is the network of block captains. However, as the following
sections will show, the block captains of some, but not all, neighborhoods take on this role. In
2The local public security bureau and work unit have copies of the dang’an, and records are increasingly electronic.
3See http://bit.ly/1zVbwRV (Retrieved December 1, 2014).
4Individuals who could not be convicted through the legal system, are sometimes punished through the laojiao
system. The laojiao system has been banned, but alternative forms of extra-judicial imprisonment, such a black jails,
psychiatric institutions, and drug detention center have been converted to this purpose. (Information from conversa-
tions with individuals who have worked in China’s public security and prosecution system.)
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other words, simply having the title of block captain does not imply an ability to obtain private
information. Obtaining private information requires the individual providing the information to, at
some level, trust the person the information is being transmitted to. Thus, just because someone is
supposed to gather information does not mean that s/he can gain the trust required to access private
information. Block captains who are e↵ective in obtaining private information are individuals who
are regarded with some measure of trust and respect by the community. Here, it is important to
emphasize that although block captains can be found in almost all Chinese neighborhoods, not all
neighborhoods have block captains who are e↵ectively engaged in gathering information for the
regime.
5.1.1 Governance of Urban Neighborhoods
China’s formal administrative structure is arranged from top to bottom: the central level, the
provincial level, the prefectural (city) level, the county (district) level, and the township (street
o ce) level. Neighborhoods, like their rural counterparts, villages, are below the township level,
and thus fall outside of the formal administrative structure of the country. In large cities, urban
neighborhoods typically encompass 2000 to 3000 households, and residents’ committees, which
administer these neighborhoods, are usually sta↵ed with a half dozen to a dozen individuals, in-
cluding a director, a vice director, and administrators focused on di↵erent policy areas such as
family planning, Dibao, petitions, and public security. Figure 5.1 shows bulletin boards located
outside of residents’ committee o ces containing information on residents’ committee sta↵, in-
cluding their name and area of responsibility.
According to the People’s Republic of China Organization Law of Urban Residents’ Commit-
tees (Residents’ Committee Law), residents’ committees are grassroots organizations that allow
residents to self-manage, self-educate, and self-serve (E⌘‘X⇢/E⌘Í⌘°⌃ Í⌘Y
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Figure 5.1: Bulletin boards outside of residents’ committee o ce listing the names and position of residents’
committee sta↵
≤ Í⌘ °Ñ˙B§⌫'Íªƒ«).5 As part of this self governance, residents’ committee
members are supposed to be elected for three year terms by residents either through direct, general
elections or through the vote of residents’ representatives. For the most part, residents’ committee
members are elected by representatives, and if general elections are held, the candidates up for
election have been vetted and pre-selected. As a result, many residents’ committee members are
also members of the neighborhood Communist Party Branch. For example, the director of the res-
idents’ committee is often the Party Secretary of the neighborhood dangzhibu or dangzhongzhi,6
Thus, although the residents’ committee is outside of China’s formal administrative structure, its
key personnel fall within the formal organizational structure of the Communist Party, making the
residents’ committee a de facto component of the CCP regime. The key responsibilities of the
residents’ committee, according to the Residents’ Committee Law, include publicizing and edu-
cating residents about national laws, regulations, and policies; managing the a↵airs and welfare of
residents; mediating disputes; helping to maintain social order; administering public programs for
5See http://bit.ly/1Ib41Kx for original text of law (Retrieved January 5, 2015).
6For explanations of Party branch, dangzongzhi, and dangzhibu, see Section 2.1.3.
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residents, and communicating the opinions and suggestions of residents to the government.
Although maintaining social order and gathering information about the preferences of residents
are explicit duties of the residents’ committee, the responsibility of administering a large number
of public programs is very time consuming. As a result, it is di cult for this small group of people
to know the detailed situation of thousands of residents. For that, they have traditionally relied
on block captains and are beginning to leverage network captains (this latter group is discussed
in further detail in Section 5.1.3). Block captains are typically selected and then recruited by
other block captains or residents’ committee members. They are primarily women, often retired
or laid o↵ former SOE workers, who live in the neighborhood. There is no formal mechanism to
compensate block captains for their work, but in some neighborhoods, block captains travel for
gatherings and retreats; they may have a small budget for food at meetings, and they receive gifts
around Chinese New Year.
Residents’ committees and networks of block captains have their roots in the early Commu-
nist period, where they connected urban dwellers without workplace associations to the regime
(Read 2012).7 Although these grassroots structures play important roles in governance—in de-
livering services, in mobilizing residents, in transmitting information from the regime downward,
they have always played a role in surveillance—the collection and upward transmission of infor-
mation. During the Cultural Revolution, residents’ committees and block captains reported sent
down youth who secretly returned to cities. In the 1980s and 1990s, faced with economic reform
and urban transformations that generated layo↵s as well as migrant workers, residents’ committees
were reformed and reemphasized as a way to increase the “infrastructural power of the Party-state”
(Heberer and Go¨bel 2011, 5). Reform was led by the Ministry of Civil A↵airs, the same bureau-
cracy that administers Dibao, with the goal of increasing the relevance of the residents’ committee
7As Read (2012) has noted, residents’ committees, which have a large range of functions, have their roots in
the Commnunist period rather than earlier traditions of community governance such as the baojia (›2) system of
community law enforcement originating in the Song dynasty.
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for urban residents (Benewick, Tong and Howell 2004; Bray 2006; Derleth and Koldyk 2004; Dut-
ton, Lo and Wu 2008; Kojima and Kokubun 2005; White and Shang 2003; Wong and Poon 2005).
While functions, training, and responsibilities were enhanced during reform, the surveillance role
of residents’ committees, and especially block captains, remained an enduring feature. For exam-
ple, during the crackdown on Falun Gong in the late 1990s, block captains helped identify practi-
tioners, and during the 2003 SARS epidemic, anecdotes of block captains taking temperatures and
imposing quarantine abounded.8
5.1.2 Variation in Information Extraction
From November 2012 to March 2013, I conducted in-depth interviews with residents, residents’
committee members, block captains, and government o cials in Wuhan, Zhenghou, Qingdao, and
Zibo. Wuhan and Zhengzhou are provincial capitals in central China with di↵erent levels of Dibao
coverage among the population (2.9% of the population received Dibao in Wuhan, 0.6% of the
population did in Zhengzhou in 2008) but similar levels of GDP, GDP per capita, household in-
come and expenditures, government fiscal revenues and expenditures, and level of unemployment.
Similarly, Qingdao and Zibo are cities in Shandong Province, in Eastern China similar along these
structural and demographic dimensions, but di↵ering in the proportion of the population receiving
Dibao.9
Armed with letters of introduction from local universities, I conducted cold visits to neigh-
borhoods across these cities. I interviewed 54 residents in Hongshan, Jianghan, Jiangan districts
in Wuhan; Shangjie, Zhongyuan, Xindong districts in Zhengzhou; Shibei, Xifang, Chengyang
districts in Qingdao, and Zhangdian, Boshan districts in Zibo. Interviewees included urban resi-
dents, former cadres, laid o↵ SOE workers, rural migrant workers living in urban neighborhoods,
8For example, see http://www.salon.com/2003/06/19/sars 2/.
9The proportion of the population receiving Dibao in Zibo was twice of that in Qingdao in 2008.
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and Dibao recipients. In Lixia (Jinan), Boshan (Zibo), Shibei and Chengyang (Qingdao), Shangjie
(Zhengzhou), as well as Hongshan and Jianghan districts in Wuhan, I interviewed 20 neighborhood
cadres, including residents’ committee workers, directors, party secretaries and block captains.
Finally, I interviewed 36 city and district government o cials and academics in Beijing, Jinan,
Qingdao, Zhengzhou, and Wuhan, including those from the local o ce of the executive, local civil
a↵airs departments, human resources and social security departments, and finance departments.
Based on this fieldwork, I found that while almost all neighborhoods have block captains,
the role played by block captains di↵ered greatly. Superficially, the block captains I encountered
all bore some passing resemblance. All were women, mostly in their 50s and 60s, who were
no longer employed. The resemblance ends there. In some neighborhoods, block captains are
well recognized and trusted members of the community who interacted frequently with residents.
They energetically educated residents on state policies, organized residents for o cially sanctioned
activities, resolved conflicts among neighbors, and gathered information about residents. In these
neighborhoods, when walking with the block captain around the neighborhood, I observed them
greeting residents by name and asking after their families. Residents I spoke with knew their block
captain and could point to the apartment where they live. When asked what role block captains
in the neighborhood play, residents would say that they help identify and solve problems in the
community.
In other neighborhoods, block captain is simply a title, and those with this title have little or no
interaction with residents or the residents’ committee. Block captains do not interact frequently or
regularly with residents. Residents either have no idea whether there was a block captain or some
vague notion that someone who went by that title existed. When asked about the role of the block
captain, residents would say they were not sure. Other scholars have noted that block captains
have a reputation for getting into other people’s business (1°ã) (Read 2012). However, while
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this reputation seemed accurate in some neighborhoods, in others it did not apply. All together, it
was clear that in some neighborhoods, block captains were at the center of their community, well
known and trusted, while in other neighborhoods they were not particularly noteworthy, and were
not distinguishable from other residents.
Conversations with residents’ committees revealed that di↵erences in the integration and pen-
etration of block captains coincide with di↵erences in the residents’ committee’s knowledge of
the neighborhood. In neighborhoods where block captains had deeply penetrated into their com-
munities, residents’ committees were well informed of the goings-on of the neighborhood. In
these neighborhoods, there are often regular (weekly or biweekly) meetings between block cap-
tains and residents’ committees, and in the meetings I observed, information about residents was
shared and discussed. In these neighborhoods, the residents’ committee not only had information
related to o cial programs (e.g., the number of pregnant women for family planning, the number
of veterans for veterans’ services, the number of residents who have enrolled in public health insur-
ance programs), residents’ committees also had access to much more personal information—which
neighbors were fighting over noise, which husbands and wives were experiencing familial discord,
which families had children who had not done well in their standardized tests, which households
were not disposing of trash properly, who had been posting handbills in inappropriate places, and
the list goes on.
In contrast, in neighborhoods where block captains had not penetrated into their communities,
residents’ committees seemed to know very little about the neighborhood’s residents. In these
neighborhoods, often there were no meetings between the residents’ committee and block captains,
or a meeting once a year, and while these residents’ committees could report numbers of residents
participating in various public programs, they knew very little about the lives of local residents.
In these neighborhoods, it seemed that what the residents’ committee knew about residents came
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mostly from residents who proactively approached the committee with questions about programs
or access to services. In these neighborhoods, residents’ committees seemed intent on doing the
minimal amount of work in order to fulfill their obligations as residents’ committee members.
For example, some of these residents’ committees would start work around 10AM, start the lunch
break by 11:30AM, return by 1:30PM, and then close by 4:00PM. Often, neighborhoods where
residents’ committees knew little about residents were also those with trash overflowing into public
spaces (see left panel of Figure 5.2). In one neighborhood, a resident had colonized the strip of
Figure 5.2: Trash overflowing in a neighborhood (left panel); vegetables being grown in neighborhood
public spaces (right panel)
dirt between the side walk and the building entryway for planting vegetables (see right panel of
Figure 5.2). When I asked this resident what the residents’ committee thought of the blossoming
garden, she replied that “they do not care and can not do anything about it” (“÷Ï °,_° 
⌦”).
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5.1.3 Sources and Implications of Variation
My work does not delve into the question of why some neighborhoods have networks of block
captains who can penetrate the private lives of residents while other neighborhoods have block
captains who do not play a role in information gathering. The di↵erences observed between resi-
dents’ committees in neighborhoods with and without information extraction capabilities could be
explained by di↵erences in the e↵ort and capabilities of residents’ committee leaders; however, it
is just as likely that residents’ committees in neighborhoods with limited information have tried
and failed to penetrate those communities. The works of other scholars suggest that this variation
could be due to di↵erences in the level of Party penetration among urban areas and the historical
legacies of conflict (Koss 2015), or to the type of housing and stability of residency (Read 2012).
The key to my analysis is that variation in the information gathering capacity of block captains
exists.
The CCP seems aware of this variation in the quality of its urban grassroots organization. In
recent years, a new grassroots structure, called network personnel or network captains (Q<X,
Q<), have appeared in neighborhoods. Network captains are predominantly young women
in their 20s or 30s, who are well educated with community college or even college degrees, who
generally do not live in the neighborhood. They are regarded as professionals engaged in social
work focused on identifying, communicating, and solving problems that residents face (Ü„⌘
≈ læ⌘≈ „≥⌘≈). In other words, network captains are informants who are empowered
to resolve the issues that they identify. During my fieldwork in 2012 and 2013, these network cap-
tains did not appear to have penetrated their local communities as residents were largely unaware
of the identity of their network captain.
What is revealed by the characteristics of block captains who are able to e↵ectively gather
private information about residents in their community is that this type of societal penetration
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may not be easy to replicate. This is because trust and respect are what enable block captains
to penetrate their community and obtain private information. Simply designating more people as
informants will not necessarily increase information gathering capabilities.
Finally, there is an inherent tension in the block captain’s ability to obtain information on pri-
vate preferences. On one hand, a block captain must enjoy a certain level of trust among residents
in order to obtain information. On the other hand, a block captain who constantly transmits private
information to the regime can be seen as betraying that trust. Block captains seem to balance this
tension by engaging heavily in persuasion. They do not merely transmit private information to the
residents’ committee, but work to ameliorate the underlying sources of discontent. For example, if
a block captain finds out that a resident is thinking of petitioning, she will let the residents’ com-
mittee know, but will also talk to the resident, to persuade that person against petitioning. However,
this balance can easily be lost, which in part explains why block captains often have reputations
for being nosy busybodies.
5.2 Former Prisoners as Potential Disrupters
As an outside observer not integrated into the communities I am studying, I by definition have
less access to information than neighborhoods administrators and insiders. In other words, if a
residents’ committee provided me with a list of individuals receiving Diboa, it would be more
di cult for me to identify the potential disrupters among them than for the residents’ committee.
As a result, I use former prisoners as a proxy to identify whether recipients of Dibao include
individuals who may pose a potential threat to social order.
Former prisoners (⌘ „Y∫X) include those who have been imprisoned through the judi-
cial system as well as those who have been detained through extra-judicial methods. The CCP sees
this population as important to the continued social stability of the country, and has emphasized
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the need for their rehabilitation and resettlement into mainstream society.10 On one hand, this em-
phasis on the rehabilitation of former convicts is not unique to China or even to non-democratic
regimes. Governments all over the world are interested in preventing recidivism and ensuring
that prisoners who may face discrimination upon release are able to pursue gainful employment
within the bounds of the law. Redistributive e↵orts toward this population could be a sign of good
governance that any country interested in crime prevention would engage in.
However, di↵erent from most democratic countries, former prisoners in China include those
who have been penalized for engaging in activities such as protest and collective action. For
example, in describing why it is important to focus on the population of former prisoners, o cials
emphasize the need to “rectify deviant influences and go back to the straight and narrow to return
to society” (9™RcﬁR>⇢), where the term deviant can refer to participation in religious
organizations such as Falun Gong. In another example, prior to the World Expo in Shanghai, the
Shanghai Bureau of Justice issued a “Four things to prevent” (€* — ) order targeted at
former prisoners. Of the four things to prevent, one echoes prevention tactics that could be found
anywhere in the world—to prevent former prisoners from committing another crime ( — ⌘ 
„Y∫XÕ∞›’Øj), but the other three relate to social order: to prevent former prisoners
from participating in petition and mass incidents ( — ⌘ „Y∫X¬ ⌦ø ˘øå§
S'ãˆ), to prevent any major criminal cases involving former prisoners ( — ⌘ „Y
∫XÕ'v'⌘ãHˆ), and to prevent former prisoners from disturbing social stability and
participating in any large-scale collective events ( — ⌘ „Y∫X¬ qÕ>⇢3öÑ
Õ'§S'ãˆ). In 2012, over 350,000 people were prosecuted through the judicial system for
disturbing social order. The crimes belonging to this category include disturbing order in the work
unit (pqUMÈè), disturbing order in public places (pqlq:@Èè), making trouble (˚
10See http://bit.ly/1zVbz00.
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EÀã), and hindering activity (;çgLL°).11 This 350,000 number does not include many
more who are imprisoned through extra-judicial means for engaging in dissent against the regime
(Human Rights Watch 2009).12
Regardless of the exact crime for which former prisoners were incarcerated, the average for-
mer prisoner who receives Dibao is more likely than the average non-former prisoner who receives
Dibao to be a potential threat to social order. One immediate question is if former prisoners are
such a good proxy, why is it that not all neighborhoods automatically give Dibao to all former
prisoners? In fact, some cities—for example those in Shandong, Jilin, Anhui province—have poli-
cies in place that guarantee Dibao to prisoners immediately upon release.13 Other localities have
policies that do not guarantee Dibao to former prisoners, but provide resources to help former pris-
oners obtain Dibao.14 However, not all localities have this policy, in part because giving Dibao
to former prisoners may increase contention among other residents who perceive this arrangement
to be unfair, believing that former convicts are never deserving of benefits. Furthermore, even in
localities with preferential Dibao policies toward former prisoners, not all neighborhoods know
whether residents are former prisoners. If former prisoners are renting, living with extended fam-
ilies or friends, or otherwise living in a location without registering with the local public security
agency, it would be di cult for the residents’ committee to know who is living in the neighborhood
at any given time without other methods of information extraction. Finally, while former prisoners
may be a good proxy for those with the potential to engage in disruption, it is imperfect. A former
prisoner may be less likely to disrupt social order than a laid o↵ SOE worker or someone facing
housing demolition.
11China Statistical Yearbook 2013
12For more recent reports, see http://bit.ly/1BwUkx1, http://bit.ly/1ySAizL, http://bit.ly/1uHAYTk (Retrieved De-
cember 6, 2014).
13For examples, see http://bit.ly/1zVbz00 (Retrieved November 15, 2013).
14For just a few examples, see http://bit.ly/1C4dQE2, http://bit.ly/1DkSggr, http://bit.ly/18T85iO,
http://bit.ly/1D3MMWX, http://bit.ly/1xw7N5R (Retrieved December 7, 2014).
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Another question is why former prisoners are considered those who have the potential to
threaten social order, since presumably they were incarcerated because they had already engaged
in some form of disruptive behavior. This is because provision is selective based on behavior
around the time benefits are distributed. As discussed in Chapter 1, potential disrupters are those
who may engage in disruption in the period immediately following benefit distribution or further
into the future, and the ill-behaved are those who engaged in disruption in the period immediately
prior to benefit distribution. This distinction in time periods helps minimize the likelihood that
benefits are perceived as a reward for disruptive behavior, and the most direct way to do this is to
avoid distributing rewards immediately after an act of disruption. Former prisoners have received
punishment for their crimes, and if they receive Dibao upon release from prison, it is unlikely
that anyone would commit a crime in order to be imprisoned, then released, so that s/he could
obtain Dibao benefits. However, the action of distributing benefits to former prisoners is publicly
observable, and could reveal information that increases disruption among other residents.
Using former prisoners among Dibao recipients as a proxy for selective welfare provision tar-
geted at potential disrupters, I expect that in neighborhoods with strong information extraction
capabilities, Dibao recipients are more likely to be former prisoners, and in neighborhoods where
information extraction capabilities are weak, Dibao recipients are less likely to be former prisoners.
5.3 Neighborhood Survey
I test the relationship between information extraction and selective welfare provision by conducting
a survey of 100 neighborhoods in four cities in Eastern (Hangzhou), Central (Wuhan, Zhengzhou),
and Western (Xian) China from March to June 2013 in collaboration with local universities. These
cities exhibit di↵erent levels of economic development, income, inequality, as well as coverage of
the Dibao program, and were selected to ensure that my finding could be generalized to di↵erent
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regions of China. A total of 21 central urban districts in these four cities was selected, and three
to five neighborhoods in each district were selected. Selected districts represent central, urban
districts and include:
• Hangzhou: Shangcheng, Xihu, Gongshu, Jianggan
• Wuhan: Wuchang, Hanyang, Jiangan, Jianghan, Hongshan, Qiaokou
• Zhengzhou: Zhongyuan, Erqi, Guancheng, Jinshui, Huiji
• Xian: Weiyang, Xincheng, Baqiao, Lianhu, Beilin, Yanta
Enumerators were college students from local universities who were also residents of the city
where the research was being conducted. Enumerators were recommended by university profes-
sors for their experience in conducting local field research, and all were trained prior to the survey.
Local enumerators were selected so that local dialect would not be a hindrance in conducting in-
terviews. Responses were obtained from 97 of the 100 neighborhoods. Enumerators asked to
speak with either the residents’ committee party secretary, the residents’ committee director, or the
residents’ committee member in charge of Dibao. If none of these people was available, enumer-
ators would wait until one of them returned, or try again on another day. Enumerators had o cial
letters of introduction from local universities explaining the goals of the research, and only three
residents’ committee opted not to participate. A total of 103 residents’ committee members were
surveyed. Interviews took place during the working hours of the residents’ committee, typically
between 9-11AM and 2-4PM from Monday to Friday.
While in the neighborhood, numerators interviewed residents who were in public areas. Ap-
proximately 380 residents were approached, and 283 residents were surveyed.15 Because of the
timing of the visits, residents interviewed were primarily individuals without work such as retirees
15In one neighborhood, no residents were available for interview, in one neighborhood only one resident was avail-
able for interview, and in three neighborhoods, only two residents were available for interview. Excluding neighbor-
hoods with less than three resident interviews does not change the results substantively.
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and mothers with young children who were present during the day. These are the people who spend
the most time in the neighborhood and are most likely to know about neighborhood programs and
to interact with the residents’ committee and block captains. Interviewed residents are not meant
to be representative of any broader population. The goal of the survey of residents was simply to
generate a measure of the information gathering capabilities of the neighborhood block captains,
and a measure of the perception of the Dibao program. Because of the small number of questions,
which did not deal with sensitive topics, the majority of residents were willing to be interviewed,
and those who did not want to be interviewed typically declined because they were just passing
through the public space and did not want to stop for a conversation.
Measuring Information Extraction Capacity: Because most neighborhoods have block cap-
tains but the role of the block captain varies between neighborhoods, I do not rely on the number
of block captains or even the behaviors of block captains to determine their ability to extract infor-
mation.16 Instead, I measure the information extraction capacity of block captains by examining
outcomes of their interactions of residents. In neighborhoods where block captains are highly
penetrated in the community and capable of obtaining private information, block captains should
be well known by members of the community. In contrast, in neighborhoods where block cap-
tains do not have the capacity to extract private information, residents might have a vague sense
that block captains exist but would not be familiar with their block captain. Thus, utilizing this
outcome to capture information extraction, I code a neighborhood’s information extraction capa-
bilities by whether the residents in the neighborhood are aware that there are block captains in the
neighborhood, and where some residents can recall the surname of their block captain.
16However, I did collect information from the residents’ committee on the number of block captains and the fre-
quency of their interaction with the residents’ committee.
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Former Prisoners on Dibao: In the survey, residents’ committees were asked whether Dibao
recipients included any with the following characteristics: disabled (ãæ, $ã,ãæ), widows,
orphaned, or single-parents (U≤&iP,d·,d?), and former prisoners (˙Ò,Rc).
Residents’ committees were asked what type of crime was committed by the former prisoners
who are receiving Dibao. However, residents’ committees often tried to side step this question by
saying they did not have this information or answering in vague terms. Among residents’ commit-
tees that did share information on crimes committed, the vast majority said the crime was drug use.
This could mean that former prisoners on Dibao are those convicted of petty crimes. However, this
could also mean that former prisoners on Dibao are those who have been detained through extra-
legal means because drug detention centers are increasingly used to incarcerate individuals who
cannot be prosecuted through the legal system.17 It is much more common for individuals pun-
ished outside of the legal system to be those engaged in actions like petitioning, or participating in
what the Chinese regime considers to be cults like Falun Gong. Given the ambiguity and lack of
reliability of information on the crime committed, it is not included as key part of my analysis.
Structural and Demographic Factors Variation among neighborhoods in the number of former
prisoners who receive Dibao could be explained by di↵erences in the number of former prisoners
in the local neighborhood population. Unfortunately, sources of data that are disaggregated to the
neighborhood level are rare, and data on the distribution of former prisoners at the neighborhood
level is unavailable.18 In the absence of data on the geographic distribution of former prisoners,
I control for structural and demographic variables at the neighborhood level that may correspond
to the distribution of former prisoners. Specifically, neighborhoods with lower incomes, lower
17Based on conversation with public security o cials, and based on reports from human rights organizations (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2009).
18The only agency that would have this information would be the public security bureau, and even they might have
not complete information.
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housing costs, and larger migrant populations might be more likely to have former prisoners.
In the survey, I measure income and housing costs by the age of buildings in the neighborhood
as reported by the residents’ committee. I measure the scope of the migrant population by the pro-
portion of residents with rural residential permits (hukou) as reported by the residents’ committee
and by whether for rent advertisements are visible in the public spaces of the neighborhood.
5.4 Results
I begin by outlining descriptive statistics. Then, I move to examine the relationship between char-
acteristics of Dibao recipients and information extraction capabilities.
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 shows the number of neighborhoods, residents’ committee members, and residents sur-
veyed by city, as well as percentages for each city. Roughly one quarter of neighborhoods were
Table 5.1: Neighborhoods and respondents by city
Neighborhoods RC members Residents
Hangzhou 18 18.6% 18 17.5% 51 18.0%
Wuhan 24 24.7% 27 26.2% 69 24.4%
Zhengzhou 25 25.8% 28 27.2% 73 25.8%
Xian 30 30.9% 30 29.1% 90 31.8%
Total 97 103 283
located in Wuhan and Zhengzhou. Hangzhou represents a smaller proportion (18.6%) of neigh-
borhoods surveyed, and Xian slightly more (30.9%). One residents’ committee member was sur-
veyed for each neighborhood in Hangzhou and Xian, while in a few neighborhoods in Wuhan
and Zhengzhou more than one residents’ committee member participated in the survey. Where
possible, at least three residents were surveyed in each neighborhood.
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Table 5.2 shows the number of neighborhoods exhibiting various characteristics important to
the analysis, the total number of neighborhoods (N) for which information on that variable is avail-
able, and the percent of neighborhoods exhibiting these characteristics (number of neighborhoods
/ N). Table 5.2 shows that although almost all neighborhoods surveyed (96%) have block captains,
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of neighborhoods surveyed
Number of Percent of
neighborhoods N neighborhoods
Block captains 92 96 96%
High information extraction capacity 28 88 32%
Dibao recipients: disabled 56 78 72%
Dibao recipients: HH with children 19 78 24%
Dibao recipients: ex prisoners 12 78 15%
Apartments for rent 18 95 19%
Residents with rural residential permit 11 97 11%
only around 30% of neighborhoods have high information extraction capacity. The neighborhood
is coded as having high information extraction capacity if at least one third of residents surveyed
can name the surname of their block captain and if all residents surveyed say that there are block
captains in the neighborhood.19 In other words, the majority of neighborhoods that have block
captains have block captains who are not well known in their community. Block captains per
neighborhood ranged from 10 to 130 and the number of households each block captain was re-
sponsible for ranged from 13 to 280. On average, neighborhoods had 40 block captains, so that
each block captain was responsible for approximately 80 households.
Looking at the characteristics of Dibao recipients, Table 5.2 shows that most neighborhoods
(73%) have Dibao recipients who are disabled. Approximately one quarter of neighborhoods
19Given the small number of residents surveyed in each neighborhood, I would not expect that all residents could
name the surname of the block captain even if the block captain were incredibly well integrated in the community.
There are many sources of uncertainty. For example, the respondent could be unable to name the surname of the block
captain because s/he is not the person who usually interacts with the block captain in the household, or because the
block captain is typically referred to by her term of address instead of her name.
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(24%) have households with children20 among Dibao recipients, and 15% of neighborhoods have
former prisoners among Dibao recipients.
In terms of structural characteristics of the neighborhoods surveyed, the last two rows of Ta-
ble 5.2 show that around 20% of neighborhoods have apartments for rent and around 10% of
neighborhoods have residents with rural residential permits. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of
neighborhoods by age. Nearly 35% of neighborhoods contain buildings constructed within the
Table 5.3: Age of Neighborhoods Surveyed
Number of Percent of
Neighborhood age neighborhoods N neighborhoods
Pre 1980s 18 83 21.7%
1980s 21 83 25.3%
1990s 15 83 18.1%
2000s 29 83 34.9%
past 10-15 years (in the 2000s), less than 20% contain buildings constructed in the 1990s, and
nearly 50% of neighborhoods were built in the 1980s or before.21
5.4.2 Dibao Recipients and Information Extraction
I find that in neighborhoods where the regime has high information extraction capabilities, Dibao
recipients are more likely to be former prisoners and less likely to be disabled. Figure 5.3 shows
the estimated probability of former prisoners (left panel) and disabled (right panel) among Dibao
recipients with high information extraction capabilities (solid line to the left), with low informa-
tion extraction capabilities (solid line in the middle), and the first di↵erence in the probability of
having former prisoners among Dibao recipients between neighborhoods with high and low levels
20The terminology “households with children” is used to denote single parent households with children, or house-
holds with orphans.
21Two of the oldest neighborhoods surveyed date back to the 1940s, one in Wuhan and one in Hangzhou.
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of information extraction capacity (dashed line to the right).22
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Figure 5.3: Probability of former prisoners among Dibao recipients (left panel), and probability of disabled
among Dibao recipients (right panel); 90% confidence intervals are shown.
The left panel of Figure 5.3 shows that the probability that Dibao recipients include former
prisoners is 43% (90% CI of 20% to 64%) in neighborhoods where block captains penetrate their
local communities and are able to extract private information about residents. In other words,
almost half of neighborhoods where residents know their block captains give Dibao to former
prisoners. In contrast, in neighborhoods with low information extraction capacity, the probability
that Dibao recipients include former prisoners is only 14% (90% CI of 3% to 34%). This means
only one in seven neighborhoods where residents do not know their block captains give Dibao
to former prisoners. When comparing these probabilities, neighborhoods with high information
extraction capacity are 23% (90% CI of 1% to 48%) more likely to have former prisoners among
Dibao recipients than neighborhoods with low information extraction capabilities.
22These predicted values are based on logistic regression of whether former prisoners are among Dibao recipients
on the level of information extraction in the neighborhood while controlling for income and other structure factors.
This figure is based on models (2) and (5) of Table A.6 in Appendix A.3 with all other variables held at their mean.
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The right panel of Figure 5.3 examines the probability that Dibao recipients include the dis-
abled. Among neighborhoods with high information extraction capabilities, the probability that
Dibao recipients include the disabled is 80% ((90% CI of 57% to 94%). Among neighborhoods
with low information extraction capabilities, the probability that Dibao recipients include the dis-
abled is 97% (90% CI of 91% to 100%). When comparing between neighborhoods, those with high
information extraction capabilities are 17% (90% CI of 4% to 39%) less likely to have disabled
among Dibao recipients than neighborhoods with low information extraction capabilities. What is
important to note here is that in most neighborhoods, regardless of the role of block captains, it
is very likely that the disabled number among Dibao recipients. Giving Dibao to those who are
disabled and unable to work generates the least amount of contention among residents. Since a
goal of the Dibao program is to preempt disruption, working to minimize the amount of contention
the program itself generates is understandable.
5.4.3 Endogeneity and Alternative Explanations
There are three potential concerns with the analysis presented above. First is the issue of endo-
geneity, that the presence of former prisoners in some neighborhood leads to greater vigilance on
part of the residents’ committee and block captains. Since vigilance requires not just recruiting
block captains but having block captains who are able to penetrate their community, it would not
be easy to increase vigilance. However, even if it is the case that places with more former prison-
ers become more vigilant and more e↵ective in extracting information, it still supports the broader
point that the regime is concerned about the potential for social disruption and that the ability to
obtain private information is a critical part of mitigating these potential threats. In other words,
while my fieldwork suggests that information extraction capacity is di cult to change, I am not
arguing that information extraction capacity causes selective welfare provision, but simply that
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selective welfare provision is not possible without access to information about private preferences.
A second concern is that these empirical patterns simply reflect the underlying distribution
of prisoners and disabled in various neighborhoods. Some neighborhoods have more prisoners,
so prisoners are more likely to receive Dibao, while other neighborhoods have more disabled, so
the disabled are more likely to receive Dibao. Controlling for structural variables may lessen this
concern, but more importantly, given the high probability of disabled receiving Dibao across all
neighborhoods, it seems unlikely that there is a great deal of variation among the neighborhoods
surveyed in terms of the size of the disabled population. Regarding the distribution of the prisoner
population, many of the high and low information neighborhoods are located in close proximity
and exhibit other similar characteristics. In addition, based on follow-up calls with residents’
committees, those giving Dibao to former prisoners were not more likely than residents’ committee
where former prisoners were not among Dibao recipients to say that there was a sizable population
of former prisoners in the neighborhood.
The final concern pertains to variation in residents’ willingness to apply for Dibao. If former
prisoners in low information extraction neighborhoods face greater stigma in applying for Dibao,
that may also explain the lower probability for former prisoners receiving Dibao in these neigh-
borhoods. There are two main reasons why this is unlikely to be the case. First, as discussed
in Chapter 2, Dibao status is often viewed as something desirable because of the ad hoc benefits
that can be access by some Dibao households. Given the desirability of Dibao, it is regarded not
as something households are ashamed of receiving in the way that many means-tested programs
are. Second, the identity of former prisoners is not necessarily open knowledge within a neigh-
borhoods. Neighborhoods where this information is most likely to be open knowledge, where
prisoners are most likely to experience stigma, are those where neighbors are familiar with one
another; however, neighborhoods with high degree of interpersonal familiarity are not less likely
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than neighborhoods without this degree of familiarity to give Dibao to former prisoners. When
controlling for familiarity among neighbors, the pattern that former prisoners are more likely to be
Dibao recipients in neighborhoods with higher information extraction capabilities remains strong.
5.5 Summary
By developing a novel measure of a neighborhood’s ability to obtain private information about
individuals, and by using the presence of former prisoners among Dibao recipients as a proxy for
individuals who have the potential to disrupt social order, I show that Dibao is selectively targeted
to former prisoners when neighborhoods have strong information extraction capabilities. Neigh-
borhoods’ information extraction capabilities depend on having block captains who are highly pen-
etrated in their local community. Only by gaining the trust of their neighbors can the block captain
go beyond publicly expressed preferences to surface private preferences. However, in transmitting
this private information to the regime, block captains run the risk of losing that trust. It is not
easy to obtain private information, especially information related to threats to social disruption,
which are pervasive and persistent. In this light, perhaps it is not surprising that while almost all
neighborhoods have block captains, only one third of neighborhoods have block captains who have
strong information extraction capabilities.
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Dilemma of Redistribution
The prior chapters show how the Dibao program is aimed at preempting threats to social order by
targeting benefits selectively to individuals who have the potential to be disruptive. This chapter
examines the consequences of this strategy as well as the consequences of the broader e↵ort to use
redistribution to maintain social order.
Redistribution is used as a means of pacification, but redistribution inexorably generates con-
tention. This is what I call the dilemma of redistribution. The benefits associated with welfare
programs, social policies, and other redistributive e↵orts are always limited, and competition and
contention will ensue over these scare resources. When redistribution is used strategically, as a
reward for protesting or as a prophylactic to prevent protest, it can generate even greater levels
of contention by creating perverse incentives for disruptive behavior and by generating dissatis-
faction over the perceived inequity of allocation. Reducing contention over strategic allocation of
benefits involves obscuring the instrumental function of redistribution e↵orts, which can be time
consuming and resource intensive.
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6.1 Dibao and Contention
The evolution of the Dibao program is a prime example of the dilemma of redistribution. The Dibao
program has always had a goal of improving social order, yet the program generates contention and
is a source of protest.
The Dibao program emerged in the 1990s as a way of pacifying former workers who engaged
in protest and collective action over the loss of benefits as work units were dissolved (Solinger
2008, 2010). Solinger (2015) notes that when Dibao first came into being in the midst of SOE
reform, Dibao focused on inclusivity, providing benefits to laid o↵ workers who were a primary
source of contentious politics at the time.
However, even as Dibao helped mitigate contention among laid o↵ workers, it became a source
of contention. Beginning in the 2000s, contention over SOE reform lessened, but stories of corrupt
and inequitable Dibao practices materialized. The phenomenon of favor Dibao or relationship
Dibao (∫≈N›,s˚N›), where Dibao benefits were distributed by administrators to family
and friends, generated widespread anger. Primarily a rural phenomenon, numerous news reports
detailed examples of Dibao being awarded to friends and family of village cadres and adminis-
trators of the Dibao program, and described how these practices led to protest and petitioning by
villagers.1 A well known story of favor Dibao recounts the distribution of Dibao by a village
cadre to the father of a vice Minister, in an e↵ort to curry favor with elites in Beijing. This story
was widely circulated in the media, leading to condemnation by top leaders including Premier Li
Keqiang.2 The Ministry of Civil A↵airs has stated that it has a “zero tolerance” policy for favor
Dibao,3 and the fight against perceptions of impropriety has led to hyper vigilance. Behavior such
as decreasing the number of Dibao recipients and increasing visible standards for eligibility, e.g,
1http://www.chinesetoday.com/zh/article/899883.
2See http://bit.ly/1ze6jO9 (Retrieved January 10, 2015).
3See http://bit.ly/1ze6ola (Retrieved November 2, 2014).
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prohibiting those who own pets from receiving Dibao, have become signals of correct implemen-
tation.
In addition to contention over the perceived fairness of distribution, Dibao has also generated
incentives for individuals to protest and act collectively in order to obtain Dibao strategically.
While the focus of this dissertation is on selective provision of Dibao to individuals who have
not yet engaged in disruptive behavior, Dibao has been used as a means of buying o↵ those who
protest.
In Chen’s (2012) study of collective petitioning, he finds that pacifying collective petitioners
with Dibao simply yields more collective petitioning. In one locality, individuals who collectively
petitioned were given Dibao as well as some other benefits. While these individuals momentarily
ceased to petition, after they saw the results that could be obtained by acting collectively, they
began to plan additional activities. In another county in Jiangxi, veterans collectively petitioned in
2006. In response, the county gave all of the veterans Dibao in the amount of 100 RMB per month.
The next year, the veterans collectively petitioned again, and the county increased their Dibao ben-
efits to 200 RMB per month with an automatic rate increase of 15% every year thereafter. Based
on Chen’s interviews with the veterans, this led the veterans to believe that without collectively
petitioning, they would never obtain anything. In 2010, thousands of veterans organized to collec-
tively protest in Baiyi Square in the capital of Jiangxi province, singing revolutionary “red” songs
and asking for benefits. These veterans were brought back to their localities by local o cials, who
wined and dined them, and reassured them that they would receive benefits. Non-veterans were
also inspired by the actions of the veterans and their results. After seeing a veteran from his village
obtain benefits after petitioning, Mr. Xiong, who had worked for the government for six months in
the 1960s, decided to petition for benefits owed for his service in the late 2000s. Mr. Xiong was
not confident that he could get anything, but said that since he had time, he would give it a try.
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Other stories describe how even when Dibao is provided as a response to protest to those
who are eligible, as long as petitioning and protest are seen as a way to obtain material rewards,
disruption continues. For example, in 2006, a Mr. Li fell into poverty because of illness in his
family. In order to support his family and put his children through school, Mr. Li turned to
petitioning as a way of securing their survival, and obtained Dibao for his ailing parents. After
seeing the result of his actions, he continued to petition and used Dibao to support his children,
even after they graduated from college. Chen (2012) describes how Mr. Li learned from his
experience, and over time gained a better understanding of the system, of how to extract profit
through disruption.
6.2 Hiding the Strategic Function of Dibao
Given the dilemma of redistribution and in particular the pitfalls of providing benefits in response
to protest, selective welfare provision is an e↵ort to achieve the goal of maintaining social order
while minimizing the disruption that the redistributive process generates. However, just as reward-
ing disruption can generate incentives to disrupt, so rewarding threats of disruption or the potential
to disrupt can also generate incentives to threaten disruption. That said, certain features of selec-
tive welfare provision obscure the connection between disruptive potential and redistribution. As
described in Chapter 1, targeting potential disrupters instead of the ill-behaved, information ex-
traction capabilities that put residents at an information disadvantage, and redistributing through a
public social policy scheme all work together to hide the instrumental exchange of Dibao benefits
for inaction. In this section, I examine the e↵ectiveness of these measures.
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6.2.1 Selective Welfare Provision Generating Contention
A feature of the Dibao program intended to alleviate contention over the fairness of distribution
is publicly displaying the names of Dibao recipients. Figure 6.1 shows two bulletin boards, the
left from a neighborhood in Wuhan and the right from a neighborhood in Zhenghzhou, with the
names of Dibao recipients and the amount of Dibao subsidy they receive each month. The displays
Figure 6.1: Bulletin boards listing households receiving Dibao
remind residents that those who receive Dibao fall within the program’s eligibility requirements,
and in doing so may alleviate the concerns of some residents. However, for families facing eco-
nomic di culties who are not currently receiving Dibao, the information displayed can increase
contention, especially if benefits are being distributed not only because of the economic plight of
households but the threat they pose to social order.
In interviews with residents’ committees in neighborhoods with selective welfare provision, the
challenge of dealing with residents who think they should be able to obtain Dibao was a recurrent
theme. In a neighborhood in Wuhan’s Jiangan district, the woman in charge of Dibao said:
Dibao work is di cult. The people who want Dibao have low competence and will
pound tables and chairs, they cry like babies who are being weaned from mother’s
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milk (N› }Z ûN›Ñ∫ (N, ˆ⇡ÕLPåÛ,1œ≠vÑiP
 7˘⇥)
A woman in charge of Dibao in Wuhan’s Hongshan district said that residents who want Dibao
but who are ineligible will repeatedly visit the residents’ committee. As a result, she has to spend
a great deal of time explaining to them why they cannot obtain the benefit. This sentiment was
echoed by an 11 year administrator of the Dibao program who had the following to say:
People applying for Dibao are those from the bottom rungs of society; sometimes
they are too calculating, so you have to have more patience to understand them and to
enlighten them. (3˜N›Ñ∫\: >⇢ïBÑ∫  ˆ⇡ÛÑ⇢ @ÂÅ⇢
 π⇣√ªÜ„  ¸÷Ï)
She suggested that they were thinking too much about how to strategically obtain Dibao and
the reasons other households are able to obtain the benefit. She emphasized the importance of
guiding these individuals to trust in the judgment of the government and Party. In Qingdao’s Shibei
and Xifang districts, residents’ committees of neighborhoods where former prisoners were Dibao
recipients gave numerous examples of complaints from residents that former criminals were being
rewarded by the state while ordinary citizens were not. In one neighborhood in Xifang district,
the residents’ committee quoted residents as saying that Dibao recipients were hoodlums who did
nothing but gamble and play mahjong. Likewise, a woman in charge of Dibao in a neighborhood
in Zhengzhou’s Zhongyuan district described how residents were unhappy with the program’s
recipients.
In contrast, in neighborhoods where Dibao recipients were the disabled, elderly with family,
or families with young children, the main challenge described by residents’ committees related to
burdensome administrative procedures (°8«↵A ), in the application and subsequent report-
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ing process. In many of these neighborhoods, Dibao administrators in the residents’ committee
would talk about the high work load involved in administering Dibao.
Neighborhood survey: The contrasting levels of discontent over Dibao provision revealed through
interviews is echoed in the neighborhood survey. I find that residents’ committees in neighbor-
hoods where former prisoners are Dibao recipients are more likely to receive complaints about the
Dibao program than residents’ committees in neighborhoods where former prisoners are not Dibao
recipients. This is not the case with other types of Dibao recipients. For example, there is no dif-
ference in the level of complaints residents’ committees report receiving between neighborhoods
where Dibao recipients include the disabled and neighborhoods where the disabled are not among
those who receive Dibao.
In the neighborhood survey, residents’ committees were asked an opened ended question about
the main challenges they encounter in implementing the Dibao program. Four categories of chal-
lenges were created based on the answers received. These include Complaints from residents,
Burdensome administrative process / high workload, Benefits too minimal, and Other. Each open
ended response could be coded into multiple categories. Complaints from residents included res-
idents’ committee responses that talked about residents expressing dissatisfaction with Dibao, re-
sponses that talked about the di culty of explaining to residents who could and could not obtain
Dibao, and responses that talked about the di culty of dealing with residents agitating to obtain
Dibao. Burdensome administrative process / high workload included residents’ committee re-
sponses that talked about the complexity of the Dibao application, review, and/or reporting process
and responses that talked about the di culty of verifying income. Benefits too minimal included
responses that talked about the low Dibao line, the low levels of cash transfers a↵orded by the
Dibao program, and the inability of the Dibao program to alleviate poverty and eliminate inequal-
ity. Finally, Other included responses such as those describing delayed disbursement of Dibao
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funding or micro-management by higher levels. After the categories were generated, two mem-
bers of the research team read through the open ended responses to code replies into these four
categories. The inter-coder agreement for these responses was 93%.
Figure 6.2 compares the probability of the residents’ committee reporting complaints from
residents given the presence of Dibao recipients who are former prisoners and Dibao recipients who
are disabled.4 The left panel of Figure 6.2 deals with whether former prisoners are among Dibao
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Figure 6.2: Probability of complaints about Dibao from residents; 90% confidence intervals are shown.
recipients in a neighborhood. When former prisoners are among Dibao recipients (the leftmost
solid vertical line of the left panel), the probability that the residents’ committee reports complaints
from citizens as a major challenge to the Dibao program is 55% (95% confidence interval of 23% to
84%). When former prisoners are not among Dibao recipients, the probability of complaints being
a major challenge for the residents’ committee is much lower at 20% (95% confidence interval
4Based on logistic regression of whether resident complaints about the Dibao program is a major challenge for
residents’ committee on the presence of former prisoners and the disabled among Dibao resident while controlling for
income and other structure factors. For coe cient estimates see model (3) of Table A.7 in Appendix A.4.
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of 8% to 39%). The di↵erence in the probability that complaints are a major challenge between
neighborhoods that do and do not have former prisoners among Dibao recipients is 35% (95%
confidence intervals of 3% to 64%)—this di↵erence is shown by the dashed line in the left panel of
Figure 6.2. In other words, the probability of complaints being a major challenge to the residents’
committee is higher among neighborhoods where Dibao recipients are former prisoners than in
neighborhoods where former prisoners are not among Dibao recipients.
In contrast, we do not see a di↵erence in the probability of complaints between neighobrhoods
where Dibao recipients do and do not include the disabled. In the right panel of Figure 6.2, the left-
most solid vertical line shows that the probability the residents’ committee reports complaints from
citizens as a major challenge to the Dibao program when Dibao recipients include the disabled is
21% (95% confidence intervals of 9% to 40%). The middle vertical line of the right panels shows
that this probability when the disabled are not among Dibao recipients is 32% (95% confidence
intervals 9% to 66%). The di↵erence in the probability of complaints between neighborhoods
where the disabled are among recipients and where they are not among Dibao recipients is -11%
(95% confidence interval of -41% to 14%). In other words, there is no statistically significant dif-
ference in the probability of complaints between neighborhoods with and without disabled Dibao
recipients.
State Institutions: One important observation is that although levels of complaints are higher for
neighborhoods engaged in selective welfare provision, this discontent is being expressed through
the residents’ committee. In other words, discontent is being funneled through government insti-
tutions. I do not have a measure of the actual level of disruption between neighborhoods that do
and do not engage in selective welfare provision. However, based on conversations with residents’
committees in both types of neighborhoods, I was not able to discern any particular di↵erences
over actual levels of protest and collective action.
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6.2.2 Pacifying Contention
There are two types of residents who express discontent over the distribution of Dibao benefits
in neighborhoods where selective welfare provision takes place: residents who think they should
be able to obtain Dibao, and residents who think the distribution of Dibao is unfair but who are
not looking to obtain Dibao for themselves. In order to rebu↵ demands and mitigate contention,
the residents’ committee needs to show those who demand Dibao why they are not eligible and
show both types of complainers why those who are receiving Dibao are deserving. Since selec-
tive welfare provision entails the provision of Dibao according to publicly stated eligibility criteria
and the unstated criteria of threatening social order, residents’ committee must be able to persuade
households that meet the first but not second criteria that their ineligibility for Dibao is only due to
their inability to meet the publicly stated criteria. Complex eligibility rules of the Dibao program,
the information extraction capabilities of neighborhoods that engage in selective welfare provi-
sion, and distributing Dibao only to potential disrupters together help residents’ committees pacify
complaints.
There are numerous rules related to the determination of eligibility for Dibao, and they change
over time. For example, in 2013, Henan province issued “Opinions on Further Improving Urban
and Rural Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme” (sé€ eZ}ŒaE⌘ N ;›
úÂ\Ñ✏¡) (Opinion) to elaborate on Dibao’s eligibility requirements for the province. The
Opinion states that households are eligible for Dibao if family members living together have com-
bined disposable income below the Dibao line during a stipulated time period, and if the house-
hold’s assets are in accordance with local provisions. The Opinion defines disposal income to
include wages, profit from business and sales transactions, income from assets, and any other
value transfers. Assets include all fixed and variable assets of all family members including cash,
savings, securities, collateral, vehicles, boats, housing, debt owned, and other assets. The Opinion
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explicitly states that any family owning more than two residences are automatically excluded.5
In terms of who constitutes family members, in Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan province, the
Zhengzhou Civil A↵airs Department says this can include any combination of spouses, parents,
children, paternal grandparents, maternal grandparents, as well as other individuals designated by
the civil a↵airs agency.6 There are numerous other directives and polices related to Dibao in the
city of Zhengzhou alone, but even this partial illustration shows that rules can be ad hoc, e.g, those
with more than two residences are automatically ineligible even if they fulfill the income and asset
criteria, and that rules can provide latitude for interpretation, e.g., what constitutes value transfers.
Given the complexity of rules and the complexity of individual circumstances, especially those
of potential Dibao applicants who are informally employed, income can be di cult to fully ascer-
tain and can be characterized in di↵erent ways. In other words, for two households with identical
economic situations, the residents’ committee can turn down the application while citing o cial
policies or help the applicant successfully obtain Dibao while conforming to policies. To illustrate
this, I use a hypothetical example, which combines facts from a number of interviews. Suppose
there is a family of three—a husband, a wife, and a child—who sees that their household income
falls below the Dibao line and approaches the residents’ committee about obtaining Dibao. This
family does not pose any threat to social order. A neighborhood engaged in selective welfare
provision can rebu↵ this applicant in a variety of ways. The residents’ committee might point to
their ownership of assets, from mobile phones to televisions, as evidence that their income must be
higher than the Dibao line, and turn down the application. The residents’ committee might point
to the extensive documentation and o cial chops required to verify income, but not provide any
assistance in completing these documents. If either adult in the household is informally employed,
it may not be possible to obtain the documentation required without assistance from the residents’
5For additional details see http://bit.ly/18LSkKt (Retrieved November 30, 2014).
6See http://bit.ly/1Cu8Nzq (Retrieved November 30, 2014).
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committee, and the application is rejected. If somehow the family is able to painstakingly obtain
the required chops and documents, its application can still be turned town if its income varies by
month, sometimes falling much below the Dibao line and other times above. Now, let’s say this
hypothetical family has no assets, has collected all the required documentation, and whose monthly
income is always below the Dibao line, its application can still be turned down if it obtains finan-
cial assistance from extended family members. In order words, an extremely impoverished family
receives help from relatives in order to get by, but this familial assistance is a value transfer that
puts its monthly “income” over the Dibao threshold, and the application is refused.
Now, let’s change the example very slightly so that this family of three is a potential threat
to social order. In this slightly altered example, the economic circumstances of the family remain
exactly the same. If the family has expensive assets or assistance from extended family that shift its
income above the Dibao line, the residents’ committee might tell the family to move the o↵ending
assets somewhere else and stop the transfer of outside assets during the application review period.
The residents’ committee can provide assistance in obtaining o cials chops and making sure all
of the required documentation is in order. If the family is engaged in informal employment, the
residents’ committee, which assesses its income, can smooth fluctuations so monthly averages do
not exceed the Dibao line.
While complex eligibility rules help residents’ committees turn away prospective applicants,
the information extraction capabilities of neighborhoods and the provision of Dibao to households
who have yet to engage in disruption help the residents’ committee demonstrate how current Dibao
recipients meet the eligibility criteria. Residents’ committees share with those who complain the
extensive documentation related to current recipients. They tell stories about the financial di -
culty faced by Dibao recipients, and contrast their plight to households not receiving Dibao. For
example, let’s say a resident comes to complain that the Dibao recipients in the neighborhood are
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good-for-nothing hooligans who are able-bodied, and should find jobs rather than rely on Dibao;
let’s also say that one of the recipients in question is a former prisoner who receives Dibao because
he is in financial straights but also because he is thinking of petitioning. The residents’ committee
might tell the complainer stories of how the recipient was imprisoned because of bad luck, how the
recipient su↵ered greatly while in prison, how the recipient faces discrimination as an ex-convict,
how the recipient is unable to find employment because prison interrupted his education, and how
he is trying to gain new skills so he can find a job. This information is likely all true, but a residents’
committee that has information extraction capabilities can make a compelling case for di↵erences
in deservingness, and unless the complainer also has access to detailed information about relative
circumstances of residents in the neighborhood, it is di cult for those complaining to know that
selective provision is happening.
The complexity of Dibao’s eligibility rules combined with the ambiguity of individual circum-
stances give residents’ committees flexibility in selecting and deflecting applicants while adhering
strictly to policy as long as residents are at an information disadvantage. If this is not the case,
it would be much easier for complainers to see that being poor may not be a su cient condition
to receive Dibao. For example, if those demanding Dibao are fully informed about the in’s and
out’s of Dibao policy as well as the detailed situation of families receiving Dibao relative to their
own financial situation, it would be much harder for the residents’ committee to persuade them
that they are not eligible for purely economic reasons. In other words, only when residents have
less information than the residents’ committee can the regime hope to hide the strategic function
of Dibao provision and convince dissatisfied residents that the decisions behind Dibao distribu-
tion are based solely on economic circumstances. This dynamic resembles game theory models of
cheap-talk persuasion, where if the receiver (resident) has an information disadvantage, the sender
(residents’ committee) can always to a some extent engage in e↵ective persuasion. If the receiver
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knows all of the information, deception can never be e↵ective (Crawford and Sobel 1982).
While most residents’ committees seemed capable of handling resident complaints, dealing
with complaints is time consuming and resource intensive. To avoid escalation, residents’ commit-
tee members have to take time to deal with those who come to complain. In one case in Qingdao,
in order to persuade a resident that he was not eligible for Dibao, members of the residents’ com-
mittee and block captains visited the man every day, up to three time a day for a week. Though
less extreme than this example, residents’ committee members often talk about making follow-up
visits to the homes of those who are unhappy about Dibao in order to placate them.
Interviews with residents’ committees also revealed some failures, where discontent over Dibao
provision escalated into disruption and violence. The party secretary of a neighborhood inWuhan’s
Jianghan district described a resident who threatened to commit suicide by jumping o↵ his building
over the unfairness of not being able to obtain Dibao while others did. This individual approached
the residents’ committee repeatedly, and the residents’ committee could not convince him that he
was ineligible. In the end, he threatened suicide. In another example from Zhengzhou, residents
angry over the allocation of Dibao moved beyond threats to action. Several residents banded
together to block the entryway into the residents’ committee, and threatened to physically harm
the families of residents’ committee members living in the neighborhood. At the time of my
fieldwork, public security o cials had stepped in, but the situation had not been resolved.
In addition to placating residents who complain about the fairness of distribution, residents’
committees also engage in more general forms of propaganda in neighborhoods with selective
welfare provision. Propaganda can take the form of advertisements and posters about the Dibao
program and its success in bulletin boards around the neighborhood. Propaganda can also take the
form of meetings, called “Dibao Policy Propaganda Meetings” (N›?V£ ⇢) that publicize
Dibao policies, the number of Dibao households in the neighborhood, and the importance of Dibao
125
Chapter 6. Dilemma of Redistribution
to social stability. Often these meetings have speakers from the Street O ce, Civil A↵airs bureaus,
as well as the leaders of the residents’ committee. This propaganda aims to improve the general
goodwill of residents toward the Dibao program.
Neighborhood survey: Perhaps due to a combination of targeted e↵orts to pacify discontent and
general e↵orts to improve perceptions of the Dibao program, even though residents’ committees in
neighborhoods engaged in selective welfare provision are more likely to report receiving resident
complaints as a challenge, residents in neighborhoods with and without selective welfare provision
have similar level of general satisfaction with the Dibao program.
There is a rhyme about the equitable distribution of Dibao that “those who deserve to get
Dibao should get Dibao,” or in Chinese yingbao jinbao (î›=›). When the Dibao program
in a given place is described as yingbao jinbao, it is a sign that Dibao is implemented fairly.
To determine general satisfaction with Dibao, residents surveyed were asked whether they felt
that their neighborhood had achieved yingbao jinbao. These responses were aggregated for each
neighborhoods so that if a majority of residents surveyed thought that a neighborhood had achieved
yingbao jinbao, the neighborhood is denoted as one that is generally satisfied with Dibao, and if a
majority of residents interviewed did not think the neighborhood had achieved yingbao jinbao, the
neighborhood is denoted as one that is not satisfied with Dibao.
Figure 6.3 shows that general satisfaction with the Dibao program is high across neighbor-
hoods, including those where Dibao recipients include former prisoners and neighborhoods with-
out former prisoners as Dibao recipients. The dashed vertical line in the figure crossing zero shows
that there no statistically significant di↵erence in the level of satisfaction between neighborhoods
with and without former prisoners as Dibao recipients. Perhaps because complaints come from a
small subset of residents and because neighborhoods engage in propaganda activities to improve
overall perceptions of the program, neighborhoods where the residents’ committee reports com-
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Figure 6.3: Probability of general satisfaction with Dibao among residents; 90% confidence intervals.
plaints being a major challenge of the Dibao program have similar levels of general satisfaction
with the Dibao program as neighborhoods where complaints are less of a problem.
6.3 Discussion
The goal of selective welfare provision is to preempt threats to social order by targeting benefits
to those who have the potential to engage in disruptive behavior. Although the dilemma of redis-
tribution is unavoidable—i.e., redistribution comes hand in hand with contention, obscuring the
instrumental function of redistribution helps decrease the chance that individuals threaten disrup-
tion in order to obtain benefits and decrease the chance that anger over the inequity of distribution
intensifies into protest. Through complex rules of eligibility, strong information extraction ca-
pabilities, and by directing Dibao benefits to households who are potentially disruptive but also
fulfill the program’s eligibility criteria, residents are at an information disadvantage relative to the
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regime.
For now, residents’ committees can, for the most part, convince residents that the strategic
exchange of benefits for inertia is not taking place. For now, complaints are funneled through
the residents’ committee. However, the distribution of Dibao is a publicly observable action that
can reveal information to residents, and dealing with discontent over the distribution of Dibao is
a time and resource intensive task that places heavy burdens on the residents’ committee. In the
concluding chapter, I turn to the conditions for the longevity of selective welfare provision and its
future prospects.
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Conclusion
This dissertation began with the puzzle of why two nearby neighborhoods, Golden Beach Road and
Lagoon Harbor, seemed to be using di↵erent criteria in the selection of beneficiaries for the Dibao
program. This variation can be explained by selective welfare provision—the selective provision
of benefits to preempt threats of social disruption. Chapter 3 shows how benefits are distributed
before sensitive time periods when the threat of disruption is perceived to be high and in places
where the threat of disruption is believed to be greater in order to decrease incentives to engage
in protest and collective action. Chapter 4 demonstrates how applicants are much more likely to
receive government responses to their requests for Dibao if their complaint includes the threat of
collective action. Chapter 5 shows that some neighborhoods provide Dibao to those who not only
face economic hardship but have greater potential to disrupt social order.
These data show how information plays a critical role in enabling selective welfare provision.
In the absence of specific information, the distribution of ad hoc benefits described in Chapter 3 is
based on heuristics. In Chapters 4 and 5, individual level information obtained through di↵erent
channels—complaints and grassroots informants—allow the regime to identify individuals who
have the potential to be disruptive.
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Selective welfare provision is a phenomenon that can be seen at all levels of government—
Chapter 2 describes the goals of the national policy in maintaining social stability. Chapter 3
provides evidence of selective welfare provision at the city level. In Chapter 4, the phenomenon is
at play at the county (district) level, and in Chapter 5 at the grassroots level of the neighborhood.
7.1 Beyond China
Selective welfare provision changes our previous understandings of the role of social policies
and welfare in authoritarian regimes by expanding the objective of provision beyond maintain-
ing regime survival to preventing social disruption. Selective welfare provision is motivated by the
desire of elites to maintain their social, economic, and political advantages. While social disrup-
tion can escalate into threats that put the durability of the regime at risk, the types of actions—
individual petitioning, small scale collective action, geographically localized protest over eco-
nomic grievances—that selective welfare provision aims to preempt do not directly threaten the
stability of the regime. Said another way, the goal of maintaining social order is broader than
regime survival—a regime can hold on to power even if there is social disorder, but it would be
di cult for a regime facing constant internal unrest and turmoil to pursue goals such as economic
development.
The fear of disruption extends beyond authoritarian regimes to transitional systems and even
democracies. Recent events in the U.S., from Occupy to Ferguson, clearly reveal the interest polit-
ical leaders have in enforcing social order and mitigating disruption. In OccupyWall Street, Mayor
Bloomberg explained his 1AM eviction of protesters from Zucotti Park by saying “This action was
taken at this time of day to reduce the risk of confrontation in the park, and to minimize disruption
to the surrounding neighborhood” and the eviction was prompted by concern that “the occupation
was coming to pose a health and fire safety hazard to the protestors and to the surrounding com-
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munity.”1 In Ferguson, Missouri, tactics from curfew to the deployment of thousands of national
guard troops were used in response to violence and disruption in the aftermath of the Michael
Brown shooting.
Likewise, examples of rewards being distributed preemptively to ward o↵ disruption have been
described in many di↵erence places and contexts. Gulf states have been described as “co-opting
potential opposition leaders with wealth, jobs, and high-status positions” (Byman and Green 1999).
In Cote d’Ivoire, President Houphouet-Boigny bolstered his regime by “buying-o↵ potential com-
petitors” (Le Billon 2003). Congo’s relative poverty is said to have made it easy for Mobutu to
“buy o↵ potential challengers” (Acemoglu, Verdier and Robinson 2004). In the Javanese sultanate,
courtiers were bought o↵ with favors, and some argue that Sukarno did the same in his “Guilded
Democracy” (Crouch 1979). After coming to power in 1969, Qaddafi used gains from nationaliz-
ing oil revenues, “buying o↵ powerful tribal chiefs who might otherwise have been a threat to his
rule” (Ross 2011).
In addition to awarding benefits to elites, there are also examples of preemptive distribution
of rewards to the masses. President Houphouet-Boigny redistributed resources from the Christian,
urbanized south to the Muslim north (Le Billon 2003). Huntington theorized that land reform could
preempt peasant support for revolution (Huntington 1968). At the end of World War II, business
elites in the Philippines bought o↵ landless peasants through patronage ties (Scott 1977). Land
reform in Peru after the 1968 coup and in El Salvador after the 1979 coup was intended to preempt
popular support for rural insurgencies (Mason 1998).
In describing strategies for deregulation, Tullock (1978) suggests the process could proceed
with less opposition if monopolies were bought o↵ rather than made to su↵er losses. Brown and
Paul (1999) attribute the success of a 1996 tax increase to fund new stadiums for the Cincinnati
Bengals and Reds in part to distribution of benefits to teachers unions and religious groups to
1From http://on.nyc.gov/1BoFNna (Retrieved January 28, 2015).
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prevent their opposition.
However, although these examples use words such as preempt, prevent, potential opponents,
and potential challengers, they do not always make clear distinctions between who constitutes a
supporter, a potential opponent, and an actual opponent. The terms opponent and potential oppo-
nent are used interchangeably, and sometime buying support is equated with buying o↵ opposition.
Just as di↵erentiating among supporters, swing voters, and opponents helps improve our under-
standing of the dynamics and outcomes of electoral competition, clearly distinguishing among the
well-behaved, potential disrupters, and the ill-behaved helps us to better understand redistributive
choices and political outcomes in contexts without electoral competition.
Redistributing to di↵erent populations has di↵erent costs and benefits. The well-behaved may
be easy to identify, and targeting benefits to everyone who is well-behaved could create incentives
for potential disrupters and the ill-behaved to become well-behaved, but distributing to this group
could entail very large transfers and may not be feasible if a country has a sizable population rel-
ative to its access to resources. Targeting transfers to the ill-behaved results in the dilemma of
redistribution, creating incentives for others to engage in protest and collective action in order to
obtain benefits. Redistributing to potential disrupters before they take action decreases their incen-
tives to take these undesirable actions, and limits redistributive e↵orts to a narrower segment of
society. However, it may be di cult to identify potential disrupters, and although the exchange of
rewards for compliance is less obvious than rewarding the ill-behaved, distributing to the popula-
tion of potential disrupters could also generate incentives for others to threaten disruption in order
to obtain rewards.
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7.2 Conditions for Selective Welfare Provision
Additional research is needed to determine when and where selective welfare provision is used
outside of the Chinese context. However, this empirical study of the Dibao program provides some
insights into when selective welfare provision is more likely to take place. First, selective welfare
provision depends on sensitivity to social disruption. Not all countries are equally apprehensive of
social disorder, and this variation may have less to do with regime type than with the structure of
the economy. Perhaps authoritarian regimes with a relatively advanced, capitalist economies like
China, Russia, or Singapore are most likely to utilize selective provision, but perhaps capitalist
democracies like Mexico and Malaysia are more more likely to employ selective welfare provision
than poor non-democratic regimes like Cambodia or Chad.
Second, whether selective welfare provision might be used as a strategy could depend on a
regime’s ability to identify potential disrupters and the availability of resources relative to the size
of its population. As the experience of Dibao in China shows, identifying potential disrupters re-
quires channels for obtaining information. Whether these are channels for capturing complaints
or a grassroots surveillance network, this capacity can be di cult and expensive to develop. For
regimes that are wealthy relative to the size of their population, for example the Gulf states, redis-
tributing to the population at large may be preferred to devoting resources to identify those who are
potentially disruptive. That said, given their level of wealth, perhaps these regimes would utilize
selective welfare provision on top of broader redistributive e↵orts.
One important consideration in studying selective welfare provision is that it is not easy to iden-
tify because it is designed in part to conceal its instrumental function. Looking only at the descrip-
tion of policies is unlikely to reveal patterns of selectivity. On the surface, Dibao is a means-tested
non-conditional cash transfer program whose explicit aim is to provide a minimum level of income
for all. Only by examining its actual outcomes—who is receiving benefits, when, and where—is
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the selectivity of distributive choices revealed. In China’s Dibao program, selective welfare pro-
vision occurs through a public social policy scheme with complex rules for eligibility. All around
the world there are social policy schemes with complex tests of deservedness—examples include
Brazil, Mexico, India, and the U.S. which as of 2012 had 79 means tested welfare programs.2 Are
benefits of these programs distributed selectively to preempt threats to social order?
7.3 Future Prospects
The empirical results of this dissertation reveal the inherent tension in redistributive e↵orts that
have instrumental goals. Whenever benefits are distributed to prevent an action the regime deems
undesirable, it generates perverse incentives for individuals to engage in that action in order to ob-
tain rewards. Given the dilemma of redistribution and the moral hazard and information problems
associated with repression (Haber 2007; Wintrobe 1998), what strategies are left for authoritarian
regime to maintain order and survival?
Selective welfare provision is one attempt to redistribute strategically that tries to ameliorate
the dilemma of redistribution by hiding its instrumental goals. However, doing so requires a great
deal of resources—to identify the right targets for benefits, to persuade and pacify those who are
discontent over the distribution of benefits. Is this strategy e↵ective in mitigating disruption? Is
this strategy sustainable in the long run?
Additional research, both theoretical and empirical, is needed to fully answer these questions,
but a factor that is critical in the continuation of selective welfare provision and to its success is
information. Without access to private information, selective welfare provision is not possible.
Our journey into neighborhoods shows how di cult it is to obtain this private information, but that
may change dramatically with technological developments, which are already underway.
2See http://herit.ag/1EKKON5 (Retrieved January 12, 2015).
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Technologies that people all around the world are using on a daily basis—smartphones, email,
social media, GPS services, applications tracking everything from calories consumed to gas sta-
tions visited—are generating huge amounts of detailed, individual-level information that is be-
coming cheaper to store and process. Although the free flow of information can empower citizens
and dissidents, autocratic and democratic regimes alike are increasingly engaged in analyzing and
using this information for strategic purposes. Just as companies use access to large-scale data
as well as statistical and computational methods to monitor, predict and change the behavior of
their customers, so regimes do the same for their subjects. State control over growing amounts of
detailed, real-time, individual-level information has the capacity to put individuals at a huge infor-
mation disadvantage, which in turn allows regimes to engage in actions such as selective welfare
provision to protect their political, economic, and social advantages by buying inertia.
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Additional Tables and Figures
A.1 Additional Tables for Chapter 3
Table A.1: OLS regression of the number of ad hoc benefits in 2012 on the number of minority groups.
Model (2) is used to estimate expected probability of ad hoc benefits found in the left panel of Figure 3.6
Dependent variable Ad hoc benefits in 2012
(1) (2)
(Intercept) -10.127 -15.420
(10.453) (11.1)
Number of non-Han minorities 0.400 0.581
(0.218) (0.247)
Controls
Fiscal Revenue 30.040
(25.45)
City Pop below Dibao Line -0.001
(0)
Population over 65 years -6.855
(63.36)
Reported Protests -0.073
(0.161)
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Table A.2: OLS regression of the number of ad hoc benefits in 2012 on the number of minority groups.
Model (2) is used to estimate expected probability of ad hoc benefits found in the right panel of Figure 3.6
Dependent variable Ad hoc benefits in 2012
(1) (2)
(Intercept) -5.234 -5.487
(3.904) (4.408)
Number of non-Han minorities 0.140 0.226
(0.081) (0.098)
Controls
Fiscal Revenue 0.000
(0.000)
City Pop Below Dibao Line -9.366
(10.110)
Population over 65 years -28.720
(25.160)
Reported Protests -0.118
(0.064)
Table A.3: OLS regression of the number of ad hoc benefits in 2012 on the number of minority groups.
Model (2) is used to estimate expected probability of ad hoc benefits found in Figure 3.8
Dependent variable Ad hoc benefits in 2012
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 19.807 12.437
(3.838) (7.429)
Population of Ethnic Group Prone to Protest 1.109 0.905
(0.556) (0.594)
Controls
Fiscal Revenue -0.000
(0.000)
City Pop below Dibao Line 18.971
(27.676)
Population over 65 years 54.555
(62.183)
Reported Protests 0.151
(0.150)
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A.2 Additional Tables for Chapter 4
Table A.4 shows the causal e↵ect of collective action on government responses, including con-
trol variables and provincial dummies for the set of all counties (unconditional) and for the set of
counties where posts were successfully posted (conditional).1 Control variables include log popu-
lation, the proportion of non-agricultural households, the proportion of permanent urban residents,
average years of education, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of ethnic minorities for the
county in 2010.
Table A.4: The causal e↵ect of treatment on government response
Dependent variable Government response (0 or 1)
Unconditional Conditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T1: collective action threat 0.077 0.075 0.074 0.101 0.101 0.102
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Constant 0.232 0.233 0.092 0.320 0.321 0.176
(0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Provincial dummies YES YES
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,103 2,103 2103
Columns 1 to 3 of Table A.4 show the results for all Chinese counties (unconditional models),
where the coe cient estimates represent the causal e↵ect of treatments on government response.
In Column 1, government response is regressed on the treatment indicator. The model in Column
2 performs the same analysis with the addition of control variables, showing that the coe cient
estimates are very stable. Finally, the model in column 3 includes provincial dummy variables in
addition to control variables, and again the coe cient estimates remain stable.
1Results are based on regression adjustment. Treatment dummmies and demeaned covariates as well as their in-
teractions with the treatment dummies are included in the regressions [CITE Lin2013]. Huber White robust standard
errors are shown, though errors are virtually identical without using robust standard errors. Moreover, because treat-
ment conditions are randomly assigned within each province (the variations of treatment are at the county level),
standard errors clustered at the provincial level are qualitatively the same as those in Table A.4.
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Columns 4 to 6 of Table A.4 show the results for Chinese counties where requests were suc-
cessfully submitted to the government web forum (conditional models). Column 4 shows the
regression of government response on the treatment, similar to the unconditional model in column
1. Column 5 shows the regression of government response on treatment variables and control
variables and Column 6 includes provincial dummy variables in addition to treatment and control
variables. As expected, the causal e↵ects of the treatment increase in the conditional models, but
remain very stable with the inclusion of control and provincial dummy variables. Together, the
models in Table A.4 show that these results are robust whether the analysis is based on all counties
or the subset of counties where posts were successfully made. Threats of collective action generate
greater responsiveness from county governments.
Table A.5 shows the causal e↵ect of threatening collective action on public responses, which
are also robust to the inclusion of control variables and location dummies.
Table A.5: The causal e↵ect of treatment on publicly viewable response
Dependent variable Publicly viewable response (0 or 1)
Unditional Conditional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T1: collective action threat 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.106 0.107 0.108
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant 0.153 0.154 0.046 0.212 0.211 0.097
(0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.03)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Provincial dummies YES YES
Observations 2,869 2,869 2,869 2,103 2,103 2,103
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A.3 Additional Tables for Chapter 5
Table A.6 shows the results of three model specifications predicting whether former prisoners are
among Dibao households—models (1) to (3), and whether disabled are among Dibao households—
models (4) to (6). Since both dependent variables are binary, logistic regression is used. Three
Table A.6: Logistic regression of Dibao recipients
Dependent variable Dibao recipients: ex prisoners Dibao recipients: disabled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Intercept) -0.916 -1.834 1.157 -0.588 -2.507 -3.605
(0.592) (1.134) (1.872) (0.558) (1.378) (1.982)
Information extraction 1.531 1.648 1.820 -1.564 -2.634 -2.780
(0.884) (0.942) (1.03) (0.786) (1.011) (1.061)
Control variables
Resident familiarity -2.926 1.072
(1.472) (1.371)
Neighborhood age 2.0⇥10 4 1.7⇥10 4 2.7⇥10 4 4.0⇥10 4
(1.3⇥10 4) (1.3⇥10 4) (1.3⇥10 4) (1.3⇥10 4)
Apartments for rent -0.434 -1.325 2.659 2.917
(0.929) (1.101) (1.225) (1.274)
Rural hukou 0.502 1.552 -0.079 -0.413
(1.515) (1.631) (1.518) (1.591)
City dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70
model specifications are included for each analysis. The first model specification, model (1) and
model (4), include only the variable of information extraction, and city dummy variables. City
dummy variables are included since cities have the authority over Dibao policy for their locality.
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These two models show that information extraction capacity positively predicts the presence of
former prisoners among Dibao recipients (result is statistically significant at the 10% level) while
information extraction capacity negatively predicts the presence of the disabled among Dibao re-
cipient (result is statistically significant at the 5% level). In model (2) and (5), control variables
that proxy for income, including neighborhood age, rental apartments, and residents with rural
residential permits, are included. These proxies for income control for the possibility that income
influences the composition of Dibao recipients—for example that information extraction capabili-
ties are higher in lower income neighborhoods, which have more former prisoners among residents.
It is likely that the distribution of disabled person correlates with income, thus income proxies are
included in both analyses. The result that information extraction positively predicts the presence
of former prisoners and negatively predicts the presence of disabled among Dibao recipients is
unchanged with the addition of income proxies. Finally, the third model specification, model (3)
and model (6) include resident familiarity as an additional control. Based on qualitative analysis,
neighborhoods where residents are familiar with each other are more vocal in their opinions about
Dibao recipients. Indeed, resident familiarity negatively predicts the presence of former prisoners
among Dibao recipients (result is significant at the 5% level), but the e↵ect of state penetration on
former prisoners and disabled among Dibao recipients remains unchanged in model (3) and model
(6), respectively.
A.4 Additional Tables for Chapter 6
Table A.7 shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is whether or not
complaints from residents is a major challenge in implementing the Dibao program. Across all
three model specifications, when Dibao recipients include former prisoners, complaints are more
likely to be reported. In other words, when former prisoners are recipients of Dibao, residential
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committees are more likely to receive complaints from residents about the implementation of the
Dibao program, but having the disabled as recipients of Dibao has no e↵ect on complaints from
residents. Model (1) includes the two explanatory variables, whether former prisoners are among
Table A.7: Complaints about Dibao
Dependent variable Complaints about dibao
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) -1.101 -0.638 -1.188
(0.521) (0.667) (1.03)
Former prisoners 1.896 1.719 1.486
(0.734) (0.775) (0.808)
Disabled -0.633 -0.423 -0.703
(0.621) (0.708) (0.804)
Controls YES
City Dummies YES YES
Observations 70 70 70
Dibao recipients and whether the disabled are among Dibao recipients. This model shows that
when former prisoners are among Dibao recipients, the residential committee is more likely to
report that complaints from residents pose a major challenge to the Dibao program (this result is
statistically significant at the 1% level). Model (2) includes dummy variables for city fixed ef-
fects, and relationship between having former prisoners among Dibao recipients and the challenge
of citizen complaints to the residential committee holds (statistically significant at the 5% level).
Finally, Model (3) includes control variables—the age of the neighborhood, whether rental apart-
ments are available in the neighborhood, and whether residents include those with rural residential
permits,2 and the e↵ect of former prisoners among Dibao recipients on complaints received by the
2For additional discussion of control variables see Chapter 5.
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residential committee remains positive (statistically significant at the 10% level).
In terms of general satisfaction with Dibao, Table A.8 shows that having former prisoners
among Dibao recipients does not correspond to a decline in general satisfaction with the neigh-
borhood’s Dibao program. In other words, the neighborhood survey shows that general levels of
Table A.8: General satisfaction with Dibao
Dependent variable Generally satisfied
(1) (2) (3)
(Intercept) 0.693 1.482 2.213
(0.261) (0.784) (1.229)
Ex prisoners 1.705 1.767 2.093
(1.077) (1.147) (1.278)
Controls YES
City Dummies YES YES
Observations 70 70 70
satisfaction toward the Dibao program are similar between neighborhoods where Dibao recipients
include former prisoners and neighborhoods that do not.
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